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Private Farms, Public Power:
Governing the Lives of Dairy Cattle
Jessica Eisen*
Abstract
It is widely assumed that laws governing dairy production
include substantial protection of animals’ interests—that in some
way the state is regulating the treatment of farmed animals and
protecting them against the worst excesses of their owners’ selfinterest. In fact, across jurisdictions in Canada and the United States,
the standards governing farmed animal protection are not established
by elected lawmakers or appointed regulators, but are instead
primarily defined by private, interested parties, including producers
themselves. As scholars of animal law have noted, this has
contributed to weak and ineffectual legal protection of the interests
of farmed animals. The present study will focus on a distinct, though
related, difficulty arising from the de facto or de jure delegation of
standard-setting authority to animal industries. Not only does this
delegation result in less stringent standards, but it also works to erode
crucial public law values, such as transparency, accountability and
impartiality.
This limitation of public law values poses a deep structural
threat to animal interests, especially in light of animals’ particular
dependence on public law for their protection. Animals are excluded
from private law protections, and from direct access to conventional
means of legal and political participation, leaving them without legal
avenues to press their interests as individuals. Effective animal
protection therefore requires that the human beings who advocate for
animal interests have meaningful access to standard-setting
processes. Such meaningful access is facilitated where public law
values assure transparent, accountable and impartial decisionmaking. For this reason, the assignment of standard-setting authority
to private producers, and the attendant diminution of public law
values, is of special concern in the animal protection context. This
*

Jessica Eisen is an Assistant Professor at the University of Alberta Faculty of
Law. The author extends her sincerest thanks to her co-editors on this volume,
Erum Sattar and Xiaoqian Hu, for their energy and enthusiasm throughout this
project, and for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks
are owed also to the University of Alberta’s Kule Institute for Advanced Studies
and to the University of Arizona for supporting an extremely helpful workshop in
connection with this volume. The author is grateful to all the participants in that
workshop and, in particular, the discussants Albertina Antognini and Andrew
Woods for sharing their reactions to an earlier draft.
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article will chart the operation of private power in setting standards
for the protection of dairy cattle and identify the damage this
privatized authority does to public law values. The article will
tentatively suggest in conclusion that high levels of privatization in
standard-setting may reflect a public desire to be comforted by the
idea of regulation, tempered by an underlying ambivalence
respecting the practical consequences of meaningful legal oversight.
I. Introduction
At the heart of the Canadian and US dairy industries are
cows: millions of living, feeling creatures, whose lives are shaped,
from birth to death, by our collective decision to use their bodies in
food production. It is widely assumed that laws governing dairy
production include substantial protection of these animals’
interests—that in some way the state is regulating the treatment of
farmed animals and protecting them against the worst excesses of
their owners’ self-interest.1 In fact, across jurisdictions in Canada
and the United States, the standards governing farmed animal
protection are not elaborated by elected lawmakers or appointed
regulators, but are instead primarily defined by private, interested
parties, including producers themselves.
As scholars of animal law have noted, this has contributed to
weak and ineffectual legal protection of the interests of farmed
animals.2 The present study will focus on a distinct, though related,
difficulty arising from the de facto or de jure delegation of standardsetting authority to animal industries. Not only does this delegation
result in less stringent standards, but it also works to erode crucial
public law values, such as transparency, accountability and
impartiality. This limitation of public law values poses a deep
structural threat to animal interests, especially in light of animals’
particular dependence on public law for their protection. Animals
are excluded from private law protections, and from direct access to
conventional means of legal and political participation, leaving them
without legal avenues to press their interests as individuals. Effective
animal protection therefore requires that the human beings who
advocate for animal interests have meaningful access to standardsetting processes. Such meaningful access is facilitated where public
1

David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals,
Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, 205, 206, 226 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (describing a widespread “presumption that the
law currently provides some basic legal protection for animals, even if there is
skepticism about its effectiveness or enforcement”).
2
See id.
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law values assure transparent, accountable and impartial decisionmaking. For this reason, the assignment of standard-setting authority
to private producers, and the attendant diminution of public law
values, is of special concern in the animal protection context.
This article will offer a descriptive account of farmed animal
protection regimes across Canada and the United States, with a
particular focus on dairy cattle. The article will further advance a
normative critique of privatized standard-setting in this sphere given
animals’ particular vulnerabilities. Part II will describe the
regulatory context under consideration: the lives and well-being of
dairy cattle in Canada and the United States. Part III will confront
the complexity of the supposed public/private distinction in law,
drawing on scholarship in feminist legal theory and comparative
administrative law. Despite the instability of these categories,
however, this Part will argue that the identification of public and
private authority—and the related operation (or not) of public law
values—remains salient in the animal protection context. In
particular, animals’ exclusion from private law protections and from
formal access to legal and political institutions make public law and
public law values (including transparency, impartiality and
accountability) critical to effective animal protection.
With this framework in place, Part IV will offer a description
of regulatory approaches to dairy cattle protection in the United
States and Canada, with an emphasis on the role of private actors in
legal standard-setting in these jurisdictions. This Part will reveal
that, although a variety of regulatory mechanisms exist across
jurisdictions, private standard-setting is commonly employed,
supplanting crucial public law functions and values. The Conclusion
will reflect on why, despite the significance of public law values to
animal protection, private power over legal standard-setting persists.
Tentatively, this Conclusion will suggest that the present legal
landscape may reflect a public desire to be comforted by the idea of
regulation, tempered by an underlying ambivalence respecting the
practical consequences of meaningful legal oversight.
II. Milk and the Lives of Dairy Cattle
The lives of cows in the Canadian and U.S. dairy industries
are controlled by human beings, from their broadest contours to their
most minute details.3 The choices of cows themselves—respecting
whether and how to care for their young, when and with whom to
3

Jessica Eisen, Milked: Nature, Necessity, and American Law, 34 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 71, 106–109 (2019).
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have sex, and how to live in community with their herds—are highly
constrained.4 Their bodies are surgically altered, physically
restrained, and continually manipulated to facilitate the production
and extraction of their nursing materials.5 The human actors whose
decisions so thoroughly shape these animals’ lives range from the
farmers who own these cows as a matter of private law to participants
in the dense networks of public administration that govern the
production and sale of dairy products.
The calves of dairy cows are generally separated from their
mothers immediately after birth.6 Male calves are usually auctioned
to be slaughtered for veal.7 Female calves spend their early days
isolated in individual hutches, then spend a period in group housing,
before they are old enough for their first insemination.8 Many cows
are subject to painful physical modifications designed to support
their use in dairying. These include the “disbudding” or removal of
horns to reduce the risk of injury arising from their confinement in
close proximity;9 the cutting of “supernumerary” or inconveniently

4

Id. Animals, of course, retain their agency in the face of human constraints,
resisting coercion and refusing instructions. See Jason C. Hribal, Animals, Agency,
and Class: Writing the History of Animals from Below, 14 HUM. ECOLOGY
REV. 101, 103 (2007) (observing that “[f]aking ignorance, rejection of commands
. . . foot-dragging . . . breaking equipment” and other tactics constitute forms of
resistance employed by animals against human beings); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 263, 270 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2004) (“Do animals dissent from human hegemony? I think they
often do. They vote with their feet by running away. They bite back, scream in
alarm, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim off.”); cf. JOCELYNE
PORCHER, THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL LABOUR: A COLLABORATIVE UTOPIA 116 (2017)
(explaining that cattle apply their “affective and cognitive capacities to work” in
order to “collaborate” in certain milking processes).
5
Eisen, supra note 3, at 106–109.
6
Kathrin Wagner, Daniel Seitner, Kerstin Barth, Rupert Palme, Andreas Futschik
& Susanne Waiblinger, Effects of Mother versus Artificial Rearing During the
First 12 Weeks of Life on Challenge Responses of Dairy Cows, 164 APPLIED
ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 1, 2 (2015).
7
Kathryn Gillespie, Sexualized Violence and the Gendered Commodification of the
Animal Body in Pacific Northwest US Dairy Production, 21 GENDER, PLACE &
CULTURE 1321, 1327 (2014).
8
Eisen, supra note 3, at 107.
9
See Erin Mintline, Mairi Stewart, Andrea Rogers, Neil Cox, Gwyneth Verkerk,
Joseph Stookey, James Webster & Cassandra Tucker, Play Behavior as an
Indicator of Animal Welfare: Disbudding in Dairy Calves, 144 APPLIED ANIMAL
BEHAV. SCI. 22, 23 (2013).
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placed teats;10 and the “docking” or amputation of their tails to
improve cleanliness and access to their udders.11
To stimulate milk production, dairy cows are repeatedly
impregnated, almost always through artificial insemination.12 When
their calves are born, they are taken away immediately to be raised
for dairy or veal according to their sex.13 While lactating, many cows
are held in “tie-stall” housing systems, in which they are closely
chained at the neck in individual stalls just large enough to allow
them to lie down or stand up.14 A feeding trough runs in front of the
cows, and a waste trough runs behind them.15 Such tie-stall housing
is often supported by the use of “electric trainers” that hover over the
cows and administer a shock if they move their bodies into positions
that might allow them to defecate outside the designated trough.16
When no longer considered productive, dairy cows are slaughtered,
often after being transported many hours by truck without access to
water or rest on their journey.17 Dairy cows are generally slaughtered
between 4-6 years of age, well below their life expectancy (if not
slaughtered) of 15-20 years.18
Cows are intelligent, social animals, and there is strong
evidence that many of these practices cause serious physical and
emotional harm. It is widely agreed, for example, that separation of
these mammals from their young is a source of “distress” or “stress”
10

ROGER W. BLOWEY & A. DAVID WEAVER, COLOR ATLAS OF DISEASES AND
DISORDERS OF CATTLE 203 (3rd ed. 2011) (explaining that supernumerary teats “are
unsightly, may interfere with milking, and can develop mastitis” and so are
“normally removed with curved scissors early in life”).
11
See Literature Review on the Welfare Implications of Tail Docking of
Cattle, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N (Aug. 2014),
https://www.avma.org/resources-tools/literature-reviews/welfare-implications-taildocking-cattle; Tail Docking of Dairy Cattle: Position Statement, CAN.
VETERINARY MED. ASS’N (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://www.canadianveterinarians.net/documents/tail-docking-of-dairy-cattle;
W. K. Fulwider, T. Grandin, B. E. Rollin, T. E. Engle, N. L. Dalsted & W. D.
Lamm, Survey of Dairy Management Practices on One Hundred Thirteen North
Central and Northeastern United States Dairies, 91 J. DAIRY SCI. 1686, 1688
(2008).
12
Eisen, supra note 3, at 107.
13
See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
14
Eisen, supra note 3, at 108.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 109.
17
See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 208; Curb the Cruelty: Canada’s Farm
Animal Transport System in Need of Repair, WORLD SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION
OF ANIMALS 4 (2010), https://www.animalalliance.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/report-WSPA-Curb-the-Cruelty-Report.pdf.
18
Eisen, supra note 3, at 109.

2020]

PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER

163

(to use the parlance of dairy science) for both cow and calf. 19 Indeed,
a significant body of literature has emerged to address how the
precise timing and manner of separation might improve productivity
and animal well-being, since cow-calf separation often causes weight
loss and injury as the pair attempt to reunite.20 There is also extensive
evidence demonstrating that tail docking is painful for cows, and that
the practice provokes behaviors associated with discomfort or severe
pain.21 (The amputation or “docking” of cows tails is most
commonly achieved by placing a tight band or rubber ring near the
base of the cow’s tail, with the tail ultimately atrophying from lack
of blood flow, then falling off.22) The practice of routine tail docking
is officially opposed by both the Canadian Veterinary Medical
Association23 and the American Veterinary Medical Association.24
There are sharp differences in opinion as to the morality of
confining, impregnating and milking animals, and as to the
acceptability of many of the specific animal use practices within the
dairy sector.25 Questions about the justice or fairness of laws
protecting animals in agricultural contexts often, perhaps inevitably,
lead to underlying questions about the importance or necessity of

19

See, e.g., Frances C. Flower & Daniel M. Weary, The Effects of Early
Separation on the Dairy Cow and Calf, 12 ANIMAL WELFARE 339, 340 (2003)
[hereinafter Flower & Weary, Early Separation]; Frances C. Flower & Daniel M.
Weary, Effects of Early Separation on the Dairy Cow and Calf: 2. Separation at 1
Day and 2 Weeks after Birth, 70 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 275, 276 (2001)
[hereinafter Flower & Weary, Separation at 1 Day and 2 Weeks]; E.O. Price, J. E.
Harris, R. E. Borgward, M. L. Sween & J. M. Connor, Fenceline Contact of Beef
Calves with Their Dams at Weaning Reduces the Negative Effects of Separation on
Behavior and Growth Rate, 81 J. ANIMAL SCI. 116, 121 (2003); Wagner et al.,
supra note 6, at 2.
20
See, e.g., Flower & Weary, Early Separation, supra note 19, passim; Flower &
Weary, Separation at 1 Day and 2 Weeks, supra note 19, at 282–83; Price, supra
note 19, at 121; Wagner et al., supra note 6, at 2.
21
See M.A. Sutherland & C.B. Tucker, The Long and Short of It: A Review of Tail
Docking in Farm Animals, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 179, 187–89 (2011);
S.D. Eicher, H.W. Cheng, A.D. Sorrells & M.M. Shutz, Short Communication:
Behavioral and Physiological Indicators of Sensitivity or Chronic Pain Following
Tail Docking, 89 J. DAIRY SCI. 3047, 3047 (2006); S.D. Eicher & J.W. Dailey,
Indicators of Acute Pain and Fly Avoidance Behaviors in Holstein Calves
Following Tail-docking, 85 J. DAIRY SCI. 2850, 2850 (2002).
22
See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra, note 11; CAN. VETERINARY
MED. ASS’N, supra note 11.
23
CAN. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra note 11.
24
AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra, note 11.
25
See Jessica Eisen, Xiaoqian Hu & Erum Sattar, Dairy Tales: Global Portraits of
Milk and Law, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2020).
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animal products in human diets and food systems.26 The analysis that
follows will not endeavor to answer underlying questions as to
whether or how the farming of mammals for their nursing materials
might be humanely or ethically conducted. Instead, the aim is to
explain how different regulatory regimes have answered questions
respecting animal care as a matter of law—and how these regimes
have decided who decides. In particular, this study will demonstrate
that significant decisions respecting the permissible treatment of
animals are often left to the private choices of individual producers.
As the following Part will argue, high levels of regulatory
privatization, and the resulting marginalization of public law values,
represent serious obstacles to effective farmed animal protection.
III. Animals and Public Law
Private dairy producers currently enjoy significant authority
to set standards for farmed animal care.27 This Part will argue that
such privatization of regulatory authority is of special concern in the
sphere of farmed animal protection. Because farmed animals lack
both private law rights and direct access to formal legal and political
remedies, their meaningful protection requires that the humans who
advocate for animal interests have adequate access to standardsetting processes. This access is best supported where decisionmaking is shaped by public law values such as accountability,
transparency and impartiality.
A. Defining Public and Private Law
It bears mention at the outset that distinctions between public
and private are rarely clean and never unproblematic—as scholars of
both administrative law and feminist legal theory have long warned.
In schematic terms, public law describes the legal relationship
between state and citizen, while private law denotes legal relations
between individuals. According to this schematic, the public sphere
is defined by shared commitments and values, while the private
26

See Katie Sykes, Rethinking the Application of Canadian Criminal Law to
Factory Farming, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 33, 55–
56 (Peter Sankoff, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015) (observing that
“opening up the question of what is ‘unnecessary’ in the context of food
production could be a discomfiting prospect, since it unavoidably leads to
questions about whether the use of animals for food is necessary at all”); Elaine L.
Hughes & Christine Meyer, Animal Welfare Law in Canada and Europe, 6
ANIMAL L. 23, 56 (2000) (“A clear definition of necessity would require a social
consensus on the legitimacy and importance of various human uses of animals;
however, this is lacking.”).
27
See infra Part IV.

2020]

PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER

165

sphere is characterized by pursuit of self-interest.28 Within both
administrative law and feminist scholarships, the terms public and
private are deeply contested, subject to multiple (sometimes
conflicting) definitions, and, in practice, impossibly intertwined.
Within administrative law scholarship, the conventional
public/private division is increasingly understood to be complicated
or collapsed by the privatization of public authority, especially
respecting standard-setting.29 The fraying edges of the public and
private spheres identified in administrative law scholarship echo a
related destabilization of these categories identified by feminist legal
theorists.30 In particular, feminist theory has exposed supposedly
“private” spheres, including “the home” and “sexuality,” as being, in
fact, fundamentally constituted by collective commitments and
public power.31
For both feminist theorists and administrative law scholars,
the complex interplay between the supposedly public and private
aspects of law are matters of normative concern. Feminist theorists
have emphasized that the rhetorical delineation of certain “private”
spheres has allowed governments to ignore, shirk or deny
“responsibility” for certain harms or inequalities.32 In a similar vein,
administrative lawyers have identified the operation of private power

28

See Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 8–10
(1988).
29
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth, and Blake Emerson, COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth & Blake
Emerson eds., 2d ed. 2017) (noting that, although “[t]he distinction between public
and private is . . . essential to administrative law,” the assumption that “one can
compartmentalize regulatory activities and actors into either a public or a private
sphere” fails to capture “the increasingly blurred boundary between state and
society” in practice).
30
See Derek McKee, The Public/Private Distinction in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 55
MCGILL L.J. 461, 472 (2010) (linking the public/private distinction within
administrative law to the state/market divide of classical liberalism, and to related
distinctions between market/family and civilization/state).
31
See, e.g., Carol Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Divide, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281–307 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds.,
1983); Susan B. Boyd, Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide? Women,
Work and Family, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 161, 171–74 (1996).
32
Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private
Dichotomy, 20 J.L. & SOCIETY 93, 97 (1993) (asserting that the public/private
distinction “allows government to clean its hands of any responsibility for the state
of the ‘private’ world”); see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1502 (1983)
(describing the casting of relations of “domination” as “private matters that do not
implicate the political state”).
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in public administration as a possible threat to public law values such
as transparency, democracy, accountability and fairness.33
These analyses point to a common set of underlying
concerns. First, the conceptual delineation of private spaces within
legal regimes—even, or perhaps especially, when cloaked in the
language of freedom or liberty—may in fact operate to authorize
oppressive and even violent relationships in practice.34 Second, there
are harms and power dynamics for which governed societies rightly
accept shared responsibility, and our institutions should be organized
accordingly.35 In other words, it is not simply that it is difficult or
impossible to sort the public from the private, but rather that efforts
to cast these spheres as independent often work to conceal and distort
our collective obligations to one another.
The concern that public/private legal distinctions can be
deployed to obscure and confuse law’s role in shaping practices and
relationships is apparent in the field of farmed animal protection.
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the farm is analogous to the private
sphere of the family within feminist theory—a space in which a
particular, contestable conception of the public good is pursued using
legal forms and social discourses that often reject overt public
regulation in favor of such values as privacy, personal duty, and even
love.36 The present analysis details farmed animal protection
regimes in Canada and the United States to reveal the mechanics of
33

See, e.g., Jean-Bernard Auby, Contracting Out and “Public Values”: A
Theoretical and Comparative Approach, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
552, 552 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth & Blake Emerson eds., 2d ed.
2017) (describing the question of how to maintain private contractors’ adherence
to “public values” as a “characteristically post-modern administrative law
question”).
34
See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY
OF SELF, AUTONOMY AND LAW (2011) (offering an extended argument in favor of
legal analyses that focus on the relationships produced by legal rules).
35
C.f. Lacey, supra note 32, at 97.
36
See Eisen, supra note 3, at 98-101 (2019) (discussing “the farm” as analogous to
the “private sphere” of feminist theory); Jessica Eisen, Milk and Meaning: Puzzles
in Posthumanist Method, in MAKING MILK: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF
OUR PRIMARY FOOD 237, 240 (Mathilde Cohen & Yoriko Otomo eds., 2017)
(observing that regulation of the farm, like “the family” within feminist critique,
“trusts private actors (farmers; husbands) to wield their power appropriately
because they are well-intentioned, bound by duty, and even because they love
those in their charge”); see also Dinesh Wadiwel, Whipping to Win: Measured
Violence, Delegated Sovereignty and the Privatised Domination of Non-Human
Life, in LAW AND THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL: A CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 116,
116–32 (Yoriko Otomo & Edward Mussawir eds., 2013) (describing the
“privatised domination of non-human life”); Mathilde Cohen, Of Milk and the
Constitution, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 115, 152 n.238 (2017) (analogizing the
private sphere of the farm to the private sphere of the family).
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the public/private law interplay working to keep the treatment of
farmed animals effectively unregulated by public authorities.
B. Animals and Public Law Values
Despite the identified artificiality of distinctions between
public and private in legal ordering, the analysis that follows will rely
on these terms to some extent. This is because, although
problematic, these categories remain operative, with their operation
having significant consequences for farmed animal protection. There
are two critical aspects of animal protection regimes that demand
continued attention to distinctions between public and private law in
this context. The first is the reality that so-called private law (laws
understood to govern relations between individuals) have
consistently refused to recognize animals as the kinds of individuals
whose relations are of legal consequence. The second is that values
such as transparency, accountability and impartiality are legally
cognizable only with respect to public law authority. Because these
public law values are crucial to effective animal protection, the
juridical positioning of animal protection as a matter of public law
improves prospects for animal protection.
Animals do not hold private legal rights, even to their own
lives and bodies. Instead, private law has quite durably retained a
basic classification of animals as things: mere objects of the property
rights of others.37 In terms of private law alone, animals are objects,
not subjects. They are things to be owned, traded, and extinguished
at the will of those who hold rights to their bodies. In the famous
formulation of property as relations amongst people (rather than
relations between people and objects),38 relations with animals are

37

See GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAW 65–115 (1995);
Wendy Adams, Human Subjects and Animal Objects: Animals as “Other” in Law,
in 3 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 29, 29–30 (2009). In recent years, a number of civil
law jurisdictions have formally affirmed in their civil codes that animals are not
“things”; however, each of these jurisdictions has also specified that provisions
pertaining to “things” also apply to animals, making the change in status merely
nominal. See Sabine Brels, The Evolution of the Legal Status of Animals: From
Things to Sentient Beings, THE CONSCIOUS LAWYER (Jan. 2016),
https://www.theconsciouslawyer.co.uk/the-evolution-of-the-legal-status-ofanimals-from-things-to-sentient-beings/.
38
See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY,
THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 3–4 (1994); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 22–23 (1913).
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invisible, with no real meaning in the world of legal value and
exchange.39
Public law, on the other hand, has long recognized some
minimal legal significance in animals’ own lives and experiences,
most notably through prohibitions against cruelty and the regulation
of certain animal-use industries. Admittedly, the longest-standing
forms of public law protection of animal interests—criminal
prohibitions of cruelty and bestiality—have not focused on animal
well-being as much as they have attended to human property interests
or community morals.40 In both Canada and the United States,
however, there is evidence of a shift in emphasis in public and
judicial understandings of these laws: a growing sense that their
purpose is, at least in part, to protect animals for their own sakes.41
The treatment of animals has become the subject of regulatory
concern, with human use of animal property addressed as a site of
ongoing risk and oversight.42 These regulatory interventions now
commonly reference the interests of animals as being legally
relevant.43
In addition to providing the sole available forum for pressing
animals’ interests, public law is tied to values of particular
significance for effective animal protection—namely transparency,

39

Some have claimed that being “owned” may be beneficial to animals. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 143, 148–149 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (arguing that “[b]ecause they use and value
animals, owners will spend resources for their protection,” such that “[o]ver broad
areas of human endeavour, the ownership of animals has worked to their
advantage”). Of course, any indirect benefit that animals may experience to the
extent that they hold value to their human owners does not amount to private law
recognition of animals’ interests. Moreover, in the case of farmed animals,
especially in industrial-scale agricultural operations, relations of economic
exploitation diminish the likelihood of alignment between animal and owner
interests. See Ani B. Satz, Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond InterestConvergence, Hierarchy, and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65, 79–80 (2009).
40
See Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law’s Role
in Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21–29 (2001) (noting that, in the United States,
19th century anti-cruelty laws were generally interpreted by courts “under the
rubric of property” or as emphasizing that “cruelty was degrading to the human
perpetrator, the human witnesses, and society as a whole”).
41
See, e.g., Regina v. D.L.W., [2016] 1 S.C.R. 402, para. 140; see also Jessica
Eisen, Animals in the Constitutional State, 15 ICON: INT’L J. CONST. L. 909, 911–
923 (2018) (offering a broader cross-jurisdictional account of legal attention to
animal interests).
42
See, e.g., The Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131.
43
See, e.g., id. at § 2131(1).
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impartiality and accountability.44 Because animals lack access to
human language, they are especially vulnerable to having their
interests overlooked in legal and political processes as they are
currently structured.45 The traditional democratic mechanisms
through which state power is held to account—elections and
litigation—are not directly available to animals to contest inadequate
or unfair conduct.46 Elsewhere, I have argued that animals therefore
experience “radical vulnerability” within contemporary legal
systems: they are both subject to ongoing state-sanctioned harm, and
practically excluded from both law-making and rightsenforcement.47
Because animals are not legally empowered to press the
private dimensions of their own individual interests,48 the public
character of animal protection demands heightened acknowledgment
and institutional fortification. Effective protection of animal
interests depends on animal advocates having meaningful access to
processes that assure the sufficiency and implementation of
standards. In public law terms, this requires that standard-setting
44

See Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 3–4 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997)
(summarizing that “[t]he list of public law values includes openness, fairness,
participation, impartiality, accountability, honesty and rationality”).
45
Eisen, supra note 41, at 941–42. Some scholars have argued that this structural
exclusion of animals from political and legal decision-making can and should be
reformed. See, e.g., SUE DONALDSON & WILL KYMLICKA, ZOOPOLIS: A POLITICAL
THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 255 (2011) (calling for recognition of “animals not
just as individual subjects entitled to respect of their basic rights, but as members
of communities—both ours and theirs—woven together in relations of
interdependency, mutuality and responsibility”); Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson,
Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 207
(2014); Alasdair Cochrane, SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE POLITICAL RIGHTS? 90–91
(2020); Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Democracy, in THE POLITICAL TURN
IN ANIMAL ETHICS 103, 115 (Robert Garner & Siobhan O’Sullivan eds., 2016).
46
See Eisen, supra note 41, at 925–29.
47
Id. at 941-946. For other scholarly treatments of animal “vulnerability,” see,
e.g., Maneesha Deckha, Vulnerability, Equality, and Animals, 27 CANADIAN
J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2015); Satz, supra note 39.
48
Scholars have debated whether legal standing for animals should be either
acknowledged or expanded as a means of allowing animals, through their
representatives, to enforce legal interests or rights. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1333
(2000); Kelsey Kobil, When it Comes to Standing, Two Legs are Better than Four,
120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 621 (2016). Even if such standing were recognized,
however, the legal rights and interests in question would (absent dramatic
transformation of animals’ legal status) remain public law protections. Moreover,
the effective advancement and enforcement of legal standards by animals’
representatives would continue to require transparent, impartial and accountable
institutions.
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authority be entrusted to institutions that value impartiality,
accountability, and transparency.49
The first of these principles, impartiality, represents a core
public law value relevant to animal protection law. Impartiality
requires that decision-makers not decide matters in their own selfinterest, a principle rooted in the idea that “a judge should neither
judge her own cause nor have any interest in the outcome of a case
before her (nemo judex in sua causa debet esse).”50 Impartiality has
been a particularly fraught moral and legal concept, particularly
insofar as it might seem to imply the possibility of a “view from
nowhere,” concealing the standpoint of privileged speakers in the
process.51 In the case of animal protection, we might think it
impossible to find a truly impartial or disinterested human decisionmaker, given the widespread human consumption of animal
products.52 But a narrower conception of impartiality—foreclosing
decision-making by those with a direct financial stake in the
outcome—is also at stake in dairy governance. To the extent that
dairy producers have economic incentives to intensify dairy
operations in ways that prioritize efficiency over animal well-being,
the value of impartiality weighs against granting them the authority
to set standards of animal care.53

49

See Jessica Eisen, Beyond Rights and Welfare: Democracy, Dialogue, and the
Animal Welfare Act, 51 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 469, 481–485 (2018). See generally
Eisen, supra note 41.
50
Laverne A. Jacobs, Tribunal Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the
Theory after Bell and Ocean Port Hotel—A Call for Empirical Analysis, in
DIALOGUE BETWEEN COURTS AND TRIBUNALS—ESSAYS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND JUSTICE (2001–2007) 43, 47–48 (Laverne A. Jacobs & Justice Anne L.
Mactavish eds., 2008). Jacobs further notes the connection between impartiality
and “the notion that decision-making requires a decision-maker to hear and listen
to both sides of the case before making a decision (audi alteram partem).” Id.
Some have distinguished “impartiality” from “independence,” with “impartiality”
representing a “state of mind” and “independence” invoking the institutional forms
that assure impartiality. R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 at para. 15; see also
Gillies v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 All E.R. 731 at para.
38 (Baroness Hale). In this article, I take “impartiality” to embrace both the
personal and institutional dimensions.
51
See Kathryn Murphy and Anita Traninger, Introduction: Instances of
Impartiality, in THE EMERGENCE OF IMPARTIALITY 1, 5–6, 20 (Kathryn Murphy &
Anita Traninger eds., 2013).
52
See Matthew Liebman, Who the Judge Ate for Breakfast: On the Limits of
Creativity in Animal Law and the Redeeming Power of Powerlessness, 18 ANIMAL
L. 133 (2011).
53
See Eisen, supra note 41, at 950 (“Human efforts to determine the legal and
regulatory strategies that best advance the interests of animals are plagued by
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The second of these values, accountability, connotes “legal
oversight of public power.”54 While accountability might embrace a
broad array of values and institutions, I mean here to invoke a
relatively narrow meaning: that public actors might be called upon to
justify their decisions, that their justifications may be subject to
review, and that there may be consequences for failed justification.55
The principle that exercises of public power must be held to account
is essential to democracy and the rule of law.56 It is also critical to
animal protection. To the extent that animal protection depends upon
the oversight of human advocates for animal interests, those human
advocates must have access to legal mechanisms by which to
challenge decisions respecting standards of animal use and care.
Transparency is a third public law value that is critical for
both animal protection and democratic governance more broadly.57
Transparency refers to the ability of “external stakeholders to
monitor the internal workings of an organization.”58 While
transparency may have costs and “trade-offs” in terms of efficiency
and other values, it is generally accepted that “at very low levels of
transparency, more transparency is likely to be beneficial” for good
governance.59 With respect to animal protection, transparency
conflicts of interest, and these conflicts are exacerbated when enforcement
agencies lack independence from the industries they regulate.”).
54
CRAIG FORCESE, ADAM DODEK, PHILIP BRYDEN, RICHARD HAIGH, MARY LISTON
& CONSTANCE MACINTOSH, PUBLIC LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND ANALYSIS 12
(4th ed., 2020). Such “legal oversight” (for example, by judges and administrative
tribunals) is distinguishable from “political oversight” (achieved, for example,
through periodic elections). Id. at 10–14. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas
Schillemans eds., 2014) (offering an introduction to scholarship on accountability
as a legal and political value).
55
Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual
Framework, 13 EURO. L.J. 447 (2007) (setting out the definition of accountability
on which I rely here).
56
Forcese et al., supra note 54, at 10. See also Mark E. Warren, Accountability
and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 39
(Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans eds., 2014).
57
See Anoeska Buijze, The Six Faces of Transparency, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 3, 5
(2013).
58
Scott Douglas & Albert Meijer, Transparency and Public Value—Analyzing the
Transparency Practices and Value Creation of Public Utilities, 39 INT’L J. PUB.
ADMIN. 940, 940 (2016).
59
David Heald, Transparency as an Instrumental Value, in TRANSPARENCY: THE
KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 59, 59 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds.,
2006); see also Paul Daly, Administrative Law: A Values-based Approach, in
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION IN COMMON LAW SYSTEMS: PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE
23 (John Bell, Mark Elliott, Jason N.E. Varuhas & Philip Murray eds., 2016)
(identifying transparency as “an important legal value”).
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(respecting both the conditions of animals’ lives and the processes
by which those conditions are regulated) is necessary to minimize
the risk of political erasure arising from animals’ exclusion from
traditional modes of legal engagement.60 Because animals cannot
advocate for themselves under current legal arrangements, human
advocates for animal interests must have some minimal access to
information in order to hold decision-makers accountable and assure
adequate substantive protection.61
Commitments to impartiality, transparency, and
accountability thus take on a special significance in the animal
protection context. These values, however, are generally only
cognizable as legal commitments where public authority is
recognized as operative.62 Yet, despite the practical significance of
public law values to effective animal protection, regulatory regimes
in Canada and the United States often depend on privatized standardsetting, concealing public responsibility and minimizing or erasing
the application of public law values.
IV. The Public and the Private In Dairy Governance
Across Canada and the United States, a variety of regulatory
regimes govern the protection of farmed animals. This Part offers a
survey of these governance approaches, organized according to a
rough spectrum of legal forms, ranging from the most public (i.e.,
primary legislation) to the most private (i.e., unencumbered
individual producer choice). As this survey will demonstrate,
however, this neat organizational structure belies the messy interplay
between public and private authority that in fact characterizes this
60

See Eisen, supra note 41, at 951; Eisen, supra note 49.
See Albert Meijer, Transparency, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 507 (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans
eds., 2014) (examining the relationship between transparency and accountability).
62
It is, of course, possible for private parties to bind themselves to such principles
through private contractual obligations. The U.S. National Dairy FARM program
and the Dairy Farmers of Canada ProAction Initiative are examples of this form of
commitment respecting dairy cattle welfare. See Katelyn E. Mills, Katherine E.
Koralesky, Daniel M. Weary & Marina A. G. von Keyserlingk, Dairy Farmer
Advising in Relation to the Development of Standard Operating Procedures, 103 J.
DAIRY SCI. 11524, 11524 (2020). Such mechanisms have become matters of
increasing interest in the fields of international and comparative administrative
law. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31
YALE L.J. 383 (2006). This article has focused on standard-setting with a
connection, however tenuous, to generalized legal requirements. The role of
voluntary or contractual standard-setting by commodity producer associations
represents a distinct but equally fascinating case study into agricultural industry
self-regulation.
61
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field of law. On closer examination, it becomes apparent that even
the most ostensibly public forms of governance are structured to give
substantial standard-setting power to animal use industries. This
privatization of governing authority comes at the expense of public
law values that are required for effective animal protection.
Various legal forms are employed to confer standard-setting
authority on dairy producers. In some jurisdictions, this is achieved
through judicial or statutory deference to the aggregate choices of
individual producers, expressed as affirmative permission to engage
in “customary farming practices.”63 In other jurisdictions, private
bodies comprised largely of producers and their representatives are
directly or indirectly empowered to set standards for permissible
conduct. The following subsections will detail these various
regulatory forms. The final subsection of this Part will summarize
the substantial role that private parties play across these animal
protection regimes, and the threat that this privatized governance
poses to public law values such as transparency, impartiality and
accountability.
A. Primary Legislation
One governance tool employed to protect farmed animals is
primary legislation. Farmed animal protection laws are passed either
through ordinary legislative processes (i.e., by elected
representatives) or through direct popular referenda in states where
such lawmaking processes exist.64 Respecting primary legislation,
the connection to public law values and processes is, in principle,
relatively clear: legislators are broadly accountable to the electorate
(not just to any single interest group), and their laws and legislative
processes are relatively transparent by constitutional design.65 Yet,
as we will see, legislative provisions protecting farmed animals often
grant significant de facto or de jure authority to private actors to
determine the substance of the standards imposed.

63

Wolfson & Sullivan supra note 1, at 212.
See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR ANIMALS ON FARMS
(2018) at 8–11.
65
Of course, in practice, these values are often not well safeguarded. As public
choice theorists, in particular, have elaborated, legislative processes are often not
public, transparent or impartial at all. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice Theory
and Legal Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL.
1: METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTS (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017). Nonetheless, the
basic institutions of democratic governance are present, and legislation is among
the most undeniably public forms of standard-setting.
64
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Legislation restricting specific animal use practices on farms
are exceedingly rare in Canada and the United States.66 Respecting
dairy cattle, these are limited to legislative prohibitions on routine
tail docking in California67 and Rhode Island.68 In all other US states,
and in Canada, the use of primary legislation to protect animals on
farms is limited to broadly framed provisions, for example
prohibiting “cruelty” or the causing of “distress” (collectively
referred to here as “anti-cruelty statutes”).69 In Canada, these include
both federal criminal prohibitions on cruelty toward animals70 and
provincial quasi-criminal cruelty prohibitions.71 In the United States,

66

See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 3, 8–11. Note that the
present analysis is restricted to the legal treatment of animals on farms. More
detailed legislative and regulatory constraints apply with respect to transport and
slaughter in both jurisdictions. In Canada, see Health of Animals Act, S.C. 1990,
c 21 and Health of Animals Regulations, C.R.C., c 296 (regarding transport); Safe
Food for Canadians Act, S.C. 2012, c 24 and Safe Food for Canadians Regulation,
S.O.R./2018-108 (regarding slaughter). In the United States, see Twenty-Eight
Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (1994) (regarding transport); Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1958) and Humane Slaughter of
Livestock Regulations, 9 C.F.R. 313 (1987) (regarding slaughter). For
commentary on these regimes, see Vaughan Black, Traffic Tickets on the Last
Ride, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 57, 57–68, 73–79
(Peter Sankoff, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015); Sophie Gaillard &
Peter Sankoff, Bringing Animal Abusers to Justice Independently: Private
Prosecutions and the Enforcement of Canadian Animal Protection Legislation, in
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 307, 313–14 (Peter Sankoff,
Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015) (arguing that private prosecutions might
also be brought under these statutes); Wolfson & Sullivan supra note 1, at 207–
209.
67
CAL. PENAL CODE § 597n (West 2010).
68
4 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4-1-6.1 (West 2012). In addition, there are some
legislated protections respecting the tethering and confinement of calves, though
this more commonly impacts the related veal industry. See generally ANIMAL
WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 9, 11.
69
See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 2; LESLI BISGOULD, ANIMALS
AND THE LAW 57–123 (2011). As discussed above, both jurisdictions include
further regulatory oversight once animals have left the farm, during transport and
slaughter. See supra note 66.
70
In Canada, criminal law is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 91(27). The Criminal Code of
Canada sets out a number of offences respecting the treatment of animals,
including a general prohibition against causing unnecessary pain, suffering or
injury to an animal. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 445.1(a).
71
Provincial governments in Canada are authorized to make law in respect of
property and civil rights. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 92(14).
Provincial authority to govern the treatment of animals is generally grounded in
this power, as animals are legally classified as property. For a survey and
discussion of Canadian provincial anti-cruelty laws, see BISGOULD, supra note 69,
at 97-123.

2020]

PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER

175

these take the form of state-level criminal anti-cruelty laws.72 These
general anti-cruelty statutes are often structured to exempt common
agricultural practices from their purview—an exemption that has
given industry actors a central role in defining the substance of the
governing legal standards.
In Canada, the classic case establishing the exemption of
common agricultural practices from criminal cruelty prohibitions is
Pacific Meat.73 In that case, the British Columbia County Court was
called upon to construe a federal Criminal Code provision making it
a criminal offence to “wilfully cause[] or, being the owner, wilfully
permit[] to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an
animal or bird.”74 At issue in that case was whether a method of
slaughtering pigs—in which conscious pigs were hoisted by the leg,
slammed into a wall and then stuck with a knife—caused pain,
suffering or injury that was “unnecessary” and so prohibited by the
criminal law.75 The court held that, while this conduct might
constitute criminal cruelty outside the slaughterhouse context, in the
present case there was no “unnecessary” suffering given the
“necessity of slaughtering hogs to provide food for mankind.”76
Although the Crown adduced evidence of less-painful slaughter
methods, the court was not prepared to accept that this made the
method at issue “unnecessary.”77 In particular, the court was
persuaded by the fact that all other slaughter houses in Canada, and
several U.S. slaughterhouses employed this same method.78

72

See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 208–09. In the United States, criminal
law is generally determined at the state level, rather than by the federal
government.
73
Regina v. Pacific Meat Co., [1957] B.C.J. No. 98, para. 14 (B.C. Cty. Ct.).
74
Criminal Code of Canada, 1953-54, c 51, § 387(1)(a). That provision has since
been replaced by the identically phrased Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c
C-46, § 445.1(a).
75
See Pacific Meat, [1957] B.C.J. at para. 1–4.
76
Id. at para. 14.
77
Id.
78
Id at para. 10. The court, on the evidence, was not prepared to find that these
alternative methods were, in fact, less painful. Id. Nonetheless, the case has come
to stand for the proposition that courts ought to defer to common industry practice
in defining the scope of the criminal prohibition at issue. See Sykes, supra note
26, at 33, 38 (explaining that “an interpretation of the animal cruelty offence has
. . . become entrenched whereby almost anything done to animals as part of the
business of producing animal food is exempt from the Code’s application,” though
disputing the doctrinal basis for this interpretation); see BISGOULD, supra note 69,
at 71 (explaining that prevailing interpretations of the Criminal Code include a “de
facto exemption” for farmed animals).
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Since Pacific Meat, the Criminal Code has not generally
been applied in prosecutions of agricultural operations.79 Instead,
prosecutions for cruelty tend to proceed under provincial quasicriminal anti-cruelty statutes.80 Even with respect to proceedings
brought under these provincial statutes, however, the Pacific Meat
protection of common industry practice (sometimes referred to as the
“implicit farming exemption”81) has continued to operate. In many
cases, such exemptions are reflected in the text of provincial anticruelty statutes.82 For example, the Ontario Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act establishes that “[n]o person
shall cause an animal to be in distress,” but then goes on to specify
that this prohibition does not apply to “an activity carried out in
accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of
agricultural animal care, management or husbandry.”83 Similar
exemptions for common agricultural practices exist in Alberta,84
79

See Maneesha Deckha, Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The
Rule of Law and Animal Vulnerability under a Property Paradigm, 50 ALBERTA L.
REV. 783, 806 n. 152 (2013); Sykes, supra note 26, at 34–35, 40–41 n.36, 49
(explaining that the Criminal Code provision is “almost invariably” applied in
cases where “pet dogs and cats” are victims of “acts of pointless sadism or spite,”
with the exceptional application of the provision to farmed animals occurring only
in respect of farms that have “stopped functioning as a farm” due to financial ruin);
BISGOULD, supra note 69, at 74 (reporting that the “criminal law has not generally
been invoked in the context of the actual practices by which animals are used,”
including in agriculture, and that “much deference is given to those in industry to
know best how to handle their animal property”); Gaillard & Sankoff, supra note
66, at 318 (discussing the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal charges
against agricultural operations).
80
Gaillard & Sankoff, supra note 66, at 318–319 (explaining that “public
prosecutors have shown an unwillingness” to lay charges under federal criminal
anti-cruelty laws, preferring to proceed under provincial quasi-criminal offences
“even in cases of extreme mistreatment”); Peter Sankoff, Canada’s Experiment
with Industry Self-Regulation in Agriculture: Radical Innovation or Means of
Insulation, 5 CANADIAN J. COMPARATIVE & CONTEMPORARY L. 1, 10 n.19 (2019)
(observing that, following an undercover investigation of a dairy in Chilliwack,
British Columbia, “[n]othwithstanding what seemed like a clear case of criminal
level abuse, the workers were only charged and convicted of provincial offences”).
81
Sykes, supra note 26, at 33.
82
See Hughes and Meyer, supra note 26, at 63.
83
Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c
O.36, §§ 11.2(1), 11.2(6)(c). In theory, the term “reasonable” could be interpreted
to carry a meaning independent of “generally accepted,” but in practice courts have
construed these terms together as providing a blanket exemption for common
agricultural practices. See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 13–14.
84
Animal Protection Act, R.S.A. 2000, c A-41, §§ 2(1)(1.1), 2(1)(2) (providing
that “[n]o person shall cause an animal to be in distress,” then specifying that
“[t]his section does not apply if the distress results from an activity carried on in
accordance with. . . reasonable and generally accepted practices of animal care,
management, husbandry . . . or slaughter”).
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British Columbia,85 Nova Scotia,86 and Quebec.87 Consequently, the
aggregate choices of individual producers become part of the law—
defining through common use which practices are immune from
prosecution regardless of how harmful they may be to animals.
In the United States, a similar picture emerges: general anticruelty statutes have been drafted or construed to exempt common
agricultural practices. As a result, the collective private choices of
individual producers effectively become legal standards. In their
critique of farmed animal protection in the United States, David
Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan describe this dynamic as it arose in
the case of Commonwealth v. Barnes:88
In Pennsylvania, individuals accused of starving
horses argued that the practice of denying nutrition
to horses who were no longer wanted and were to be
sold for meat was a “normal agricultural operation”
. . . . Such horses, the defendants argued, are
commonly denied veterinary care and sufficient
nutrition, and are placed in so-called killer pens
. . . . While the court did convict the defendants of
cruelty, it decided to do so only because the
defendants failed to offer sufficient testimony as to
the pervasiveness of the practice, and no testimony
[that they were in fact raising the horses for meat].
The case highlights the ramifications of the
exclusion of customary farming practices from
criminal anticruelty statutes . . . . The defendants’
85

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 372, § 24.02(c)
(providing that “[a] person must not be convicted of an offence under this Act in
relation to an animal in distress if . . . the distress results from an activity that is
carried out in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of
animal management . . . .”). Note that British Columbia has additionally
incorporated the NFACC Codes into its legislative scheme. See Animal Care
Codes of Practice Regulation, B.C. Reg. 34/2019, § 4; see also infra note 142 and
accompanying text.
86
Animal Protection Act, S.N.S. 2008, c 33, §§ 21(1), 21(4) (establishing that
“[n]o person shall cause an animal to be in distress,” then specifying that this
prohibition does not apply “if the distress, pain suffering or injury results from an
activity carried on . . . in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted
practices of animal management, husbandry or slaughter”).
87
Animal Welfare and Safety Act, C.Q.L.R., c B-3.1, §§ 6, 7 (establishing that “[a]
person may not, by an act or omission, cause an animal to be in distress,” then
stating that this prohibition does not apply in respect of “agricultural activities . . .
carried on in accordance with generally recognized rules”).
88
629 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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problem was not that they starved horses, but that
they could not prove that enough people were doing
the same thing.89
Since the time of Wolfson and Sullivan’s writing, the practice of
codifying explicit customary agricultural practice exemptions has
only expanded in the United States.90 As a result, primary legislation,
despite its formal anchoring in public law, places significant
authority to set legal standards in the hands of private actors.
B. Regulation and Delegated Legislation
Regulations, or “delegated legislation,” represent another
public law tool governing the lives of farmed animals. Regulations
arise where primary legislation has expressly delegated to an agency
or public body the authority to set precise regulatory standards. The
formal role of public law standards and values remains relatively
clear in cases of regulation or delegated legislation. Under such
arrangements, public bodies are bound by enabling legislation, which
is in turn passed through democratic means. Although the shape and
content of public engagement respecting rule-making and standardsetting differs significantly between Canada and the United States,
both jurisdictions include some basic procedural requirements that
are followed in the creation of regulations, and some minimal
opportunities for judicial and appellate review through which
citizens might hold public actors accountable to their statutory grants
of authority.91
As is the case with primary legislation in both Canada and
the United States, regulatory prohibitions respecting specific farmed
animal use practices are extremely rare. In Canada, provincial
farmed animal protection regulations are either highly general in
form or explicitly import standards set by non-governmental entities
89

Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 214–215.
See JUSTIN MARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT 98–110 (2019) (surveying common agricultural practice exemptions
in the United States and explaining that, “[i]f a practice becomes generally
accepted or customary, no matter how cruel, it cannot, as a matter of law, serve as
the basis for an animal cruelty prosecution in forty states”).
91
For a discussion of regulatory oversight in Canada, see Linda Reid, Oversight of
Regulations by Parliamentarians, 33 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REV. 7, 7–10
(2010); Lorne Neudorf, Rule by Regulation: Revitalizing Parliament’s Supervisory
Role in the Making of Subordinate Legislation, 39 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY
REV. 29, 29–31 (2016). For a discussion of ‘rulemaking’ in U.S. administrative
law, including a discussion of differences from select parliamentary systems, see
PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL COMPARISON
ch. 8 (2016).
90
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(as discussed in the following subsection). In the United States,
however, a small minority of states have delegated law-making
authority to a public body which has in turn established detailed
regulations respecting specific agricultural practices.92 These rare
instances of detailed regulatory protection of animal interests
arguably represent the strongest importation of enforceable public
law values into farmed animal protection regimes in Canada and the
United States.
New Jersey’s experience with detailed regulation of farmed
animal protection provides a useful example. In 1996, the New
Jersey Legislature amended its anti-cruelty statute to delegate
standard-setting authority to the New Jersey Department of
Agriculture (NJDA) and the state Board of Agriculture.93 In
particular, the amended statute prohibited “cruelty” toward animals
while also enabling the NJDA and Board of Agriculture to establish
“safe harbor” provisions that would insulate certain practices from
legal action under the statute and its regulations.94 In that context,
the NJDA attempted to create, inter alia, a broad “safe harbor”
exemption for common agricultural practices and a narrower “safe
harbor” for tail docking.95 Because the NJDA was bound by a
substantive statutory mandate, to which it was accountable as a
matter of public law, the regulatory process and resulting standards
reflected public law values.
Consider the impact of public law values on the common
agricultural practices “safe harbor.”96 First, a relatively transparent
92

See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 3, 5, 6, 14 (discussing
delegated authority to set binding standards for the protection of farmed animals in
New Jersey, Alaska, Arizona and Ohio).
93
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-16.1(a) (1996) (“The State Board of Agriculture and the
Department of Agriculture, in consultation with the New Jersey Agricultural
Experiment Station and within six months of the date of enactment of this act, shall
develop and adopt, pursuant to the ‘Administrative Procedure Act,’ P.L.1968,
c.410 (C. 52:14B-1 et seq.): (1) standards for the humane raising, keeping, care,
treatment, marketing, and sale of domestic livestock; and (2) rules and regulations
governing the enforcement of those standards.”).
94
N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric., 955
A.2d 886, 900 (N.J. 2008); see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-16.1(b) (1996)
(“[T]here shall exist a presumption that the raising, keeping, care, treatment,
marketing, and sale of domestic livestock in accordance with the standards
developed and adopted therefor pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall not
constitute a violation of any provision of this title involving alleged cruelty to, or
inhumane care or treatment of, domestic livestock.”).
95
See N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric., 955
A.2d 886, 903–909 (N.J. 2008).
96
Id.
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and accountable process was followed in the development and
adoption of regulatory standards. Second, the standards themselves
were subject to judicial review, creating a further layer of
accountability and transparency, and introducing the courts as
relatively impartial adjudicators. Third, the courts’ ultimate decision
respecting the safe harbor constrained the role of private producers,
in part out of concern that producers’ economic incentives made
them ill-suited to impartial standard-setting respecting animal care.
First, the process by which regulatory standards were
adopted was relatively transparent and accountable, resulting in a
final regulation that was somewhat more protective of animal
interests. The regulations as originally proposed had defined
exempted “routine husbandry practices” broadly, as “techniques
commonly employed and accepted as necessary or beneficial to raise,
keep, care, treat, market, and transport livestock.”97 This would have
had the effect of conferring substantive standard-setting authority on
producers, essentially re-inscribing the common agricultural practice
exemption found in the anti-cruelty provisions discussed in the
previous subsection.
In accordance with the New Jersey
Administrative Procedures Act, however, this initial proposal was
subject to a public comment period, in which over 6,500 written
comments were received and various witnesses appeared at a public
hearing.98 Following extensive criticism of the proposed definition
of “routine husbandry practices” as both vague and inclusive of
inhumane practices,99 the definition of “routine husbandry practices”
was redefined in the promulgated regulation as “techniques
commonly taught by veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and
agricultural extension agents.”100 This public process therefore
resulted in a regulatory definition of prohibited conduct that was a
degree removed from a direct conferral of authority on the collective
choices of individual producers. The process itself, moreover, was
relatively transparent and accountable to the public.
Second, the standards adopted by the regulators were subject
to judicial review, further demonstrating and bolstering the presence
of public law values in the New Jersey scheme. The conferral of
authority on “veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural
extension agents” to define acceptable “routine husbandry
practices,” although narrower than the initially proposed definition,
97

35 N.J. Reg. 1877 (May 5, 2003).
36 N.J. Reg. 2586(a) (June 7, 2004).
99
Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 905.
100
Id. at 904.
98
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was nonetheless challenged in judicial review proceedings.101 The
petitioners, including several animal advocacy groups, argued that
the safe harbor provisions for routine husbandry practices
impermissibly delegated authority to private parties (in particular,
veterinary schools, land grant colleges and agricultural extension
agents), despite the legislative mandate that the NJDA and Board of
Agriculture were to determine the content of the “humane” practices
that would be authorized by the regulations.102 In arguing that the
regulations impermissibly delegated standard-setting authority to
these private parties, the petitioners noted that there was no evidence
that the NJDA scrutinized these entities, individually or as a whole,
for example through independent assessment of their texts, curricula,
course offerings or personnel.103 The NJDA, it was argued, thus had
no evidentiary basis for assuming that the practices taught by these
entities were “humane,” as required by the enabling legislation, and
in accordance with the NJDA’s own regulatory definition of
“humane” as “marked by compassion, sympathy, and consideration
for the welfare of animals.”104
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed.105 The court
described the regulations as “plac[ing] into the hands of this wideranging and ill-defined group of presumed experts the power to
determine what is humane.”106 The agency’s failure to conduct any
substantive inquiry into the practices endorsed by these entities left
the NJDA “without any basis in the record” for their apparent

101

Id. at 903–904. The legal challenge took the form of an “appeal” to the
Appellate Division. Id. at 888. Appeals to the Appellate division may be made as
of right “to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or
officer, and to review the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or
officer” with specified exceptions, none of which applied in this case. See N.J. CT.
R. 2:2-3(a)(2). An earlier appeal, launched prior to the promulgation of the
amended regulations, had been dismissed without prejudice to allow the parties to
pursue the matter after the regulations had been promulgated. See Soc’y for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 917 n.6.
102
Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 904.
103
Id. at 904–05. The NJDA countered that it had in fact reviewed some such
curricular materials, though the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that this
review did not take place until after the regulations had been promulgated and
litigation was underway. Id. at 905–06.
104
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-1.2(a) (2004); see Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, 955 A.2d at 904.
105
Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 904–07. The
petitioners were initially unsuccessful before the New Jersey Appellate Division.
N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., No. A6319-03T1, 2007 WL 486764, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2007).
106
Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 905.
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presumption that the practices endorsed by these entities were in fact
humane.107
The New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized two distinct but
interrelated flaws in the routine practices safe harbor exemptions:
first, that they failed to follow the legislature’s directive that the
agency authorize only “humane” practices; and, second, that they
amounted to an impermissible delegation of statutory authority.108
The court observed that many other jurisdictions have adopted
welfare laws that exempt routine agricultural practices,109 and that
the New Jersey legislature explicitly chose a different “specific
goal,” namely to exempt “humane,” rather than merely “routine”
practices.110 In the court’s view, “[t]o suggest, as the Department's
‘routine husbandry practices’ definition implies, that the Legislature
meant ‘routine’ when it said ‘humane’ would ‘abuse the interpretive
process and . . . frustrate the announced will of the people.’”111 In
other words, the public law value of accountability was engaged and,
because of the regulatory structure in place, enforceable through
judicial review.
Third, the public law value of impartiality was relevant to
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s assessment. The court was
particularly troubled by the fact that the “impermissible
subdelegation” in this instance transferred power to “some entities
that might also be described as private interests.”112 Dr. Bernard E.
Rollin, an expert in animal welfare, had filed an amicus brief with
the court explaining that the private entities in question in fact
endorsed practices on the basis of their economic productivity, rather
than on the basis of compassion or concern for animal well-being.113
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that “there is no evidence
that [the NJDA] considered the intersection between the interests of
those who attended these institutions or are taught by them and those

107

Id.
Id. at 906–07.
109
Id.; see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(c)(3) (repealed 2015); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5(1). For an overview of customary agricultural practice
exemptions in the United States, see Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212–16.
110
Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 906.
111
Id. (quoting Serv. Armament Co. v. Hyland, 362 A.2d 13, 17 (N.J. 1976)).
112
Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 906. The New Jersey
Supreme Court relied on the established principle that agencies may not
subdelegate their statutory powers unless the legislature intends that they may do
so. Id. The court also relied on caselaw demonstrating particular skepticism of
unauthorized subdelegations to interested parties. Id.
113
Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 896–97, 904.
108

2020]

PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER

183

who are concerned with the welfare of animals.”114 The court
remarked that it would have been possible for the NJDA to
incorporate external standards through more deliberate reference to
specific institutions that the agency determined to be reliable arbiters
of “humane” treatment.115 As it stood though, the agency “accepted,
without analysis, the practices that are taught in every veterinary
school, land grant college, and agricultural extension agent not only
in this state, but in the rest of the country and, it would appear,
wherever they might be found around the globe . . . [although]
nothing in the record suggests that all of them will meet the standard
set by our Legislature.”116
In light of this broad, unauthorized, and unaccountable
delegation of authority, the court struck down the safe harbor
exemptions for routine husbandry practices as representing
“arbitrary and capricious” agency action.117 Following this ruling,
the agency passed a revised regulation, prescribing an open list of
specific “science-based” sources and standards, which “may be
found to be humane.”118 By specifically identifying particular
“science-based” sources, the agency narrowed its reliance on private
parties as arbiters of “humane” conduct, and assigned this role to
actors defined by their supposed impartiality.119 Moreover, these
actors’ assessments of “humane” practices no longer gave rise to
definite “safe harbors,” but were instead merely persuasive (i.e. “may
114

Id. at 906.
Id. at 906–07.
116
Id. at 907.
117
Id.
118
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-1.1(b) (2012) (establishing a presumption that “the
raising, keeping, care, treatment, marketing and sale of domestic livestock” does
not constitute “cruelty” or “inhumane care” where it includes practices that “may
be found to be humane, based upon techniques for necessary livestock
management and producers included in the following science-based sources or
other sources, which may be shown to incorporate similar science-based
standards,” including the Handbook of Livestock Management, (Battaglia, 4th ed.,
2007), and particular publications of the Federation of Animal Science Societies,
the American Veterinary Medical Association, the American Association of
Equine Practitioners, the Rutgers School of Environmental and Biological
Sciences, and the New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station.
119
The presumed independence and impartiality of “science-based” sources is
contested. See generally SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995) (arguing that scientific and legal knowledge
are interconnected and co-constituting). Nonetheless, this appeal to “science”
undeniably represents an embrace of impartiality as a public law value, particularly
in comparison to the prior scheme’s delegation of authority to parties with more
direct financial self-interest in lax regulatory standards. See supra notes 112–113
and accompanying text.
115
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be found to be humane”); the ultimate decision as to whether a
practice qualified as “humane” was now more clearly in the hands of
public authorities.
In addition to challenging the NJDA’s routine agricultural
practice exemption, the petitioners also challenged a number of more
particular safe harbor exemptions, including the “tail docking” of
dairy cows.120 The petitioners argued that the practice of tail docking
was not “humane” as required by the governing statute, and so its
inclusion within a safe harbor was beyond the scope of the
regulator’s authority.121 The NJDA defended its decision on the basis
that it had responded appropriately to concerns about animal pain
raised in public comment and that there was some (albeit conflicting)
evidence to support the view that tail docking might improve milk
quality and udder health and reduce the spread of disease.122 The
NJDA further noted that it does in fact “discourage[]” tail docking,
and intends to monitor the practice with the possibility of banning it
in the future if it later concludes the practice to be “inhumane.”123
The NJDA was thus required in the course of judicial review
proceedings to account for both its decision-making process and its
ultimate choice as a regulator. Such transparency and accountability
exceed that required of producers empowered to set standards
through the common agricultural practice exemptions to anti-cruelty
legislation, as discussed in the previous subsection.
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
NJDA’s arguments.
The reviewing court recognized the
“considerable expertise that the [NJDA] brought to bear in reaching
its decision to include tail docking within its list of permitted
practices,” and the very high standard of review that applies to
agency decisions of this kind.124 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that the decision to list routine tail docking as a permissible (i.e.
“humane”) practice was “both arbitrary and capricious,” and so
outside the scope of the regulator’s authority.125 The court was
swayed not only by the evidence of the pain and suffering caused by
the practice, but also by the fact that both the American Veterinary
Medical Association and the Canadian Veterinary Medical
Association have “specifically disparaged” the practice “as having
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Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 908.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 908–09.
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Id.
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no benefit and as leading to distress.”126 The ambiguity of the
evidence of any benefit associated with routine tail docking, and the
fact that the practice was “discourage[d]” by the NJDA, supported
the court’s finding that shielding tail docking from penalty was
contrary to the statutory mandate.127 The statutory directive that the
agency must define “humane” practices required that decisions
respecting tail docking not be left to the “individual conscience of
each dairy farmer.”128 Further to this judicial ruling, the governing
regulation was modified to provide that tail docking of cattle be
permitted only in individual cases (i.e. not as a routine matter), and
“only upon determination by a veterinarian for individual
animals.”129 Again, we see that the regulator was required to be
transparent about its reasons for setting particular standards, and was
accountable to an impartial judiciary. This public law oversight,
moreover, substantively elevated the governing standards for the care
of dairy cattle.
New Jersey’s experience of regulation and review is highly
unusual in the context of farmed animal protection in Canada and the
United States, representing a relatively remarkable level of
protection for public law values. It is not my intention to suggest
that dairy cows in New Jersey have good lives, or that the legal
regime governing producers in that state is acceptable. It is important
to emphasize that dairy industries across Canadian and U.S.
jurisdictions are characterized by extensive social and physical
control of animals.130 The NJDA and reviewing court were each
engaged in welfare balancing wherein considerable attention was
given to whether impugned practices were in fact useful to dairy
production.131 Tail docking was ultimately impermissible as a
routine practice because there was no persuasive evidence that it
benefited dairying.132 Harmful practices that are perceived as
necessary to industrial dairying—most notably calf separation—are
not disrupted or even threatened by the New Jersey scheme.133 While
public law values are necessary for effective farmed animal
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-2.6(f) (2012); see ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra
note 64, at 3.
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See supra Part II.
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See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
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For a discussion of calf separation, see supra notes 19–20 and accompanying
text.
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protection, they are certainly not sufficient, especially absent
substantial democratic commitment to animal interests.134
Nonetheless, the presence of public law values—
impartiality, transparency and accountability—are remarkable in this
scheme relative to other forms of farmed animal protection across
Canada and the United States. Concerned citizens in New Jersey
believed that a regulatory body was failing to adhere to its statutory
mandate in defining “humane” practices. These citizens were able
to file suit, bring evidence, and convince a reviewing court that it was
“arbitrary and capricious” to conclude that routine tail docking was
“humane,” and that it was similarly “arbitrary and capricious” to
assume that the practices endorsed by “veterinary schools, land grant
colleges, and agricultural extension agents” ought to be trusted as
necessarily “humane.”135 The litigation and ensuing judicial reasons
engaged with themes of bias, transparency, adequacy of reasons, and
substantive conformity with legal requirements. In short, the
governing regime was legible as an operation of public power, and,
as such, public law values were understood by all involved to be both
relevant and operative.
C. Private or Quasi-Private Standards
Canada’s National Farm Animal Care Council (NFACC)
represents a step further along the rough public-to-private spectrum
of farmed animal protection tools: formal but private (or quasiprivate) standard-setting bodies. Such bodies may be recognized
through statute, regulation or judicial assessment as setting
persuasive or authoritative standards for animal care. But these
bodies themselves are not legally bound to public law values. As the
NFACC case study demonstrates, such entities may choose to adopt
processes that have elements of transparency, accountability or
impartiality, but these choices are not subject to public law
enforcement.
NFACC is wholly funded by government, but not created or
constrained by statute or regulations.136 NFACC is comprised of
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See infra Part V. See also Eisen, supra note 49 (arguing that democratic
engagement is necessary to enforcing and strengthening animal protection
standards).
135
See Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 903–07.
136
See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 17 (“From the start, the endeavour has been
funded by Agriculture Canada, a federal agency, though the government has no
voting seat at the table, and no official role in the direction of the coalition. It
funds the project and has observer status – nothing more. Other provincial

2020]

PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER

187

commodity producers (including Dairy Farmers of Canada, Dairy
Processors Association of Canada, and Dairy Farmers of Ontario),
animal protection groups, the Canadian Veterinary Medical
Association, and other interested parties, including restaurants and
retailers, and manufacturers of animal feed.137 The primary function
of NFACC is the development of “Codes of Practice” (Codes) setting
out guidelines for the care of farmed animals.138
Although NFACC Codes use some language suggestive of
legal compulsion (i.e. “standards” and “requirements”),139 the Codes
have no independent legal force.140 Their juridical role varies from
province to province depending on the extent, if any, of legislative
incorporation. In some provinces, where no legislative or regulatory
reference is made to the Codes, they may be relied upon by courts as
evidence of the “reasonable and generally accepted” practices that
are routinely exempted from the ordinary operation of anti-cruelty
statutes.141
In other provinces, the Codes are referentially
incorporated to provide “safe harbors,” such that compliance with the
Codes constitutes an absolute defense to a cruelty prosecution.142
The Codes are not generally incorporated as establishing mandatory
regulatory standards, although such incorporation is certainly
possible.143

agriculture ministries have also been involved, though government agencies are
not permitted to vote on NFACC matters.”).
137
Id. at 16–17.
138
See id. at 18.
139
Id. at 18, 32–33, 48–49; see also Implementing Codes of Practice, NFACC.CA
(2013), http://www.nfacc.ca/resources/assessment/
animal_care_assessment_framework.pdf.
140
Sankoff, supra note 80, at 18–19.
141
See Sankoff, supra note 84, at 35, 37 n.122 (discussing R. v. Dondale, 2017
SKPC 58 as a case in which “failing to follow the code of practice, in conjunction
with other evidence, established that the animals were in distress for the purposes
of the Act”); id. at 35 n.118 (discussing R. v. Kowalik, 2010 SKPC 58 and R. v.
Tomalin, 2011 NBPC 29 as cases that demonstrate that courts are strongly
influenced by NFACC Codes). But see id. at 35 n.118 (discussing R. v. Van
Dongen, 2004 BCPC 479 and R. v. Hurley, 2017 ONCJ 263 as emphasizing
NFACC compliance is neither mandatory nor determinative of compliance with
the law).
142
See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 19; see, e.g., Animal Care Codes of Practice
Regulation, B.C. Reg. 34/2019, § 4 (establishing that “the requirements and
recommendations contained in a [listed] code of practice [including the 2009
NFACC Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of Dairy Cattle] are
recognized as reasonable and generally accepted” for the purposes of the statutory
customary agricultural practices exemption).
143
See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 20. For examples of mandatory incorporation of
Codes, see Animal Protection Standards Regulations, Nfld. Reg. 36/12, §§ 2(2) &
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The NFACC “Code development process” sets out a number
of procedural and substantive requirements for Codes.144 These
include, for example, that Codes “should meet or exceed [World
Organisation for Animal Health] standards,” should be based on “the
best available science and other acceptable knowledge sources,” and,
wherever possible, should include reasons for standards imposed.145
The Code process is initiated by commodity groups themselves, for
example the Dairy Farmers of Canada.146 An expert scientific report
is first prepared, setting out major animal welfare concerns in a given
industry.147 A draft Code is then developed by a Code Committee
with a specified composition, and made available for a 60-day public
consultation period.148 If that process is “appropriately followed,”
the NFACC Executive “will support the Code,” and a final Code will
be issued.149 There is, however, no mechanism by which to hold the
NFACC process accountable to these requirements, through judicial
review or otherwise.150
NFACC’s treatment of calf separation and tail docking
demonstrate the limits of this regulatory model. First, the Code’s
approach to tail docking illustrates the weakness of Code
“requirements.” Second, the Code’s approach to calf separation
demonstrates the strength of producer interests in defining Codes that
5 (establishing that a “code or standard adopted in these regulations may be
considered a requirement” where the code contains mandatory language, and
“adopt[ing]” aspects of the NFACC Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of
Dairy Cattle); Animal Welfare Regulations, P.E.I. Reg. EC194/17, § 26, sched. B
(requiring out that “[e]very owner of a commercial animal shall comply with the
codes of practice listed in Schedule B,” including the Code of Practice for the
Care and Handling of Dairy Cattle). NFACC specifies that Code requirements
“may be enforceable under federal and provincial legislation” and that producers
“may be compelled by industry associations to undertake corrective measures or
risk a loss of market options.” Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of
Farm Animals, NFACC.CA (2020), https://www.nfacc.ca/code-developmentprocess. Such possible incorporation into legislative or voluntary standards are,
however, not intrinsic to the Codes themselves. See Sankoff, supra note 84, at 23.
144
Development Process for Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of Farm
Animals, NFACC.CA (2020), https://www.nfacc.ca/code-development-process
[hereinafter Development Process for Codes]; see also Sankoff, supra note 80, at
22–23.
145
Development Process for Codes, supra note 144.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See Sankoff, supra note 80 at 4–5 (observing that NFACC is “a major player on
the Canadian law-making scene” despite “an organizational framework that lacks
many of the traditional checks and balances of a legislative body, and the fact that
what the group produces is not actually law, in the strict sense of the word”).
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prioritize industry imperatives over animal well-being—and the
absence of protection for public law values in spite of this predictable
outcome.
The Dairy Code of Practice (2009) takes preambular note of
the lack of evidence supporting tail docking as a hygiene measure,
and the research demonstrating that “[d]ocked heifers show signs of
chronic pain,” among other possible complications.151 The Code sets
out as a “requirement” that “[d]airy cattle must not be tail docked
unless medically necessary,”152 and sets out a number of alternative
“recommended best practices,” including “switch trimming” (i.e.
trimming the hair on cows’ tails) and maintenance of a clean housing
environment.153 As noted above, however, the language of
“requirement” should not be taken to define a mandatory legal
standard in the absence of formal incorporation into a provincial
regulation.154 The Code’s use of the word “requirement” carries no
independent legal force.155
The Dairy Code of Practice further acknowledges calf
separation as a source of “stress,” but does not provide for any
“requirements” in relation to this practice.156 The Code’s preambular
statement on “Calves” explains:
Generally, dairy calves are separated from their
mothers shortly after birth. There are benefits to both
calf and dam by allowing the pair to bond. Allowing
the calf to spend a longer period of time with the
dam may result in lowered morbidity and mortality
in the calf; however, separation stress to both the
cow and calf will be higher the longer they are
together. Cow health is generally improved by
allowing the calf to suckle (related to oxytocin
effects on the post partum uterus). Whether the calf
is removed immediately or allowed to suckle the
cow, it is important to ensure that the calf receives
adequate colostrum.157
151

Code of Practice for the Handling of Dairy Cattle, NFACC.CA § 4.6 (2009),
https://www.nfacc.ca/codes-of-practice/dairy-cattle/code#Section4 [hereinafter
Dairy Code of Practice].
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text.
155
See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text.
156
Dairy Code of Practice, supra note 151, at § 3.8.
157
Id. (citations omitted).
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The “recommended” practices that follow include monitoring the
calf for signs of illness during its early days, and the recommendation
that farmers “reduce separation distress by either removing the calf
shortly after birth or by using a two-step weaning process.”158
The notional (but not generally legal) force that “required”
practices may have do not apply to such recommended practices.159
In fact two-step weaning processes remain rare, with most dairy
calves separated immediately from their mothers despite the
associated “stress.”160 The sole social “requirement” set out for
calves is that they “have visual contact with other calves.”161 It is
further recommended that their “motivation to suck” be satisfied with
an artificial teat.162 The acknowledged scientific consensus on the
stress of separation, and the lack of associated “requirements” (even
in the diminished form represented by the Code), reflects the interests
of producers and production imperatives in the Code process.
However, unlike under the New Jersey regime, the NFACC
delegation of authority to producers is not legible as a public law
concern amenable to judicial oversight. NFACC, although funded
entirely by government, and created for the purpose of setting
standards contemplated to have legal effect, thus represents a step
away from the public law values evident in the New Jersey scheme.
Because NFACC does not operate pursuant to statutory authority, it
cannot be made accountable as the NJDA was in respect of its
decision to allow routine tail docking. Arguments that NFACC is
biased, lacks transparency, or makes unreasonable decisions are not
cognizable as justiciable questions of public law. Formally, NFACC
is merely a private body, making private choices, unaccountable to
the mechanisms that constrain public power. This is true despite the
fact that NFACC is created to, and does in fact, generate Canada’s
only detailed articulation of standards for legally permissible
treatment of farmed animals.163
There is no legal basis on which to demand adherence to
public law values—such as transparency, accountability and
impartiality—in NFACC standard-setting.
These values do,
158

Id.
See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text.
160
Emillie M. Bassi, Ellen Goddard & John R. Parkins, “That’s the Way We’ve
Always Done It”: A Social Practice Analysis of Farm Animal Welfare in Alberta,
32 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 335, 346–47 (2019).
161
Dairy Code of Practice, supra note 151, at § 1.1.1.
162
See id. at § 2.2.1.
163
Sankoff, supra note 80, at 4–5.
159
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however, arguably remain operative in an attenuated form. Because
NFACC is designed to have many of the trappings of a conventional
administrative body, NFACC offers some assurances of
transparency, structured decision-making, and reason-giving—albeit
assurances that are not subject to judicial or administrative
supervision. NFACC, for example, promises to follow a specific
process for developing its Codes,164 binds itself to consider some
kinds of evidence,165 includes requirements for the composition of
Code Committees,166 commits to the regular review of Codes,167 and
publishes draft Codes for comment before ultimately making its final
Codes transparently available to the public.168 The fact that judicial
review is unavailable, however, limits the confidence that might
reasonably be placed in these voluntary processes and commitments.
D. Private Choices of Individual Actors
In the absence of express legal requirements to the contrary
(which, as we have seen, are rare), individual producers may decide
to dock the tails of cattle on their farms, or separate calves from their
mothers, or otherwise engage in common agricultural practices
despite their harm to dairy animals.169 At first blush, these may
appear to be purely private choices. In legal terms, we might think
of these as producers’ private decisions as to how to dispose of their
own property. But, as we have seen, even these purest of private
actions carry a law-making function in the context of animal
protection as it is structured in most jurisdictions. This is because,
as discussed above, almost every jurisdiction has incorporated
“customary agricultural practices” as the governing legal standard
for defining exemptions to criminal and quasi-criminal anti-cruelty
laws—including in jurisdictions where those laws are the only ones
governing the treatment of animals on farms.170
In most
jurisdictions, therefore, dairy producers’ private, profit-seeking
decisions carry a double valence for the lives of farmed animals.
These private producer choices not only shape the experiences of the
animals they own themselves, but they also contribute to setting the
164

Development Process for Codes, supra note 144.
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.; see also Sankoff, supra note 80, at 28 (arguing that this establishment of
periodic review enhances public deliberation on the legal treatment of farmed
animals).
168
Development Process for Codes, supra note 144.
169
See supra Part II for a review of harmful dairy industry practices.
170
See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212–216; supra notes 64–90 and
accompanying text.
165
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legal standards that govern the treatment of farmed animals more
generally.
Because this form of standard-setting power is so diffuse and
indirect, the force of public law values is negligible. There is no
expectation that individual dairy producers will be transparent with
respect to how they treat their herds, let alone how they arrive at
decisions respecting animal care. In fact, across jurisdictions, the
proliferation of “ag gag” laws affirmatively protect producers’ ability
to shield their operations from public scrutiny.171 There is further no
expectation that they will be impartial when making choices
respecting animal care. Producers are not bound, even notionally, to
any public obligation to weigh competing values in setting standards
for animal care. They are, instead, legally authorized and expected
to maximize their own interests in dairy productivity, with their
resulting choices elevated to the level of de facto legal standards.
Finally, with no public obligations to impartiality or transparency,
there are no substantive commitments to which they might be made
accountable, and no mechanism for public law accountability.
E. Dairy Cow Protection and Public Law Values
The foregoing survey elaborates the various forms of legal
oversight engaged by Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions to protect the
interests of dairy cows. Although organized around the formality of
lawmaking authority involved (beginning with legislation and
ending in practice or custom), this survey has demonstrated that, in
reality, there are significant interactions and overlaps between these
forms of governance. These regulatory environments represent, in
Jody Freeman’s terms, case studies of “regulatory regimes,” in which
the classical administrative law distinction between “public” and
“private” seems to blur, with private actors directly or indirectly
engaged in public or quasi-public functions.172 In particular, we have
seen that, across jurisdictions, the aggregate choices of individual
agricultural producers have a significant impact on the substance of
legal standards respecting the treatment of farmed animals.
Scholars and animal advocates have long argued that this
state of affairs gives farmers effectively unrestricted control over the

171

See Jodi Lazare, Ag-Gag Laws, Animal Rights Activism, and the Constitution:
What is Protected Speech? 58 ALBERTA L. REV. 83 (2020); Justin F. Marceau, Ag
Gag Past, Present, and Future, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2015).
172
See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816–19 (2000).
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lives of the animals in their care.173 Such criticisms often emphasize
that, given producers’ incentives to prioritize economic efficiency
over animal well-being, this amounts to putting the proverbial
“foxes” in charge of the “henhouse.”174
I suggest here that this fox-in-charge-of-the-henhouse
problem is one instance of a broader set of concerns respecting
farmed animal protection: that public law values are inadequately
guarded in this context. Deficits of public law values such as
impartiality, transparency and accountability are particularly
problematic where animals are an affected constituency. Animal
experience lacks even the most basic recognition as a matter of
private law.175 And public law, which has so far been the sole forum
for legal recognition of animal interests, is only capable of providing
robust protection where animals’ particular vulnerabilities are taken
into account.176 Animals—who do not vote or hold office or instruct
counsel—are likely to have their interests protected only where
interested human voters, litigators and activists have the information
and legal tools necessary to assure that protection. In other words,
effective animal protection is possible only in settings where
decision-making is relatively impartial, transparent and
accountable.177
Yet despite the importance of public law values to effective
animal protection, legal regulation of farmed animal use has not
generally nourished these values. Exceptionally, in New Jersey, a
generalized regulatory reliance on the judgments of “veterinary
schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural extension agents” was
justiciable, and ultimately found to be an impermissible delegation
of authority to define standards of animal care, in part because of
these parties’ interest in the economic exploitation of animals.178 But
this lack of impartiality was only visible as a legal “problem” because
of the structure of the particular statutory regime, the United States’
more developed judicial constraints on rulemaking processes,179 and
because of the legislature’s choice to bring animal protection out of

173

See BISGOULD, supra note 69, at 173–74; Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at
226.
174
Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212-219.
175
See supra Part III.
176
See supra Part III.
177
See supra Part III.
178
See Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 903–07; supra Part
IV.B.
179
See sources cited supra note 91.
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the sphere of broad criminal or quasi-criminal prohibition,180 and into
the realm of more detailed public regulation.181
More commonly, standard-setting respecting the treatment
and use of farmed animals is left in the hands of entities like
NFACC,182 or even the aggregate choices of individual producers,
who are not bound to public law values.183 Although the NFACC
process is entirely publicly funded, governments play no substantive
role in establishing Code standards.184 The Code development
process includes many of the trappings of a regulatory process
(procedural requirements, public comment periods, substantive
parameters, etc.), but these ostensible requirements are not subject to
oversight or enforcement through judicial review proceedings.185
The resulting process is unlike a statutory delegation of legislative
authority, for example to professional associations: there is no
delegating statute constraining the exercise of rulemaking or
standard-setting, and no judicial oversight, despite the fact that the
NFACC process does, and is contemplated to, generate standards
with legal force.186

180

See supra Part IV.A. For a broader critique of criminal and carceral approaches
to animal protection, see generally MARCEAU, supra note 90.
181
See supra Part IV.B.
182
See supra Part IV.C.
183
See supra Part IV.D.
184
See supra Part IV.C.
185
See supra Part IV.C. Such unenforceable methods of implementing public law
values in privatized regulatory regimes have been scrutinized in administrative law
scholarship. See, e.g., MICHAEL TAGGART, THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 2 (1997); Steven Bernstein, When is Non-State Global Governance Really
Governance?, 1 UTAH L. REV. 91, 91, 93 (2010) (arguing that many forms of nonstate government do not function as “meaningful governance”); Francesca
Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New
Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 860–61
(2011); Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and SelfRegulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146, 146–68 (Robert
Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge eds., 2010); Freeman, supra note 177, at
816–19; Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL.
& ADMIN. L. 291, 298–326 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2003) (assessing whether and how
private delegations might remain constitutionally accountable in the absence of
judicial oversight); Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation
More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55
ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 361, 361 (2010) (describing conditions under which selfregulation is more or less effective, and concluding that self-regulation cannot
fully replace direct legal enforcement mechanisms).
186
Sankoff, supra note 80, at 4–5, 24 n.82 (referring to NFACC as a “body
performing a government function of setting standards”).
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Even more starkly, the prevalence of common agricultural
practice exemptions to cruelty provisions across Canada and the
United States effectively endows producers themselves with the
authority to set standards of animal care.187 It may be the case that
these farmers are effectively defining the substance of farmed animal
protection law, but they are not subject in this function to any
structured public oversight whatsoever. Unlike primary legislation,
these choices are not made by elected representatives. Unlike
regulation, they are not legally bound to follow any substantive or
procedural requirements. Unlike private or quasi-private standardsetting, there is not even a voluntary or implied commitment to
embrace any public purposes whatsoever—or to articulate and
defend decisions made.188
In sum, standard-setting in the sphere of farmed animal
protection is often left in the hands of actors who are legally welcome
and expected to act in their own self-interest, rather than in the
interests of animals, or in accordance with any other public-regarding
interests; who are not required to explain or even publicly reveal their
choices in any systematic way; and who are not generally
accountable to any statute or public body. Under this common model
of standard-setting in the farmed animal protection context, the
operation of public law values—including transparency,
accountability, and impartiality—dwindles and effectively
disappears.
V. Conclusion
Dairy cows are radically vulnerable beings.189 They are
subject to routinized, large-scale and deeply intimate harms in every
area of their lives.190 Their sex, birth, and nursing are, in particular,
meticulously controlled as the engines of vast economic and political
machines constructed and directed by human beings.191 Like other
farmed animals, they are particularly vulnerable to the private
authority that their legal owners exercise over their lives and bodies,
and to public law institutions, which they have no direct power to
shape.

187

See supra Part IV.A. and Part IV.D.
The sole minimal exception would appear to be that some farmers may choose,
on an individual basis, to bring their practices into the judicial and public-law
spotlight by testifying as to their own practices in order to assist in the defence of
another farmer charged with cruelty for a similar practice.
189
Eisen, supra note 41, at 941–42; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
190
See supra Part II.
191
See supra Part II.
188
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Meaningful legal protection of animal interests requires
recognition of public law values. Impartiality, transparency, and
accountability facilitate public engagement on the part of democratic
and litigation constituencies beyond those who have a direct financial
interest in the unencumbered exploitation of animals. Yet, as we
have seen, significant regulatory and standard-setting authority
across Canada and the United States has been effectively ceded to
producers, with exemptions for common agricultural practices
serving as only the most extreme (and most common) example.
These privatized modes of standard-setting leave vanishingly little
role for the public law values necessary to effective farmed animal
protection.
The choice across jurisdictions to establish some veneer of
constraint on industry, while at the same time allowing industry to
substantially determine governing standards, raises questions. Why
are farmed animals regulated in this way, despite the apparent
importance of transparency, impartiality and accountability to
effective protection? One possibility is that governments and
democratic majorities feel a moral imperative to protect animals, but
this imperative is significantly tempered by an ambivalence as to the
consequences of more interventionist regulation. The price and
availability of agricultural products, including perhaps especially
dairy,192 is weighted heavily in the policy balance. If, however, we
wish to take seriously the experiences of the animals whose lives are
so thoroughly determined by their positions as farmed animals, the
public law dimensions of our commitments must be more
consciously and more consistently defended.

192

See Mathilde Cohen, Of Milk and the Constitution, 40 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
115, 119–21 (2017).

The U.S. Dairy Industry in
the 20th & 21st Century
George B. Frisvold*
Abstract
At the beginning of the 20th Century, the U.S. dairy industry
was comprised of millions of small-scale operations producing for
their own or for very local consumption. By the end of the 20th
Century, the industry was dominated by large-scale producers
marketing products via large cooperatives. Improvements in
transportation, advances in animal breeding and feeding
technologies, and scale economies have allowed the industry to be
more competitive on global markets, where there is now active
international trade in dairy products. Major government programs to
support dairy farm income date back to Depression-era problems
facing the industry. Federal programs to support dairy income led to
recurring problems of overproduction. Programs initially instituted
to protect dairy producers from oligopsony power of purchasers now
have more questionable effects given industry concentration.
Increased market concentration has led to ongoing antitrust scrutiny
of the industry, while geographic concentration of production has
raised concerns over water and air pollution. At the outset of the 21st
Century, increased productivity has made the dairy industry less
reliant on government programs and more reliant on global markets.
Yet the industry faces many challenges: greater scrutiny over
greenhouse gas emissions, secular declines in milk prices and U.S.
per capita milk consumption, reduced viability of small-scale
operations, and the rise of plant-based milk substitutes. Still, dairies
and dairy products remain an important part of U.S. agriculture and
U.S. household food consumption.
I. Introduction
The U.S. dairy industry at the beginning of the 20th Century
was characterized by diffuse production and geographically
concentrated consumption.1 By the end of the century, it was
characterized by concentrated production, with nationally and
Professor, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of
Arizona.
1 See M. R. Weimer & D. P. Blayney, Landmarks in the U.S. Dairy Industry, 694
AGRIC. INFORMATION BULL. 1, 3–4 (1994). The United States Department of
Agriculture provides statistical data through the National Agricultural Statistics
Service that may be access publicly online. See generally Quick Stats, NAT’L
AGRIC. STAT. SERV., https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ (last visited February 9,
2020).
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globally diffused marketing for consumption.2 Numerous
technological advances enabled this transformation.3 The federal
and state governments have also actively intervened in U.S. dairy
markets.4 Many laws and programs enacted in response to income
and market problems facing dairy producers at the beginning of the
century and during the Great Depression remain in effect today.5 Several
critics have questioned the need for and value of such programs in
light of modern market realities. 6 For example, government
programs to raise dairy prices have led to waves of overproduction,
which led to the slaughter of dairy herds.7 As the industry became
increasingly comprised of larger-scale producers and marketing
cooperatives, it has faced ongoing antitrust scrutiny from the U.S.
Department of Justice.8 The rise of farm-level and geographical
concentration has also presented problems of air and water pollution.9
At the outset of the 21st Century, increased productivity has
made the dairy industry less reliant on government programs and
more reliant on global markets.10 Yet, the industry faces many
challenges: greater scrutiny over greenhouse gas emissions, secular
declines in milk prices and U.S. per capita milk consumption,
reduced viability of small-scale operations, and the rise in plantbased milk substitutes.11 Still, dairies and dairy products remain an
See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5.
See id.
4 Id. at 17–18.
5 ERIC M. ERBA & ANDREW M. NOVAKOVIC, THE EVOLUTION OF MILK P RICING AND
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN DAIRY MARKETS 14 (Cornell Program on Dairy
Mkts. and Policy, EB 95-05, 1995).
6 Robert T. Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, The Pricing Policies and Goals of
Federal Milk Order Regulations: Time for Reevaluation, 23 S.D. L. REV. 662, 663
(1978).
7 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13.
8 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 674.
9 JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE C HANGING S TRUCTURE
OF DAIRY FARMING 31 (U. S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47,
2007).
10 See DANIEL A. SUMNER, DAIRY POLICY PROGRESS: COMPLETING THE MOVE TO
MARKETS 9 (2018).
11 NIGEL KEY & STACY S NEERINGER, CARBON PRICES AND THE A DOPTION OF
METHANE DIGESTERS ON DAIRY AND HOG FARMS 3–4, 8 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 16, 2011). Hyunok Lee & Daniel A.
Sumner, Dependence on Policy Revenue Poses Risks for Investments in Dairy
Digesters, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 226, 227 (2018). HAYDEN STEWART ET AL., WHY ARE
AMERICANS CONSUMING LESS FLUID MILK? A LOOK AT GENERATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN INTAKE FREQUENCY, at i (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research
Serv., Rep. No. 149, 2013). HAYDEN STEWART AND JERRY CESSNA, LIVESTOCK,
DAIRY AND POULTRY OUTLOOK: SPECIAL ARTICLE ON DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES: A
LOOK AT SALES OF COW’S MILK AND PLANT-BASED MILK ANALOGS 2 (U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., LDP-M-279 SA, 2017). JAMES M. MACDONALD
ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF DAIRY F ARMING 31 (U.
S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47, 2007).
2
3
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important part of U.S. agriculture and U.S. household food
consumption.12
II. The U.S. Dairy Industry at the Beginning of the 20th
Century
At the beginning of the 20th Century, households produced
milk primarily for home consumption, while markets for milk were
not yet well developed.13 While most farms had cows, production
was small-scale and diffuse.14 By 1920, five million US farms had
dairy cows (compared to 54 thousand today).15 In 1930, 70% of US
farms had dairy cows, yet sale of dairy products accounted for a
relatively small share of farm household income.16 Among all farms
with cows, dairy sales accounted for more than 40% of total farm
sales on only 14%.17
The scope for marketing dairy products increased with
improvements in technology and infrastructure.18 Refrigerated tanker
cars allowed rail shipments of milk across longer distances, allowing
transportation of milk from rural areas to fast-growing urban ones.19
The introduction of trucks and improved roads gave producers
greater flexibility and control in milk shipping. 20 Production of
evaporated milk, processed cheese, and butter, which were less
perishable than fluid milk, all became more widespread.21 There was
more scope for storing and marketing these processed products over
greater distances.22 But, after World War I, European demand for those
U.S. dairy products that could be preserved and shipped more easily
dropped, leading to falling dairy prices.23
M. SWEITZER ET AL., FOOD-AT-HOME EXPENDITURES: COMPARING COMMERCIAL
HOUSEHOLD SCANNER DATA FROM IRI AND GOVERNMENT SURVEY DATA 16 (U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., TB-1946, 2017). NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ACH17-4, 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE
HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION 1 (2019),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_DairyCattle
_and_Milk_Production.pdf.
13 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1.
14 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
15 For historical numbers, see id. at 3. For current numbers, see Quick Stats, supra
note 1.
16 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
17 Id.
18 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1–2.
19 Id. at 1.
20 Id.
21 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 7–8.
22 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1 and 4.
23 Id. at 4.
12
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Moreover, many barriers remained to permit orderly
marketing of milk.24 First, farm households lacked many basic
resources: only 58% had cars, 25% had telephones, and 33% had
electricity.25 Few farms then had refrigeration.26 Fluid milk is
produced daily on dairies.27 Yet, it is highly perishable even with
refrigeration (which most farms still lacked).28 Without phones, it
was difficult for farmers to find and negotiate with buyers.29 Prices
were based on weight and butterfat content, but farmers could not
know if their milk that was shipped more distantly was being
weighed and tested fairly by milk purchasers.30 On the other side,
handlers were not assured the milk they contracted for in advance
was not soured or tainted.31
Fluid milk was bulky and difficult to transport over long
distances.32 It is also highly perishable, greatly limiting the space and
time over which it may be transported and consumed.33 In urban
centers, there were a relatively small number of large milk buyers
(called handlers) purchasing milk from a large number of small,
unorganized producers.34 This market structure gave handlers
oligopsony power to push down milk purchase prices below
competitive levels.35
To countervail this oligopsony power, dairy producers began
to organize collectively in cooperatives to bargain over the prices of
dairy products they received.36 Handlers countered this collective
action in court, arguing that such explicit cooperation by sellers
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.37 The Clayton Act of
191438 explicitly exempted non-stock agricultural associations from
antitrust laws, but did not address some of the vague wording of the
Sherman Act that left the status of cooperative marketing
Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 668–69.
MARYANNA S. SMITH & DENNIS M. ROTH, CHRONOLOGICAL LANDMARKS IN
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 63 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. Info. Bulletin No. 425,
1990).
26 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 3.
27 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5.
28 Id.; see Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
29 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.; see SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5.
34 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2.
35 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
36 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2.
37 See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2019); see ERBA &
NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2.
38 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2019).
24
25

2020]

U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY

201

associations ambiguous.39 To partially address this ambiguity,
Congress annually passed “riders” on appropriations for the
Department of Justice, prohibiting it from prosecuting cooperating
farmers.40 Dairy producers began organizing large-scale “milk
strikes” withholding milk to cities.41
To address these ongoing issues, the 1922 Capper-Volstead
Act 42 allowed farmers limited exemptions from antitrust controls of
the Clayton and Sherman Antitrust Act, allowing them to organize to
collectively set product prices.43 Passage of Capper-Volstead was
controversial at the time, with concerns that the antitrust exemption
would give dairy cooperative marketing associations too much
power to raise prices, at the expense of consumers.44 Senator Atlee
Pomerene of Ohio argued, “There is nothing in this bill to prevent a
combination of men who are dealing in food products – and I refer
to the dairymen – from getting the most exorbitant prices, and doing
so at the expense of the babes of the country.”45 Capper-Volstead
prohibited “undue price enhancement” by cooperatives, but did not
specify what constituted “undue.”46 Further, authority to monitor and
temper agricultural cooperative pricing behavior was given to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) rather than the Department
of Justice.47 USDA was perceived at the time to be more sympathetic
to farm interests (and less likely to restrict their behavior).48
In the 1930s, while court decisions restricted cooperatives
from interstate marketing of dairy products, courts tended to uphold
cooperative intrastate marketing.49 California, a major dairy state,
adopted an intrastate marketing organization in the early 1930s, which
is still in effect today.50 Despite Capper-Volstead, cooperative
marketing associations were largely unsuccessful in raising dairy
product prices, for two reasons.51 First, because milk is highly
perishable, its value falls dramatically over a short time.52 The threat
by dairies of withholding milk supplies was less credible than for
James L. Guth, Farmer Monopolies, Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress:
Origins of the Capper-Volstead Act, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 67, 68 (1982).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–92 (2020).
43 Id.; see Guth, supra note 36, at 82.
44 Guth, supra note 36, at 75.
45 Id. at 78.
46 7 U.S.C. § 292.
47 Guth, supra note 36, at 82.
48 See id.
49 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 7.
50 Id.
51 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 5.
52 See id. at 3.
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more easily storable agricultural commodities.53 Second, because the
associations were voluntary, producers were not compelled to join
them, and those not in associations often sold into the urban markets
(acting as “strikebreakers”).54
In the wake of the Great Depression, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA) was passed, giving the Secretary of
Agriculture authority to impose production controls to reduce
commodity surpluses and raise prices.55 The AAA provided for the
establishment of marketing orders.56 Unlike cooperative associations,
marketing orders had aspects of mandatory compulsion.57 Growers
within a designated region could vote on whether to form a marketing
order, with the referenda requiring a super-majority to assent.58 Once
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, however, the rules of the
order applied to all producers in the region.59 Thus, producers were no
longer able to free ride and undercut arrangements negotiated by the
order.
In 1935, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
National Industrial Recover Act was an unconstitutional delegation
of power.60 The AAA was amended in 1935 to address the Court’s
ruling, but in 1936 the Supreme Court ruled that the 1935 AAA
violated the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.61 To address
the Court’s ruling, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing and
Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), which among other things
specified the Secretary’s powers over establishment and enforcement
of marketing orders more clearly.62 The AMAA also brought all
handlers (buyer processors) in an approved marketing order area
under the authority of the order.63 Minimum prices for different types
of dairy products were set for all handlers in an order.64
See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. Swantz, Alexander. "How we came
to have federal milk marketing orders: What they are and what they do." Journal
of Dairy Science 45, no. 11 (1962): 1397-1402, at 1398.
54 Id. at 5.
55 See Paul L. Murphy, The New Deal Agricultural Program and the Constitution,
29 AGRIC. HIST. 160, 160–69 (1955).
56 Id. at 161.
57 See id. at 160–62.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935); Murphy, supra
note 51, at 160.
61 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77–78 (1936); Murphy, supra note 51, at
160–61.
62 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat.
246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Murphy, supra note
51, at 163.
63 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat.
246; see Murphy, supra note 51, at 163–64.
64 See Murphy, supra note 51, at 163.
53
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When some processors refused to pay assessments under and
order, the United States filed a complaint against them in October 27,
1938.65 The processors countered that the marketing order and the
AMAA of 1937 was unconstitutional, infringing on their Fifth
Amendment rights to due process, their property rights under the
Fourth Amendment, and on rights reserved only for states under the
Tenth Amendment.66 The District Court concurred, and the United
States appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.67 The Court upheld both
the AMAA and the Milk Order in a 5 to 4 decision, citing both
Congress’ authority to regulate economic activity through the
Interstate Commerce Clause and under its power to authorize
regulatory powers it deemed necessary, even if this granted powers
to the Executive Branch (i.e., the Secretary of Agriculture).68
The AMAA and subsequent legislation in the 1940s
solidified key aspects of U.S. dairy policy.69 These included:
• Establishment of Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMO)
across different regions and states;70 the FMMOs allowed
dairy producers to coordinate to increase their sales
revenue;71
• Government price supports for dairy products carried out by
direct government purchases of dairy products;72
• Dairy product import controls;73
• Disposal of “surplus” dairy products by channeling them to
foreign relief, the School Lunch Program, and other
outlets.74
The Steagall Amendment of 1941 established a support price
for dairy products promoted my government purchases of butter
(which could be stored).75 Under the Agricultural Act of 1949,
government purchases of dairy products to support farm income was
United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 540 (1939); see 9
NEIL E. HARL & CHARLES F. CURTISS, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 70.01[3] (2007).
66 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 541, 568; see HARL & CURTISS, supra
note 61, at § 70.01[3].
67 HARL & CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3]; see Rock Royal Cooperative,
Inc., 307 U.S. at 539–41.
68 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 568–71, 577–78; see HARL &
CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3].
69 See generally SUMNER, supra note 10.
70 Id. at 8, 10.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 8–9.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 8.
65
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formalized as a central policy.76 Section 22 of the original, 1933
AMAA included provisions for import controls.77 These were first
applied with implementation of the Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 1951.78 Imported products were typically limited to 3% or less of
U.S. milk production.79 Import restrictions were another means to
maintain the government support price.80
These policies sought to address a host of problems facing
dairy farming in particular, and U.S. agriculture in general, in the
1930s. First, there were certain aspects of agriculture that led to what
was called “the farm problem.”81 Both the demand and supply of
dairy products was inelastic – both consumption and production
changed relatively little in response to changes in market prices.82
Related to this feature, small changes in consumer demand or
production could cause large fluctuations in milk prices.83 Next,
demand for dairy products was growing slowly, while technological
innovations were causing supply to increase faster.84 As production
outstripped demand, this placed downward pressure on prices.85 A
related problem was what Cochrane called the “agricultural
treadmill.”86 Farmers adopting cost-reducing technologies or
improved practices could sell at lower prices than non-adopters.87
This downward price pressure induced other operators to adopt costcutting technologies and practices in order to survive in the market.88
This, in turn, increased supply further, starting another cycle of price
reductions.89
Id.
Id. at 9.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See id.
81 John M. Crespi & Richard J. Sexton,
Concurrence, Coopératives de Producteurs et Marketing Orders aux États-Unis
[Competition, U.S. Farmer Cooperatives, and Marketing Orders], 277–78
ÉCONOMIE RURALE 135, 135 (2003) (Fr.), English translation available in
RESEARCHGATE, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289527129_CrespiSexton-EconRurale-ENGLISH; Bruce L. Gardner, Changing Economic
Perspectives on the Farm Problem, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 62, 62 (1992).
82 Gardner, supra note 77, at 63.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 WILLARD W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 96–97 (1958).
87 See id. at 95.
88 Id. at 96.
89 Id. at 95.
76
77
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Marketing orders and dairy cooperatives were also supposed
to address the oligopsony power of milk handlers.90 Collective action
by dairy producers was intended to provide countervailing power to
such buyer market power.91 Economic theory suggests that buyers
who exercise oligopsony power restrict purchases and lower prices
for the inputs they purchase.92 In the case of milk, this would lead to
lower prices dairies received for milk and lower volumes of milk
purchased.93 This latter would also reduce the supply of milk
available to final consumers.94 Theory also suggests that if sellers
coordinate action in this type of market, they can increase both the
price they receive and sales.95 This raises both overall economic
welfare and benefits final milk consumers because greater
production lowers consumer prices.96 While the 1937 Act established
programs to raise dairy farm income, policies to raise farm prices
were to, “be in the public interest.”97
Finally, the marketing orders were intended to use
coordination to overcome a host of communication, transportation,
and technological impediments to marketing milk.98 An explicit goal
of legislation was to promote “orderly marketing” of products.99
Further, dairy legislation was drafted in the context of rural
poverty and nutrition concerns during the Great Depression.100 For
example, there was concern that if a large share of dairy operations
went out of production, it would take years to rebuild production
capacity.101 This would lead to price spikes later, once consumer
demand recovered.102 But, such price spikes would harm consumers.
Further, rural poverty (as illustrated by popular literature such as
Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath and by Dorothea Lange’s iconic
photographs of the rural poor for the Farm Security Administration)
was a major macroeconomic problem.103 Then, a large share of the
David L. Baumer et al., Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal
Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 185
(1986).
91 Id. at 185 & n.8.
92 Id. at 197 & n.46.
93 See id.
94 Id. at 198.
95 Id. at 196; see Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral
Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831, 831–41 (1989).
96 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 198.
97 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 662–63.
98 See id. at 670.
99 Id. at 662.
100 See id. at 678.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See generally SUSAN LEVINE, SCHOOL LUNCH POLITICS: THE SURPRISING
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S FAVORITE WELFARE PROGRAM 40, 46 (2008).
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U.S. population still resided on farms.104 A motivation of providing
milk for the School Lunch Program and dairy products as foreign aid,
aside from supporting farm income, was to improve nutrition of lowincome, vulnerable populations.105
III. The Dairy Industry in the Latter Half of the 20 th
Century
Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, the dairy
industry and federal dairy policy faced several challenges. While the
USDA intervened significantly to increase dairy prices, these myriad
market interventions often had unintended negative consequences,
which led to a cascade of new interventions (with their own
contradictions).106 Protected from antitrust limits by the CapperVolstead Act, and encouraged by economies of scale, dairies and
marketing cooperatives grew larger and larger.107 Various tactics by
large cooperatives to increase their market power led to greater
Justice Department scrutiny and initiatives to limit what was
characterized as their anti-competitive behavior.108 This has raised
various legal questions about the appropriate limits of cooperative
and marketing order behavior under Capper-Volstead.109 Finally,
programs to “dispose of” surplus milk via foreign aid and federal
nutrition programs sought to simultaneously (a) raise farm income
and (b) improve nutrition of the economically vulnerable.110 Some
commentators began to question whether the farm income support
goal of these programs was promoted at the expense of nutrition and
anti-poverty goals.111
A. Difficulties Maintaining Federal Price Supports
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANALYZING THE SMALL
CITY AND RURAL MARKET AREA 3 (1933).
105 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.
106 Id. at 46; E. Dale Odom, Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated: Testing the
Limits of Capper-Volstead, 59 AGRIC. HIST. 40, 46 nn. 10–11 (1985).
107 See Odom, supra note 102, at 47–48.
108 Id. at 50.
109 Id. at 52–53.
110 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.
111 J. Amy Dillard, Sloppy Joe, Slop, Sloppy Joe: How USDA Commodities
Dumping Ruined the National School Lunch Program, 87 OR. L. REV. 221, 223
(2008); Michael T. Belongia, The Dairy Price Support Program: A Study of
Misdirected Economic Incentives, 66 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 5, 14 (1984);
see Michael Correll, Getting Fat on Government Cheese: The Connection Between
Social Welfare Participation, Gender, and Obesity in America, 18 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 46 (2010).
104
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The Agriculture Act of 1949 established the Milk Price
Support Program (MPSP).112 Under the MPSP, USDA would
purchase less perishable dairy products, such as cheddar cheese,
nonfat dry milk, and butter at a pre-determined, government set
price.113 USDA would commit to purchasing as much of these
products as the dairy industry could supply at these support prices.114
The law also required the Secretary of Agriculture to set a minimum
price support for fluid milk as well as these manufactured dairy
products.115 Because fluid milk is an input into manufactured dairy
products, government purchases of manufactured products bid up the
price of milk.116 The MPSP did not, however, place any limits on the
quantity of milk that dairies could produce.117
The intention of the program was to take dairy products off
the market in times when prices were low and then make them
available when prices recovered.118 The government sent nonfat dry
milk abroad as food aid through Food for Peace programs.119 Some
cheddar cheese and butter was distributed to the School Lunch
Program, by other federal nutrition programs, by Veterans
Administration hospitals, and by federal prisons.120 The rest was
stored in warehouses or underground caverns. 121
The post-World War II period saw a series of technological
innovations that reduced the costs of dairy production.122 In the
1950s, producers began adopting antibiotics and sulfa drugs to
combat mastitis and other diseases.123 This increased milk production
per cow.124 The use of mathematical linear programming techniques
allowed researchers to develop least-cost feed rations.125 Use of
mainframe computers in the 1960s made it easier for feed companies
Katherine Lacy et al., Government Cheese: A Case Study of Price Supports, 2
APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RESOURCES 14, 17 (2020).
113 Id.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO-42-823, CONSEQUENCES OF DAIRY PRICE
SUPPORT POLICY 15 (1979).
117 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 17; see Jeffrey LaFrance & Harry de Gorter,
Regulation in a Dynamic Market: The U.S. Dairy Industry, 67 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
821, 821–32 (1985).
118 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 112, at 22–24.
119 See Seth King, Dairy Support Prices to Increase on April 1, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1978, at 19.
120 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20.
121 See id.
122 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 10-11
123 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
124 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4.
125 See I. Katzman, Solving Feed Problems Through Linear Programming, 28 J.
FARM ECON. 420, 420 (1956).
112
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and Cooperative Extension to quickly develop and disseminate
information about these least-cost rations.126 By the late 1970s,
artificial insemination was wide used for dairy cow breeding.127
These innovations all acted to push down costs and increase supplies
of dairy products.128 These growing supplies made it more difficult
for the government to support prices above market levels.129
Government price supports were trimmed in the Nixon and
Ford administrations under the tenure of Secretary of Agriculture,
Earl Butz.130 In attempts to control inflation in the early 1970s, the
Nixon Administration relaxed certain dairy product import quotas.131
Increased imports and expansion of domestic production led to
subsequent price collapses.132 In response, farmers lobbied Congress
and pushed 1976 presidential candidates for more government
support.133 Newly-elected President Carter signed the Food and
Agricultural Act of 1977, which increased the milk support price by
11% in 1978 and another 14% in 1979.134
With guaranteed higher prices, dairy production expanded,
inducing the USDA to stockpile even more products to support
prices.135 Each year, though, dairies had an economic incentive to
over-produce, which only increased government acquisitions further
to support prices.136 Dairies produced 10% more milk per year than
the private market demanded at support prices.137 From 1977 to 1981
alone, the USDA bought up and stored more than 560 million pounds
of cheddar cheese alone.138 Government dairy program spending rose
above $2 billion per year.139 By 1981, government stocks of dairy
products were growing by 20 million pounds per week.140 The
Reagan Administration attempted to reign in dairy program spending
See generally id.
Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5.
128 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4-5, 10.
129 Katherine Lacy et al., Government Cheese: A Case Study of Price Supports, 2
APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RESOURCES 14, 17 (2020). de Goiter, H., Nielson, D. J.,
& Rausser, G. C. (1995). The determination of technology and commodity policy
in the US dairy industry. In GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of
Policy Reform (pp. 253-274). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
130 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 11–12.
131 Id. at 12.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 19.
134 See id. at 12.
135 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 18.
136 See id. at 17–22.
137 See id. at 21.
138 See id. at 14.
139 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20.
140 Associated Press, A Big Dairy Surplus Grows, So Do U.S. Wishes to Shed It,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1981, at 74; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20.
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and accumulation of dairy product stocks, without much success
initially.141 The 1981 Agriculture and Food Act, slowed the rate of
support price increases. 142 The Administration authorized the release
of what became known as “government cheese” – stockpiled cheese
distributed to low-income people via food banks, food pantries, and
other non-profit organizations.143 Yet, because dairies could sell to
the government at high prices, supply continued to expand as
producers adopted output-expanding technologies and practices.144
Stocks continued to accumulate.145
The 1983 Dairy Production Stabilization Act established the
Milk Diversion Program (MDP) to control the supply of milk.146 The
federal government offered dairy farmers $10-per-hundredweight to
reduce their sales below their historical production.147 More than 2
billion pounds of these reductions, however, were only “air” as many
producers had already reduced their production prior to signing
contracts.148 Thus, a significant portion of program funds went to
producers who were planning to reduce their production anyway.
There was further slippage as dairy producers who did not sign up
for the MDP increased their production.149 Total U.S. milk
production increased to record levels, again triggering even more
government dairy purchases.150
The Dairy Production Stabilization Act did, however, set in
place reductions in the support price.151 The USDA also instituted the
Dairy Termination Program (DTP) to control supplies.152 Under the
DTP, the federal government bought out entire dairy herds, with
farmers committing to forego dairying for five years.153 The
government slaughtered or exported animals from purchased
herds.154 Operating from April, 1986 to September 1987, the program
cost more than $1.8 billion, 155 with more than 1.4 million animal
See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20–21.
Id. at 21; see ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13.
143 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 21.
144 See Associated Press, Surplus Cheese Goes to Poor as President Signs Farm
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1981, at 12.
145 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 21.
146 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 14.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 15.
153 Id.
154 HARRY KAISER & ANDREW NOVAKOVIC, RESULTS OF THE DAIRY TERMINATION
PROGRAM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK MILK PRODUCTION 1 (Cornell Univ.
Dep’t of Agric. Econ. Ser. No. A.E. Ext. 86-20, 1986).
155 Id.
141
142
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slaughtered.156 Originally authorized under the Food Security Act of
1985,157 the Dairy Export Incentive Program provided subsidies to
exporters shipping dairy products abroad.158 The Dairy Production
Stabilization Act159 also created the National Dairy Board (NDB),
which from 1984 to 1987 spent more than $100 million in television
and radio advertising to promote dairy products.160 There is some
evidence that the advertising and promotional programs succeeded in
increasing the demand for milk.161 Through this combination of
reduced price supports, export subsidies, increased demand via
advertising, and animal slaughter, dairy over-supply problems began
to ebb.162 USDA stocks of dairy products began to fall steadily starting
in 1984.163
Since the late 1980s, structural and technological change in
the U.S. industry has dramatically reduced the cost of U.S.
production.164 This had the effect of making U.S. products more
competitive on global markets.165 The early 1980s were
characterized by U.S. export subsidies and tight import restrictions
keeping competing products out of U.S. markets.166 As U.S.
production became more competitive, world prices rather than
government support prices served as a price floor for U.S. dairy
commodities.167 By the 1990s, government support prices were
rarely in effect.168 The 2014 Farm Bill (Agricultural Act of 2014)
eliminated price supports and export subsidies altogether.169 The
U.S. still has what Sumner has called a “mind-boggling array of TRQ
regulations.”170 TRQs (tariff rate quotas) essentially act as import
quotas, and the United States still maintains many of these for dairy
products.171 Yet, Sumner has assessed these have relatively little
John M. Marsh, The Effects of the Dairy Termination Program on Live Cattle
and Wholesale Beef Prices, 70 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 919, 919 (1998).
157 15 U.S.C. § 713a-14 (1985) (repealed 2014).
158 Id.
159 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501–14.
160 Id.; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 9.
161 Ronald W. Ward & Bruce L. Dixon, Effectiveness of Fluid Milk Advertising
since the Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983, 71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 730,
738–39 (1989).
162 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 9.
163 Id. at 6 fig.5, 9.
164 J. CESSNA ET AL., GROWTH OF U.S. DAIRY EXPORTS: REPORT FROM THE
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE 10 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv. Ser. No.
LDPM-270-01, 2016); see SUMNER, supra note 10, at 1, 7–9.
165 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 9.
166 Id. at 8.
167 See id. at 9–10.
168 Id. at 9.
169 Id. at 16.
170 Id. at 10.
171 Id.
156
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effect, favoring a few companies, but with little effects on larger
markets.172
Two major remaining components of U.S. dairy policy are
the Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) and a relatively new
Margin Protection Program (MPP), which, on the surface, operates
as a revenue insurance program.173 Producers can take out (highly
subsidized) insurance policies that protect them when the price of
animal feed rises relative to milk prices.174 Like US crop insurance
programs, payments can be more than actuarially fair.175 In other
words, indemnity payments can regularly exceed payment premiums
(i.e., some can regularly make money from their insurance).176 Similar
to crop insurance, when MPP constitutes essentially a disguised
federal income payment. In cases where signing up does not provide
producers such assured returns, producers have either not signed up at
all or have signed up at the minimum level of coverage, which requires
zero premiums.177
B. Nutrition Programs
The distribution of government-purchased dairy products as
domestic or international food aid dates back to the AAA of 1935.178
Surplus dairy products were distributed under the School Lunch
Programs, first established in 1935.179 The Agricultural Act of 1954
established the Special School Milk Program to use USDA funds to
increase fluid milk consumption in schools.180 The program was
extended in 1956 to include “nonprofit summer camps, orphanages, and
other child-care institutions.”181 The national Food Stamp Program was
approved and made part of permanent agricultural legislation in 1964.182
Implementation of USDA nutrition programs have not been without
Id. at 5, 10.
Id. at 3.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 18–19.
176 See id.
177 Id. at 17–18.
178 Agricultural Adjustment Act Amendment of 1935, ch. 641, 48 Stat. 750 (1935);
see Daniel A. Sumner & Joseph V. Balagtas, United States’ Agricultural Systems:
An Overview of U.S. Dairy Policy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DAIRY SCIENCES 20, 20–
25 (H. Roginski et al. eds., 2002).
179 HERMAN M. SOUTHWORTH & MAXWELL I. KLAYMAN, THE SCHOOL L UNCH
PROGRAM AND AGRICULTURAL SURPLUS DISPOSAL 1–2 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Misc.
Pub. No. 467, 1941).
180 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 15.
181 SMITH & ROTH, supra note 22, at 75.
182 MILTON C. HALLBERG, POLICY FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: CHOICES AND
CONSEQUENCES 316 (1992).
172
173
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controversy.183 Programs have been tasked with achieving multiple
goals, disposing of government purchased surpluses, increasing
demand for competing commodities (and pleasing competing
commodity groups), and improving nutrition of low income or other
target populations.184 Controversies have arisen when farm income
support and nutrition objectives have not coincided.185 Some critics
have argued that the farm income support objectives have taken
precedent over nutrition goals.186
C. Challenges to Capper-Volstead Exemptions
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) increase dairy
producer incomes through price discrimination.187 FMMOs divide the
country into geographic regions.188 There have been as many as 42,
but that has been reduced to 11.189 Milk and dairy product processors
in each region are required to pay farmers at least a minimum price for
four classes of milk defined by the Federal government.190 Class I is
the milk used for fluid beverage products.191 The price of fluid milk is
relatively inelastic – the quantity that consumers demand changes little
relative to changes in the price of milk.192 Conversely, if the quantity
available of milk falls, the price increases more proportionally than the
quantity reduction.193 So, limiting supplies increases sales revenues.
Demand for fluid milk is inelastic because it is highly perishable and
expensive to transport, so fluid milk in a particular area faces little
competition from outlying areas.194 Demand for manufactured milk
products (e.g. cheese, butter) can be stored longer and transported less
expensively.195 These products face more regional and even global
Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; see LEVINE, supra note 99, at 68, 108–09,
130.
184 See generally SUMNER, supra note 10.
185 Correll, supra note 107, at 62–65; Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; see
LEVINE, supra note 99, at 68, 108–09, 130.
186 Correll, supra note 107, at 62–65; Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; Belongia,
supra note 107, at 9.
187 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 12.
188 Id. at 11.
189 Hayley H. Chouinard et al., Milk Marketing Order Winners and Losers, 32
APPLIED ECON. PERSP. & POL’Y 59, 59–60 (2010). US Department of Agriculture
(USDA) Office of Budget & Program Analysis. 2020 USDA Budget Explanatory
Notes. Agricultural Marketing Service. At 21-9.
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/21ams2020notes.pdf (accessed
12/8/2020)
190 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 12.
191 Id. at 13.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 21.
194 Id. at 21–22.
195 Richard A. Ippolito & Robert T. Masson, The Social Cost of Government
Regulation of Milk, 21 J. L. & ECON. 33, 56 (1978); Masson & Eisenstat, supra
note 6, at 670.
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price competition.196 Because of this, demand for these products is
more price elastic.197 Changes in the amount supplied have a relatively
small impact on the price producers receive.198
Marketing orders increase producer income by setting a high
price for fluid milk and reducing its supply below competitive
levels.199 At the same time production is shunted toward
manufactured products.200 As output of manufactured products
increases, their prices fall only a little bit. 201 When the supply of fluid
milk is reduced, though, its price rises a lot. 202 Dairy producers
receive a blend price that is a weighted average of fluid milk and
manufactured dairy product prices.203 Compared to a competitive
market outcome, more milk is produced overall, but less actually is
sold as fluid milk, while more is sold in the form of manufactured
products.204 How individual consumers are affected overall by the
price changes depends on their relative expenditures on fluid milk
versus processed dairy products.205 Consumers, on the whole, are
made worse off, though, as consumer losses from higher fresh milk
prices outweigh gains from lowered prices of manufactured
products.206
The economic welfare effects of marketing orders depend on
one’s reference point. Gardner (1984) characterized competing views
of U.S. dairy policy.207 One was of “market failure” story, where dairy
policy is designed to counter anti-competitive behavior of milk
processors.208 The Capper Volstead Act was passed at a time when
technological and institutional constraints presented severe problems
for dairy producers.209 In the 1920s on-farm refrigeration was limited
SUMNER, supra note 10, at 9; see ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9; see
Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 35–36.
197 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 666.
198 Id. at 667.
199 Robert T. Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, Welfare Impacts of Milk Orders and
the Antitrust Immunities for Cooperatives, 62 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 270, 271 (1980)
[hereinafter Welfare Impacts].
200 Id.
201 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 666 n.17, 667.
202 See id.
203 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 35.
204 Id. at 51.
205 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 688.
206 John E. Kwoka, Jr., Pricing under Federal Milk Market Regulation, 15 ECON.
INQUIRY 367, 380 (1977).
207 Bruce L. Gardner, Price Discrimination or Price Stabilization: Debating with
Models of U.S. Dairy Policy, 66 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 763, 763 (1984) [hereinafter
Price Discrimination].
208 Id.; Gardner, supra note 77, at 92.
209 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 204; see Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at
669.
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as was transportation infrastructure.210 Dairies were captive to a small
number of buyers in the nearest urban centers to their farms.211 Dairies
marketed their wares individually and so had little bargaining
power.212 In contrast, handlers had great scope to exert monopsony
power.213 Capper Volstead allowed dairies to organize to set prices,
but the intent was to countervail monopsony power.214 The
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 and subsequent legislation
supported formation of milk marketing orders and marketing
cooperatives.215 At the time, dairy production was small-scale and
marketing largely uncoordinated.216
A competing perspective was one of “capture” where dairy
producers were able to influence USDA policy to their benefit at
consumer and taxpayer expense.217 As dairy marketing became more
consolidated, sentiment, particularly by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice began to shift toward the
capture perspective.218 In the post-World War II era, technological
and institutional change fundamentally altered how dairy products
were marketed.219 First, improvements in roads, refrigeration, and
shipping technology meant that dairies could sell their product to
more distant markets, lessening the need to only sell to the most local
processors.220
Also, dairy marketing cooperatives began to
consolidate, increasing their geographic scope and market power.221
The large cooperative, American Milk Producers Incorporated
(AMPI) formed in 1969 out of several mergers of smaller
cooperatives in 1967.222 Over the next three years AMPI merged with
54 more cooperatives223 until it stretched from Texas to the Canadian
Border.224 By the mid-1970s, AMPI produced about one eighth of all
milk sold in the United States and had become the largest cheese
producer in the world.225 Around this time, two other large
cooperatives were formed via merger: Mid-America Dairymen
(Mid-Am) and Dairyman, Inc. (DI).226 In many markets, AMPI, MidMasson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670.
ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1.
212 Id. at 2.
213 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 34.
214 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 193.
215 Id. at 206; see Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 37.
216 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 669–70.
217 Price Discrimination, supra note 199, at 763.
218 See Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 204; see Kwoka, supra note 198, at 380.
219 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 9.
220 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9.
221 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220.
222 Welfare Impacts, supra note 191, at 275..
223 Id.
224 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220.
225 Odom, supra note 102, at 44.
226 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220.
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Am or DI controlled 90% or more of all raw milk sales.227 By 1982,
these three cooperatives, along with Land O’Lakes were all Fortune
500 companies.228
Justice Department economists began to argue that actions
of the larger cooperatives went beyond just countervailing the
market power of milk purchasers.229 They argued that the largest
cooperatives were exercising supervailing power.230 While
countervailing power would lead to greater milk sales (and lower
prices) to consumers, the exercise of supervailing power was meant
to increase cooperative profits at the expense of consumers, raising
prices above competitive levels.231 Economists at the Federal Trade
Commission and Justice Department conducted econometric market
studies estimating the effects of cooperative behavior on prices and
consumer welfare.232 Kwoka estimated that marketing orders raised
milk prices 7-15% above competitive levels and created a
deadweight loss to the economy of $55 to $180 million per year.233
Ippolito and Masson estimated that U.S. milk marketing orders, by
increasing fluid milk prices, transferred $210 million from
consumers to producers.234 Masson and Eisenstat estimated that
U.S. dairy cooperatives succeeded in raising retail fluid milk prices
by $0.07 -$0.10 per gallon, costing consumers of $71 million per
year from 1967-1975.235
In addition to such studies, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
also began to take a more aggressive stance to reign in what was
perceived as excessive anticompetitive behavior.236 The DOJ sued
the three large cooperatives, AMPI, Mid-Am and DI in 1972.237
DOJ alleged the cooperatives engaged in “predatory pricing, price
squeezes, and foreclosure of nonmembers from customers through
contracts and mergers with nonfarmer milk processors.”238 DOJ
signed a consent decree with AMPI in 1975 and one with Mid-Am
in 1977.239 In the AMPI consent decree, AMPI did not admit to any
wrongdoing, but agreed to desist from specific "predatory and
Id.
Id. at 184 & n.1.
229 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 662, 670.
230 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 185.
231 Id. at 198–201.
232 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, passim; Kwoka, supra note 198, passim.
233 Kwoka, supra note 198, at 380.
234 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 37.
235 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 668 n.22.
236 Ananth N. Madhavan et al., Cooperation for Monopolization? An Empirical
Analysis of Cartelization, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT.161, 161–75 (1994).
237 Id. at 163.
238 Id.
239 Id.
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exclusionary" practices.240 AMPI also lost that part of the major
private case charging conspiracy to monopolize.241 In 1976, the suit
against DI went to trial in 1976 and was eventually resolved in 1985,
partially in the DOJ's favor.242 Studies found that after the consent
decrees, cooperatives were less able to exercise market power to push
fluid milk prices significantly above minimum government support
prices.243 In other cases, courts have ruled that cooperatives
attempting to further monopoly power by acquiring investor-owned
firms, engaging in predatory practices, or forming joint ventures with
non-cooperative businesses are not protected by Capper Volstead
exemptions and are subject to prosecution under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.244
IV. The U.S. Dairy Landscape Today
Dairy production is important to US farm and food systems.
In 2018, the United States produced more than 200 billion pounds of
milk, 13 billion pounds of cheese, 840 million gallons of ice cream,
and 50 million gallons of frozen yogurt.245 Dairy farming, product
processing, and wholesaling employed more than 290,000 workers,
who received more than $15 billion in wages in 2018.246 According
to the most recent, 2017 Census of Agriculture, farms sold nearly $37
billion of milk, accounting for about 9% of total U.S. farm sales.247
U.S. households spend roughly $8 per week on dairy products on
average, with spending ranging from $4 per week for low income
households to nearly $12 per week for high income ones.248
Households with lower incomes, children, or both tend to have a
higher share of dairy spending in the form of fresh milk.249
Id. at 164 n.17.
Id.
242 Id. at 163.
243 Id. at 164 n.18, 174.
244 Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n v. U.S., 362 U.S. 458, 471–72
(1960); U.S. v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 203–07 (1939); U.S. v. Maryland Coop. Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151, 154–55 (D.D.C. 1956).
245 Quick Stats, supra note 1.
246 Quarterly Census of Employment Wages, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/cew/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
247 NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ACH17-4, 2017
CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION 1
(2019),
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_DairyCattle
_and_Milk_Production.pdf.
248 M. SWEITZER ET AL., F OOD-AT-H OME EXPENDITURES: COMPARING COMMERCIAL
HOUSEHOLD SCANNER DATA FROM IRI AND GOVERNMENT SURVEY DATA 16 (U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., TB-1946, 2017).
249 Id. at 32, 34; Chouinard et al., supra note 181, at 74.
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Milk production is characterized by concentration regionally
and across operations.250 Five states – California, Wisconsin, Idaho,
New York, and Texas – account for more than half of all U.S. milk
production.251 The top eight states (adding Michigan, Pennsylvania,
and Minnesota) account for two-thirds.252 In 2017, there were more
than 9.5 million milk cows on more than 54,000 U.S. farm
operations.253 About 15,000 operations had no milk sales.254 These
were comprised almost entirely of operations with herds of 19 or
fewer cows.255 Of farms that did have sales, those with herds of fewer
than 100 cows accounted for nearly two-thirds of operations, but only
11% of sales.256 In contrast, just 5% of farms had dairy herds of 1,000
or more cows, but these farms accounted for more than half of all
milk sales.257 About 84% of milk sold in the United States is
marketed by dairy farmer-owned cooperatives.258 The four largest of
these – Dairy Farmers of America, Land O’Lakes, Dairy Farmers
Incorporated, and Darigold Inc. – market about 40% of all U.S.
milk.259
From 1980 to 2018, the total U.S. dairy herd size has
declined about 12%, but milk produced per cow has more than
doubled.260 The average number of milk cows per farm with cows
rose from about 50 in the 1987 Census of Agriculture to about 175 in
the 2017 Census.261 Another measure of dairy scale is the midpoint
herd size – the size for which half of all milk cows are in herds of
that size or larger.262 This midpoint has risen from 80 cows in 1987
to 900 cows in 2012, and to more than 1,000 cows by 2017.263
The United States has become a major exporter of some
dairy products, especially dry milk powder, while still being a
significant importer of others, particularly cheese.264 From 2004 to
2014, U.S. dairy product exports more than quadrupled.265 Overall,
NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 239, at 1–2.
Id.
252 Id.
253 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., AC-17-A-51, 2017
CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 7 tbl.1 (2019) [hereinafter 2017 CENSUS].
254 Id. at 23 tbl.17.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 6; Quick Stats, supra note 1.
261 2017 CENSUS, supra note 245, at 7 tbl.1.
262 ROBERTO MOSHEIM ET AL., CHANGING STRUCTURE, FINANCIAL RISKS, AND
GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR THE U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY 7 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Econ. Research Serv., Rep. No. 205, 2016).
263 Id. at 7–8; Quick Stats, supra note 1.
264 CESSNA ET AL., supra note 156, at 22.
265 Id. at 1.
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the United State is the third largest global exporter of dairy products,
following New Zealand and the European Union (EU).266
What can we glean from this dizzying array of dairy facts and
figures? First, the U.S. dairy industry remains a central part of U.S.
agriculture, while dairy products remain an important part of consumer
diets. It is a technologically dynamic sector, demonstrating impressive
and sustained productivity growth. A driving factor behind this growth
are scale economies that have allowed producers to lower average
costs by increasing operation size.267 Today, the U.S. dairy industry is
dominated by large-scale operations, with marketing dominated by
large-scale marketing cooperatives.268 Productivity growth has made
U.S. dairy production more competitive in international markets.269
This has shifted the U.S. policy stance away from protectionism to a
more outward looking export orientation.270 The United States has
abandoned dairy product export subsidies and moved away from
import controls and tariffs (although this has been incomplete).271
The industry has moved toward less government intervention in
general (although substantial involvement remains).272
A. Technological and Structural Change
Larger dairy farms have been able to take better advantage
of a range of technologies and practices (Table 1).273 Larger
operations make greater use of artificial insemination as well as
services of veterinarians and nutritionists.274 They are also far more
likely to use computers to deliver feed to cattle and for milking. 275
As operations have grown, dairies have relied less on producing their
own feed and raising their own heifers (as replacements) and more
on purchasing them from other operations.276 While smaller
operations produce more of their own feed, larger operations are
more specialized, purchasing it from others.277 Larger farms are also
more likely to enter into forward pricing contracts for inputs
(primarily feed).278 This reduces their risks against unexpected
Id. at 2.
Id. at 10.
268 See id.
269 Id. at 2, 10.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1.
272 Id. at 2.
273 MOSHEIM ET AL., supra note 254, at 16.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 7.
278 Id. at 16.
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increases in feed prices.279 Larger farms can also use their size to
increase their bargaining power, negotiating input prices, rather than
accepting them as given.280
Table 1. Comparison of dairy practice adoption for three different
herd sizes
Herd Size (number of cows)
Practices
<50
200-499
>1,999
Percent of Farms Adopting Practice
Artificial insemination
Routine veterinary service
Nutritionist service
All feed purchased
Most feed purchased
Heifers off-farm
Forward contract inputs
Negotiate for inputs
Computers for feed delivery
Computers for milking
Source: MacDonald et al., 2016281

75
43
59
2
36
1
7
17
1
1

80
89
87
5
54
10
49
63
16
24

Thus, larger farms have split off several functions that
smaller operations still engage in. This has allowed them to greatly
reduce their average production costs (Figure 1).282 One can see
dramatic reductions in production costs as the scale of operation
increases.283 The dramatic shift in the average scale of dairy
operations is not surprising in light of these cost advantages.

Id.
Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 18.
283 Id.
279
280

99
96
95
21
95
31
69
93
69
33
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Figure 1. Average cost per cwt (hundredweight) of milk
produced by herd size
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Source: MacDonald et al., 2016284
A. Dairy Antitrust Issues in the 21st Century
Economists have continued to find evidence of dairy policies
redistributing income from consumers to producers.285 One study
examined effects on different types of households.286 It found that
marketing orders reduced wellbeing for families with young
children, but benefited couples without children.287 This was because
they reduced prices of processed products (such as cheese or yogurt),
but raised prices of fluid milk.288 It also estimated that the program
was more costly to lower income than high income households.289
Another study found that in markets regulated by Federal Milk
Marketing Orders, cooperatives are able to exert market power to
raise the price of milk 9% above marginal cost, transferring more
than $70 million per year from final consumers.290
Dairy cooperative and marketing order activity has continued
to receive antitrust scrutiny.291 In 2010, the DOJ and several states filed
a civil antitrust suit against Dean Foods alleging that its purchase of
processing plants owned by the Wisconsin cooperative, Foremost
Id.
See Chouinard et al., supra note 181, at 59.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 74.
289 Id. at 74–75.
290 Metin Cakir & Joseph V. Balagtas, Estimating Market Power of U.S. Dairy
Cooperatives in the Fluid Milk Market, 94 AM J. AGRIC. ECON. 647, 657 (2012).
291 DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41224, CONSOLIDATION AND
CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY 18–20 (2002).
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Farms, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.292 DOJ asserted the
acquisition would eliminate price competition from Foremost Farms,
raising milk prices paid by schools, grocery chains, restaurants, and
other retail outlets.293 Various cooperatives have been the defendants in
class action suits, often settling out of court.294
B. Emerging Environmental and Consumer Challenges
As the U.S. population has shifted westward, so has dairy
production, with significant growth in California, Idaho, New
Mexico, and Arizona.295 Western operations also tend to be larger on
average.296 Although U.S. milk production continues to grow, that
production has been concentrated in fewer counties over time.297 In
1969, 71 counties had one-quarter of all dairy cows, while half of all
cows were in 247 counties.298 By 2017, a quarter of U.S. dairy cows
were in just 16 counties (with all but one in the West), while half of
all cows were in just 50 counties.299
This concentration and westward movements present certain
environmental challenges.300 First, this concentrates manure wastes
on a smaller land area.301 As noted above, larger operations have
moved away from feed and forage crop production, which means
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 18.
294 Id. at 19–20; John C. Monica, Jr., Agricultural Antitrust Liability: What about
the Reasonable Farmer, 22 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 2; Jessica Fu, Milk Co-Ops
Slaughtered 500,000 Cows via a “Retirement” Program. Now They’ll Pay $220
Million in a Price-Fixing Lawsuit, THE COUNTER (Dec. 5, 2019, 4:23 PM),
https://thecounter.org/dairy-cooperatives-herd-retirement-cow-slaughter-antitrustprice-fixing-retailer-lawsuit-settlement/; Carol Dumas, National Milk Settles CWT
Lawsuit for $220 Million, CAPITAL PRESS (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.capitalpress.com/ag_sectors/dairy/national-milk-settles-cwt-lawsuitfor-220-million/article_566e01f4-1b6b-11ea-98a1-0b954157be31.html; Melinda
Burton, Not Everything is Settled in the Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America
Antitrust Class Action – The Fight Over Allocating Fees to Class Counsel, FARUKI
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.ficlaw.com/blog/class-actions/archives/noteverything-is-settled-in-the-allen-v-dairy-farmers-of-america-antitrust-classaction-the-fight-over-allocating-fees-to-class-counsel; see Yuliya V. Bolotova,
Agricultural Supply Control: Lessons from the U.S. Dairy and Potato Industries,
CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2015, at 1, 1.
295 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 1.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 23.
298 Id.
299 See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 239; see 2017 Census Ag Atlas
Maps: Milk Cows – Inventory, NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV.,
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/Online_Resources/Ag_At
las_Maps/17-M209g.php (last modified Feb. 1, 2019).
300 See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 23.
301 Id. at 23–24.
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there are fewer crop acres where manure might be applied as
fertilizer.302
This excess manure can lead to various types of water and
air pollution.303 Nitrogen and phosphorus from manure can end up in
surface and groundwater.304 One study of public wells in California
found that one in ten of those sampled exceeded the maximum
concentration level (MCL) of nitrate permissible under the Safe
Drinking Water Act.305 Fertilizers on cropland of which dairy manure
was a significant part, were the dominant factor accounting for the
contamination.306 An EPA study of Washington found one in five
sampled wells exceeding the nitrate MCL, with dairy manure again
being a significant contributor.307 This same study also found a group
of dairies in the Yakima Valley were the primary source for
pharmaceutical contamination in the majority of dairy source water
samples.308 Dairy production can also contribute to air pollution in the
form of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
and oxides of nitrogen (NO and NO2), ammonia (NH3), hydrogen
sulfide (H2S), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) as well as
particulate matter.309 Many of these are criteria pollutants regulated
under the U.S. Clean Air Act.310 In addition, Section 304 of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
requires farms to report NH3 and H2S emissions if 45.3 kg or more of
either are emitted in any given 24-hour period.311
In the mid-1970s, EPA established effluent limits for large
feedlots (including dairies) under its Clean Water Act authority.312 In
April 2003, EPA established regulatory requirements for
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).313 After a legal
challenge to the 2003 rule, EPA was remanded to revise some
Id. at 3.
Id. at 23–24; M. A. G. von Keyserlingk et al., Invited Interview: Sustainability
of the US Dairy Industry, 96 J. DAIRY SCI. 5405, 5415 (2013).
304 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 24.
305 THOMAS HARTER ET AL., ADDRESSING NITRATE IN CALIFORNIA’S DRINKING
WATER WITH A FOCUS ON TULARE LAKE BASIN AND SALINAS VALLEY
GROUNDWATER 11, 35 (2012).
306 Id. at 11.
307 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-910-R-13-004, RELATION B ETWEEN NITRATE
IN WATER WELLS AND POTENTIAL SOURCES IN THE LOWER YAKIMA V ALLEY,
WASHINGTON, at ES-6 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201712/documents/lower-yakima-valley-groundwater-report-2013.pdf.
308 Id. at 23–24.
309 See Keyserlingk et al., supra note 295, at 5415.
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312 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 26.
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portions of the regulations.314 The original 2003 regulations required
all CAFOS to apply for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits.315 This designated all CAFOs as point
sources of pollution.316 The revised rule only required CAFOs
discharging (or proposing to discharge animal wastes) into U.S.
water to obtain NPDES permits.317
One potential technology for dealing with dairy wastes are
anaerobic digesters, which use the methane in manure to produce
electricity.318 Methane has 28-36 the global warming potential of
carbon dioxide.319 Adoption of digesters, however, is less than nine
percent on very large operations and nearly nonexistent for smaller
operations.320 Digesters can reduce dairy electricity costs and
potentially be a source of revenue through the sale of excess
electricity.321 Another source of revenue is the sale of carbon offsets,
but markets for such offsets has been slow to develop, with low
prices.322
In California, the dairy industry is a major source of methane
emissions.323 Under Senate Bill 1383, signed into law in 2016,
livestock operations will be required to reduce methane emissions
starting in 2024, with a requirement to reduce emissions by 40% by
2030.324 Using anaerobic digesters to produce electricity in
California can be problematic, though, because the process can
generate other air pollutants.325 Many dairies are already located in
air pollution nonattainment areas regulated by the EPA.326 An
alternative is to use the process to produce pipeline-injectable
renewable natural gas that could potentially be used as transportation
fuel.327 To be economically viable, even large dairies would have to
operate cooperatively to achieve the needed scale economies. The
Id.
Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 29.
319 Nicolas Sanchez & David C. Mays, Effects of Methane Leakage on the
Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Electricity Generation, 133 CLIMATE CHANGE 169,
172, 176 (2015).
320 NIGEL KEY & STACY S NEERINGER, CARBON PRICES AND THE A DOPTION OF
METHANE DIGESTERS ON DAIRY AND HOG FARMS 3–4, 8 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 16, 2011).
321 Id. at 1.
322 Id.
323 Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. Sumner, Dependence on Policy Revenue Poses Risks
for Investments in Dairy Digesters, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 226, 227 (2018).
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325 Id. at 229.
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California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) Program has a
tradable credit system that allows to producers of eligible low-carbon
transportation fuels to sell emission reduction credits. 328 In
December 2015, the California Air Resources Board announced it
would allow LCFS credits for vehicle fuel produced from biogas that
counts toward avoided dairy methane emissions.329 Lee and Sumner
warn however that the viability of dairy production of biogas for
vehicles depends on a raft of assumptions about future regulations
and incentives facing transportation, air pollution, and energy
production.330
Another resource concern deals with water scarcity. Much
dairy production has expanded in the arid Western United States.331
With limited water supplies and continued population growth, water
scarcity has grown acute.332 Prolonged drought and the potential
lower precipitation under climate change exacerbates this scarcity
problem.333 A future challenge for dairies will be the water
requirements for feed and forage crops needed to support their
herds.334 Such crops like alfalfa and corn silage tend to be relatively
water intensive.335 In the future, dairies may have to rely on feed and
forage from more distant markets.
The dairy industry also faces challenges on the consumer
side.336 US per capita milk consumption has been declining with each
successive generation consuming less fluid milk than the generation
before.337 Increases in cheese and yogurt consumption partially
offsets this downward trend.338 Another challenge to the dairy
industry is the rise of plant-based milks (e.g. soy milk, cashew milk,
Id. at 230.
Id.
330 Id.
331 George B. Frisvold et al., Agriculture and Ranching, in ASSESSMENT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SOUTHWEST UNITED STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR
THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REGIONAL TECHNICAL INPUT R EPORT
SERIES 218, 220–21 (Gregg Garfin et al. eds., 2013).
332 Jonathan Overpeck et al., Summary for Decisionmakers, in ASSESSMENT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SOUTHWEST UNITED STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR
THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REGIONAL TECHNICAL INPUT R EPORT
SERIES 1, 15 (Gregg Garfin et al. eds., 2013).
333 Margaret Wilder et al., Climate Change and U.S.-Mexico Border
Communities, in ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SOUTHWEST UNITED
STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REGIONAL
TECHNICAL INPUT REPORT SERIES 340, 341 (Gregg Garfin et al. eds., 2013).
334 Frisvold et al., supra note 323, at 222.
335Id. at 224.
336 HAYDEN STEWART ET AL., WHY ARE AMERICANS CONSUMING LESS FLUID MILK?
A LOOK AT GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INTAKE FREQUENCY, at i (U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Econ. Research Serv., Rep. No. 149, 2013).
337 Id.
338 Id. at 1.
328
329

2020]

U.S. DAIRY INDUSTRY

225

almond milk, rice milk, oat milk, etc.).339 These plant-base products
now represent nearly 7% of the combined animal and plant milk
sales.340 The dairy industry has attempted legal action to prevent
these products from using the term “milk” but, in a set of cases, it has
been turned back (Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co.; Gitson v. Trader
Joe’s Co.; Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers).341 In 2017, Senator
Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin) introduced the Dairy Pride Act,
which would prohibit plant-based products from using terms such as
“milk,” “yogurt” or “cheese” on their labels.342 The bill, however is
“languishing in committee.”343 Interestingly, it has no co-sponsors
from major nut producing states such as California, New Mexico or
Georgia.344 The first two are also major dairy states.345 Neither does
the bill have any Senate cosponsors from major soybean producing
states.346
V. Conclusions
The U.S. dairy industry has transformed itself from one
isolated from world markets and highly dependent on government
programs to an industry more globally and market oriented.347
Impressive productivity growth and industry concentration has made
this possible.348 Yet, such concentration (including geographical
concentration) has certain negative environmental implications.349 A
future challenge facing the industry will be compliance with
environmental laws while navigating changes in global dairy
markets. Increased consolidation of dairy cooperatives has also
brought increasing challenges to the Capper Volstead exemptions for
agricultural cooperatives to antitrust action.350 The rise of plantHAYDEN STEWART AND JERRY CESSNA, LIVESTOCK, DAIRY AND POULTRY
OUTLOOK: SPECIAL ARTICLE ON DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES: A LOOK AT SALES OF
COW’S MILK AND PLANT-BASED MILK ANALOGS 2 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ.
Research Serv., LDP-M-279 SA, 2017).
340 Id. at 3.
341 Iselin Gambert, Got Mylk: The Disruptive Possibilities of Plant Milk, 84 BROOK
L. REV. 801, 812–17 (2019).
342 Id. at 803.
343 Elaine Watson, NMPF Hails Victory over Plant-Based “Milks” in Spending
Bill, PBFA Says Claims Have “Zero Legal Significance”, FOOD NAVIGATOR (Mar.
23, 2018, 15:23 GMT), https://www.foodnavigatorusa.com/Article/2018/03/23/NMPF-hails-victory-over-plant-based-milks-inspending-bill-PBFA-says-claims-have-zero-legal-significance.
344 Cosponsors: S.130 – 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/130/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
348 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
349 See Frisvold et al., supra note 323.
350 See supra notes 199–208 and accompanying text.
339
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based milk substitutes and declining per capita U.S. milk
consumption threaten domestic demand.351 Yet, income growth (and
increased demand for dairy products in developing countries)
represents a market opportunity.352
351
352

See supra notes 328–333 and accompanying text.
SUMNER, supra note 10, at 9–10.

Towards Industrial Dairy Farming in Pakistan:
The End of Small Farms and the
Transformation of Cattle-Rearing Practices
Erum Sattar*
Abstract
Milk in Pakistan is infused with the self-understanding of a
nation. British colonial administrators laid the modern-day
foundations of the country’s structure through land grants to small
farmers. In an agricultural country where nearly forty percent of the
population remains food insecure, rearing animals is a way of life in
the rural areas where milk remains an important source of animal
protein. Selling the daily surplus that families don’t consume is a
significant source of earnings for cash poor families – and here an
unprecedented change is taking place within dairy management and
milk procurement systems. The scale of this change is significant as
is its ability to connect even the smallest of dairy farmers to the milk
buying habits, shaped by sophisticated marketing campaigns, of
middle-class buyers in the country’s burgeoning cities. The
significant changes underway are the result of the actions of large
multinational and national companies - including the entry of the
commercial arm of the military in the commercialization of the milk
value chain - paying cash to small farmers. These operations, which
may at first seem symbiotic, in connecting rural sellers to urban
buyers, are in fact placing significant pressures on farmers to increase
the size of their holdings as well as to improve their breeding stock
by moving towards improved (meaning imported) higher yielding
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cattle varieties. While national and provincial governments with the
support of international development partners promote the dairy
sector as contributing to rural, economic and national development,
I argue that a strategy driven by efficiency will ultimately lead to the
demise of those very same small livestock and agricultural farmers it
aims to uplift. This is because the logic of commercializing the milk
value chain through the operations of large Milk Procurement and
Marketing Companies (MPMC’s) and the pressures to increase milk
yields and herd sizes requires consolidation and financing – options
that are mostly available to richer and larger farmers. Is modernized
milk collection already moving beyond its reliance on collecting milk
from dispersed small farms? The unfolding pressures carry with them
the effects of increasing demand for all inputs, including
consolidated land, water and feed operations which in turn have
significant implications for small farmers, animals and the
environment. With small farmers reliant on the income from the sale
of milk that ties them to a system that may come to no longer need
them, can we foretell the demise of small farms? I suggest that these
insights are particularly relevant for the study of rural, economic,
social, national and international development.
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"You are assisting the poor of Pakistan and this helps us fight
the root cause of
extremism and terrorism."
-

President General Parvez Musharraf on the opening of
Nestle’s milk factory1

I. Background
Let me recount an anecdote from a field visit2 to a model
Nestle farm in Punjab province of Pakistan.4 A hardworking,
educated young farmer who spoke good English and wore jeans had
3

1

Kabirwala, Nestlé Opens New Milk Factory in Pakistan, Its Largest Milk
Reception Plant in the World, Nestlé (Mar. 16, 2007),
https://www.nestle.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/milkfactorypaskistan.
At the inauguration outside Lahore, Pakistan of Nestle’s largest milk plant in the
world when General Parvez Musharraf was President of the country, “Nestlé opens
new milk factory in Pakistan, its largest milk reception plant in the world.” Id.
2
See Communique, Friends of Democratic Pakistan Summit Meeting Concluding
Statement by the Co-Chairs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 24, 2009), https://20092017.state.gov/p/sca/ci/pk/friends/131015.htm. This portion of the research was
conducted along with the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP), a consortium of
Pakistan’s largest donors formed after the resumption of democratic rule in 2008 to
help achieve development priorities, and the Harvard Water Security Initiative’s
Water Federalism Project. Id. See generally Jonathan Shaw, The Water Tamer,
HARVARD MAGAZINE (Jan. – Feb. 2012),
https://harvardmagazine.com/2012/01/the-water-tamer.
3
Nestle is one of the two largest dairy companies in Pakistan. See Nestle Pakistan
Sells Pasteurized Milk in $23 Billion Market, EDAIRYNEWS (Feb. 27, 2015),
https://edairynews.com/en/nestle-pakistan-sells-pasteurized-milk-in-23-billionmarket-42185/ [hereinafter Pasteurized]. It took over operations of the older local
MilkPak Pakistan Ltd. Id. The other main local conglomerate, Engro Pakistan
(now FrieslandCampina Engro) (Engro), emerged after the majority share buyout
by the Dutch conglomerate of the local Engro Foods Ltd. Jim Cornall,
FrieslandCampina Completes Engro Foods Deal, DAIRY REPORTER (Jan. 5, 2017,
10:23 GMT),
https://www.dairyreporter.com/Article/2017/01/05/FrieslandCampina-completesEngro-Foods-deal. For details of the corporate takeover, see generally Our Brands,
FRIESLAND CAMPINA, https://www.frieslandcampina.com/aboutfrieslandcampina/our-brands/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).
4
A “province” is the equivalent administrative unit to a “state” in the U.S.
Resource Library: Encyclopedia Entry, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/province/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2020).
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returned to Pakistan after a degree in computer science from the
United States. His parents had money to invest so he bought land
with access to a road network and partnered with Nestle to become a
bulk milk supplier. He saw commercial milk operations as a
profitable business venture and initially targeted a herd size of 50100 buffaloes and cows.5 He had plans to grow and improve his herd
with imported varieties and artificial insemination. Nestle was very
proud of his farm and showcased him to visitors as a model farmer,6
certainly more affluent and educated than the average dairy farmer7.
To demonstrate his commitment to Nestle’s recommended
infrastructure and cattle rearing practices, he’d installed large ceiling
fans which periodically dispersed cooling mist in the well-ventilated
cattle sheds. He had two biogas pits to produce electricity from dung,
which gave him uninterrupted electricity,8 to power the farm’s tube
well9 and the 6 split air conditioners in the farm office. Because he
had access to investment capital, he could take advantage of Nestle’s
assurance that the company would buy all the milk volume he could
produce through increased herd size and yields. The question for us
is whether this model farmer is representative of the bulk of livestock
and small farmers in the country who would find anything close to
such expenditure beyond their reach. Also, what does presenting
such a commercially minded farmer as a ‘model farmer’ reveal about
the operations of large private-sector national, and international dairy
marketers more broadly, as well as the implications of the dairy value
chains they are creating.
Two large foreign milk and dairy conglomerates, the Swiss
Nestle and the Dutch FrieslandCampina, are Pakistan’s largest
5

Milk from both buffaloes and cows makes up the bulk of commercial milk sales
in Pakistan. UMM E. ZIA ET AL., DAIRY REPORTS: DAIRY DEVELOPMENT IN
PAKISTAN 2 (2011), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-al750e.pdf.
6
NESTLÉ, CSV REPORT OF NESTLÉ PAKISTAN LIMITED: TOGETHER WE CARE 24–29
(2014), available at https://www.nestle.pk/sites/g/files/pydnoa361/files/assetlibrary/documents/financial_reports/nestle_ar_2014_csv.pdf [hereinafter CVS
NESTLÉ]. Nestle is funding a project of the NGO, the Dairy and Rural
Development Foundation (DRDF) to upgrade 100 farms on a 50% cost-sharing
basis to model farms. Id. at 28.
7
See Samrina Akhtar et al., Management Profile and Contribution of Livestock in
Poverty Alleviation and Nutritional Improvement in Peri-Urban Areas of
Faisalabad, 45 PAK. J. AGRI. SCI. 381, 381–82 (2008). A study conducted in suburban areas of Faisalabad, Pakistan’s third largest city, found that just over 58% of
dairy farmers were illiterate. Id.
8
Shahzeb Jillani, Power Cuts Hit Pakistan’s Economy, BBC NEWS (July 15,
2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-pacific-14164825. Reliable
regular electricity is far from the norm with power blackouts colloquially known as
‘loadshedding’ prevalent in both urban and rural areas. Id.
9
A well with a submersible pump to access groundwater.
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formal sector providers of milk.10 Together the two companies
control approximately 90% of Pakistan’s formal dairy value chain.11
Providing a rationale for the work that the foreign dairy
conglomerates are doing. Nestle, for instance, claims that by
“developing progressive dairy farmers (medium scale) into
commercial dairy farmers (large scale)” it is “contributing to
achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 1 and 2 (No
poverty and Zero Hunger) which aim at poverty reduction, ending
hunger, achieving food security, and promoting more sustainable
agriculture.”12 Let us take a closer look at the development of
Pakistan’s dairy sector to assess the extent to which this particular
form of market development, and the global language of economic
and social development that is used to justify it, is warranted in the
country’s case.
II. Introduction
What we saw that day was certainly not the norm for the
majority of Pakistan’s dairy farmers and animals, whether local
buffaloes or cows (local, imported, or improved through AI), where
about 84% of rural households have between 1-4 dairy animals.13
The bulk of milk consumed in the country is from indigenous breeds
of riverine buffaloes, approximately double that of cow’s milk: 58%
to 35%.14 Even though Pakistan is the world’s fourth largest producer
of milk after China, India, and the U.S.,15 with a stock of
approximately 48 million heads of buffaloes and cows.16 Only 7% of
farms report having what may be considered a large farm, 50 head of
10

Kazim Alam, Of Loose Milk and Tight Margins, DAWN (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.dawn.com/news/1541158.
11
Id.
12
Nestlé Empowering Farmers with Best Farm Practices, NESTLÉ PAKISTAN (Apr.
23, 2018), https://www.nestle.pk/media/newsandfeatures/nestle-supportingfarmers-to-become-leaders-in-agriculture [hereinafter Farm Practices].
13
Abdus Sattar, Milk Production in Pakistan, PIDE BLOG (Mar. 1, 2020),
https://pide.org.pk/blog/milk-production-inpakistan/#:~:text=Average%20household%20holdings%20are%202,2006%2D07
%5D%20in%20Pakistan.
14
Omer Farooq, Agriculture, in PAKISTAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 2008–09 17, 33
(Pak.), available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/02Agriculture09.pdf.
15
Abdul Rehman et al., Livestock Production and Population Census in Pakistan:
Determining Their Relationship with Agricultural GDP Using Econometric
Analysis, 4 INFO. IN PROCESSING AGRIC. 168, 168 (2017).
16
GOV’T OF PAK., AGRIC. CENSUS ORG., AGRICULTURE CENSUS 2010: ALL
PAKISTAN TABLES (IN ACRES) tbl. 11.4 (2010), [hereinafter AGRICULTURE CENSUS
2010], available at
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/aco/publications/agricultural_census2010
/Tables%20%28Pakistan%20-%20In%20Acres%29.pdf.
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cattle.17 Further, given that milk yields are low, 5-6 times less than
what are achieved in the developed world,18 cattle holdings are
relatively dispersed and dairy is embedded in the fabric of daily rural
life. In fact, 80% of the milk in the country is produced by either rural
commercial or rural subsistence producers, 70% of that is produced
by subsistence farmers.19 At the same time, given this particular form
of dairy abundance, imports continue to rise as domestic demand
outstrips supply.20 Pakistan is the largest importer of formula milk in
the world.21 When looked at more closely, what imports reveal is that
there is a shift from fresh milk towards manufactured dairy products
(both liquid and powdered). The large commercial dairy marketers,
in addition to their sale of packaged milk brands, are also at the
forefront of promoting the sale of manufactured dairy products.22
One explanation is that having these products in their portfolios
allows them to target customers at lower price points which they’ve
recognized as being potentially highly profitable since milk’s price
(both fresh and packaged) continues to make it unaffordable for a
large segment of the population.23 As per Nestle’s research, this
group earns between $2-8 a day.24 We must of course recognize that
it is precisely the practice of selling manufactured dairy products that
undercuts the price of fresh, raw, and loose milk. This is because milk
now has to compete against a product that can be manufactured at a
lower cost, and to state the obvious is not milk but a substitute. It is
this segment, fresh raw milk after all, that the companies see as their
real competitor.25
17

Umm E. Zia, Pakistan: A Dairy Sector at a Crossroads, in SMALLHOLDER
DAIRY DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS LEARNED IN ASIA 76, 76 (Nancy Morgan ed.,
2009), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0588e.pdf [hereinafter Crossroads].
18
Sattar, supra note 13.
19
Crossroads, supra note 17, at 76, 80.
20
See generally Muhammad Naeem Tahir et al., Current Standing and Future
challenges of Dairying in Pakistan: A Status Update, in MILK PRODUCTION,
PROCESSING AND MARKETING (Khalid Javed ed., 2019), available at
https://www.intechopen.com/books/milk-production-processing-andmarketing/current-standing-and-future-challenges-of-dairying-in-pakistan-a-statusupdate.
21
Dairy Industry in Pakistan, PAKISSAN.COM (Sept. 17, 2017, 5:12 pm),
https://www.pakissan.com/2017/09/17/dairy-industry-in-pakistan/.
22
See Marylou Andrew, Milk in the Time of Opportunity, AURORA (Jan. 29, 2018,
10:36 AM), https://aurora.dawn.com/news/1141745. These products may be
manufactured using whey, lactic acid, powdered milk or vegetable protein. Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Farooq Tirmizi, Despite Stellar Earnings, Nestle Pakistan Aspires for Better
Results, THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Feb. 8, 2012),
https://tribune.com.pk/story/333671/despite-stellar-earnings-nestle-pakistanaspires-for-better-results. In an interview the former CEO of Nestle Pakistan
revealed for instance that, “Take the example of yoghurt. We are 80% of the
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Since the country’s independence in 1947, the share of
agriculture in the GDP has been on a downward trajectory,
nevertheless, it remains significant at nearly 20%.26 Livestock,
perhaps surprisingly, is the bulk of the agricultural sector at 60%
representing 11% of total GDP.27 Let’s note how remarkable this is
for a primarily agricultural country, such that the total value of
livestock products is more than the combined value of all major crops
including the largest primary commodities of cotton, wheat, rice, and
sugarcane.28 Most farm families obtain 20-25 % of their income from
their holdings of 2-3 buffaloes and cows along with 5-6 sheep and
goats.29 These families sell about a third of the milk they produce.30
Meanwhile, on the consumption side, nearly a third of household
income spent on food is on milk and dairy products.31 About 69% of
the irrigated area is in Punjab province which means that it has the
most significant share of the country’s economy as well as its
agricultural base.32 The milk production too comes from the two
largest agricultural provinces, Punjab and Sindh, that together
produce 96% of milk.33 Of this about 73% of milk production comes
from Punjab, Sindh contributes about 23%, while the other provinces
and areas produce the remainder.34

market when it comes to packaged yoghurt. But that packaged segment is only 2%
of the total market, . . . [s]o it doesn’t really matter what our market share is. We
need to grow the whole packaged segment.” Id.
26
Gov’t of Pak., Fin. Div., Agriculture, in PAKISTAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 2019-20
17, 17 (2020), [hereinafter ECONOMIC SURVEY 2019-20], available at
http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_20/02_Agriculture.pdf.
27
Gov’t of Pak., Fin. Div., Agriculture, in Pakistan Economic Survey 2018-19 11,
14 (2019), [hereinafter ECONOMIC SURVEY 2018-19], available at
http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_19/2-Agriculture.pdf.
28
See Muhammad Tariq et al., Milk Marketing and Value Chain Constraints, 45
PAK. J. AGRIC. SCI. 195, 195 (2008).
29
Muhammad Ashfaq et al., Factors Affecting the Economic Losses Due to
Livestock Diseases: A Case Study of District Faisalabad, 52 PAK. J. AGRIC. SCI.
503, 503 (2015).
30
See generally Tariq et al., supra note 28, at 199.
31
PETER WYNN ET AL., REPORT ON DAIRY MISSION TO PAKISTAN 5 (2006).
32
See A Snapshot of India and Pakistan Agriculture, KLEFFMANN GROUP,
https://www.kleffmann.com/en/kleffmann-group/news--press/press-releases/asnapshot-of-the-pakistan-and-indianagriculture/#:~:text=Punjab%20covers%20about%2069%25%20of,to%20the%20n
ational%20food%20production%20%5Bhereinafter%20SNAPSHOT%5D, (last
visited Oct. 28, 2020).
33
Sattar, supra note 13.
34
Arshad H. Hashami et al., Gender Role in Livestock Management and Their
Implication for Poverty Reduction in Rural Toba Tek Singh, Punjab-Pakistan, 44
PAK. J. AGRIC. SCI. 674, 674 (2007).
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In the seventh decade of Pakistan’s founding, a vast
percentage of the population, about 47%, remains dependent on some
form of an agricultural income.35 With an estimated population of
approximately 220 million,36 this amounts to nearly 104 million
people. Of this, an estimated 7.5 million families are involved in the
livestock sector and depend on the milk they produce both to meet
their own nutritional needs and the income they are able to generate
from the sale of any surplus.37 The sector employs between 30-35
million people directly.38 Approximately 62% of the rural population
relies on an agricultural income.39 The bulk of livestock holdings
remain small and dispersed, as farms of less than 5 acres make up
64% of the total farms in the country.40 Perhaps, more than the sheer
size of the livestock sector in the economy, for those dependent on
an income from farming, the production and sale of milk is the most
significant source of regular income throughout the year.41 This is
because there are two annual cropping seasons, spring and winter.42
35

Rehman et al., supra note 15, at 169.
See Pakistan Population 2020 (Live), WORLD POPULATION REV.,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/pakistan-population (last visited Nov.
3, 2020). The census remains deeply politicized in Pakistan and the previous
completed census was in 1998. Even though the census is to be repeated every ten
years, there was a nearly two-decade gap to the 2017 census. To date, the results of
this remain provisional. Muhammad A. Wazir & Anne Goujon, Assessing the 2017
Census of Pakistan Using Demographic Analysis” A Sub-National Perspective 2
(Vienna Inst. of Demography, Working Paper No. 06/2019),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/207062/1/1667013416.pdf.
37
CTR. FOR APPLIED POLICY RESEARCH IN LIVESTOCK, UNIV. OF VETERINARY &
ANIMAL SCIS., POLICY PAPER: IMPORT OF MILK & WHEY POWDERS IN PAKISTAN 1
(2017), available at http://www.uvas.edu.pk/doc/MBA/policy/Import-Milk.pdf
[hereinafter POLICY PAPER].
38
M. Sarwar, Dairy Industry in Pakistan: A Scenario, 4 INT’L J. AGRIC. &
BIOLOGY 420, 420 (2002); Pakistan Livestock Census 2006, PAK. BUREAU OF
STAT., http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/pakistan-livestock-census-2006 (last visited
Nov. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Livestock Census 2006].
39
Rehman et al., supra note 15, at 169.
40
AGRIC. CENSUS ORG., GOV’T OF PAK., AGRICULTURAL CENSUS 2010: PAKISTAN
REPORT, at XLVII (2010), available at
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/aco/publications/agricultural_census2010
/WRITE-UP%20AGRI.%20CENSUS%202010.pdf [hereinafter AGRICULTURAL
CENSUS].
41
Farmers are paid for their milk weekly and there is a shift to mobile payments so
that some of the downsides of cash payments such as safety concerns can be
minimized. See Staff Report, Milk Payments Mechanism: Easypaisa, Nestle
Collaborate to Facilitate Dairy Farmers, DAILY TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016),
https://dailytimes.com.pk/91261/milk-payments-mechanism-easypaisa-nestlecollaborate-to-facilitate-dairy-farmers/.
42
See ECONOMIC SURVEY 2019-20, supra note 26, at 17–18. In the spring Kharif
cropping season sowing takes place between Apr-Jun with harvesting taking place
between Oct-Dec and in the winter Rabi cropping season, sowing takes place
between Oct-Dec with harvesting occurring between Apr-May. See id.
36
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Farmers and tenant farmers get paid for their crops when they harvest
and bring them to market.43 Thus, the farming calendar makes the
regular weekly income farmers can get from the sale of milk
necessary for them to be able to meet their household expenses.
Landless livestock farmers are even more dependent on their
earnings from the sale of milk.44 In a cash-strapped, debt-burdened
rural economy we should not underestimate the impacts of even
small amounts of money to effect significant structural
transformation.
An analysis of the transformation in the dairy sector that is
underway in Pakistan shows that while looked at individually, as on
the farm above, each of the expansionary decisions to undertake
dairy farming at greater scale is one of efficiency. Leading to higher
productivity with increased milk yields from both improved, often
imported, breeds and practices.45 Plus, as the model farmer and
company representatives inform a visitor, producing cattle that is
better cared for. However, the heart of the structural transformation
in the dairy sector that is underway, in which large companies move
in to connect livestock and small farmers with urban consumers by
being a source of regular income. This is the very process through
which the logic of the market may triumph at the cost of those same
livestock, small farmers, and landless agricultural workers. Given the
pressures on small farmers to consolidate, I suggest that greater
infusions of regular payments, which at first glance is exactly what
may seem to be what a resource-poor rural economy needs, is the
very mechanism by which small farmers are made to feel the need to
consolidate. Allowing them to feel the pressures through the
transmission of price signals to overcome the small sizes of their
landholdings and herds. In essence, to no longer remain small.
In brief summary, there is a massive, structural
transformation taking place in dairy production. Along with a
growing nexus of rural areas with urban areas and the overall role of
the private sector in this structural shift towards a market-based
economy. The structural change towards a market-led approach
means that Pakistan is well on its way to a capitalist dairy sector. One
43
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with severe, and troublesome, long-term implications for the survival
of small-scale dairy and agricultural farmers. The negative effects on
livestock health and welfare as the process of ever greater efficiency
pressures fall on the most vulnerable, both human and animal.
Pakistan is nowhere close to the kind of consolidation of the livestock
industry we see in some other countries in this issue. Nevertheless, I
suggest that with current trends, and the direction of change, the first
hints of such a large structural shift are visible. Surely, once the goal
becomes greater yield without a significant regulatory or ethical
check developing concurrently, how long can the trend by bucked?
The under-appreciated tragedy from a country perspective is that
policy-makers are not even asking these relevant questions of the
structural changes underway.
To show this transformation in the dairy sector, the article is
divided into four sections that taken together describe the forces of
change that are underway: (i) the self-understanding of the nation as
one based on its rural strength and the British colonial origins of the
idea of ‘a nation of farmers’; (ii) the structure of the rural economy
that supports milk production at a vast and small scale including the
critical work of women in daily dairy management; (iii) how
international development finance is enabling the role of market
forces in shaping the lives of small farmers together with
multinational and national companies to increase yields; and (iv)
unconsidered implications for policy going forward.
III. Imperial rule Creates a Nation of Farmers
To comprehend the self-understanding of a nation one must
get a sense of the history through time and place. Modern-day
Pakistan boasts the world’s largest contiguous irrigation network, an
area covering 45 million acres.46 The origins of farming in the Indus
Basin are to be found in the Bronze-era Indus Valley Civilization
centered around Mohenjo-Daro.47 In the modern era, present-day
Pakistan’s agricultural endowment is the result of Britain’s creation
of a vast, agricultural landholding and loyal rural class situated
primarily in that part of Punjab province in India. The Jewel in the
Crown of the British Empire, that upon Partition in 1947, came to
Pakistan’s share. This irrigation network remains the basis of
Pakistan’s economy and continues to employ nearly half its labor
46

See Indus Basin Irrigation System of Pakistan, TRIPLE BOTTOM-LINE,
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3, 2020).
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force.48 To this day, agriculture accounts for nearly 70% of the
country’s export earnings.49 For instance, national development
goals envisage it becoming a milk and meat exporter.50 Despite the
sheer scale of the endowment of a rural agrarian base, 36.9% of the
population remains food insecure.51 To date, the country’s dismal
and regressive social and economic outcomes are grounded in this
basic structure of an economy created to serve the ends of a departed
Empire.
A. British Rule of India and the Rural Cooperative Moment
For our purposes, it is important to take account of the long
history, going back to the colonial era of rural cooperatives in India
when imperial rulers attempted to create them.52 Under British rule
of India, the development of irrigation canals brought water to the
previously unirrigated plains of the Indus river.53 This enabled the
settlement of new lands, with new farmers moving west from the
densely populated regions of eastern Punjab.54 At the same time as
the canal irrigation project, building the canal colonies was also a
colonial-settler project. This helped increase food production in the
face of recurring and devastating famines that undermined the
credibility of imperial rule. 55 At the height of their development,
massive population transfers occurred.56 According to census
figures, nearly 1.5 million settlers moved from Punjab’s eastern parts
48
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50
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51
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to the canal colonies of western and southern Punjab in the two
decades between 1901-1921.57 While efforts were made to form and
operate “cooperative irrigation societies” after the war in 1920, the
experiments failed due to a lack of “harmony among the
cultivators.”58 While the efforts had centered on the sharing of
irrigation water, the colonial government learned the lesson and did
not attempt to organize rural cooperatives for other purposes either.59
When it comes to the formation of dairy cooperatives, forces similar
to the ones disincentivizing cooperatives for water sharing may be in
effect.
IV. Shifting Practices
A. Transporting Milk to Cities
While dairy farmers have always sold their milk to periurban areas and cities, with the advent of the MPMC’s milk
procurement is becoming more formalized.60 This, of course, was a
key rationale for their introduction as they would be able to bring
high-quality milk to consumers. But, as the IFC has recognized, it is
difficult to build businesses that bring nutrition to the base of the
pyramid consumers.61 Before we take a closer look at the differences
in practice between the informal and formal mechanisms for milk
transport, we must note the immense difference in their market
shares. To date, after three decades of the introduction of formal
dairy value chains, raw unprocessed milk remains between 95-97%
of the market while the remaining 3-5% of milk is Ultra High
Treated(ment), or UHT, pasteurized and homogenized milk62 sold by
the MPMC’s.63 In addition to this huge volumetric difference, the
substantive differences in their practices are significant as they relate
to procurement, handling, storage, transport, and sale.64 The
57
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See generally Natasha Ansari et al., ‘Milk for Milk, Water for Water’: Analysing
Pakistan’s Dairy Innovation, IDS BULLETIN (2018),
https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/index.php/idsbo/article/view/2933/Online%20article.

2020]

MILK VALUE CHAIN IN PAKISTAN

239

traditional doodh walas65 (milk sellers) buy milk either directly from
farmers at short distances. More commonly, dodhis (milk
transporting middle men), who transport milk to peri-urban areas and
cities in large metal vats, or more recently plastic containers, without
any quality checks or refrigerated transport.66 Usually, low-quality
unhygienic ice may be added to the milk vats to cool and protect it
from high temperatures during transport as well as to add to the
volume of milk, thereby improving margins.67 This leads to dilution,
as well as problems of contamination given the quality of water used
to make ice.68 Despite these concerns, traditional dodhis perform a
fundamental, low-cost, and efficient service in transporting milk
from where it is primarily produced to where it is primarily
consumed.
The MPMC’s meanwhile have built a more formalized milk
collection chain that embeds farmers and private-sector dodhis into
a network of milk collection and chilling centers that allows them to
check quality, while cooling the milk during transport.69 Nestle, for
instance, collects milk from 190,000 dairy farmers, has 3,500 milk
collection centers, and 3,300 chilling centers.70 By 2014, through its
emphasis on checking quality from collection through transport, it
lowered microbial and Mycotoxin levels, as well as reduced total
milk rejections by 20% over the previous year. 71 Engro, too, has
135,000 farmers from whom it collects milk and has developed a
network of 1,600 milk collection centers.72 In partnership with a
major telecom and digital phone service provider it has installed a
data collection and payments system at its milk centers to gather
quality data, volume data, and make automated payments to
farmers.73
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B. Managing Diary Animals for Quality and Yields
One of the major areas of concern for MPMC’s is the safe
and hygienic procurement of milk.74 It is particularly illustrative to
see some of the changing practices on farms and the ways market
dynamics are transforming animal welfare. In some sense, as will be
evident by contrast with some of the other articles in this volume,
questions that may arise in other jurisdictions about animal welfare
are currently largely absent from dairy development discourse in
Pakistan. The driving motivation of MPMC training programs, for
the most part, is to increase milk yields. Therefore, dairy animals are,
in that framing, important to take proper care of due to their
instrumental milk-yielding value. Nestle, for instance, works with its
farmers to increase the low milk yields of dairy animals from a given
base of 5-6 liters to 10-14 liters.75 While this is a very far cry from
what dairy farmers in developed countries, such as the U.S. or
Australia produce. For the farmers who sell their milk by volume,
these are large gains.76 The improved practices for better animal
welfare and hence greater milk yield that company representatives
impart are a combination of a few simple things. For example,
sheltering animals in open sheds, rather than closed brick rooms that
retain greater heat. Along with such things as ensuring that during
the long hot days of summer, with temperatures routinely crossing
100-plus Fahrenheit, livestock even when tied, have ample leeway to
easily reach a water container. Representatives of large milk buying
companies explain the parallel to farmers by drawing an analogy to
human lactating mothers; just as a breast-feeding mother has to have
regular drinks of water to make sure that she produces enough milk
to feed her child, so too do their dairy animals.77
In addition to training farmers who remain on their own
farms to care for their animals in ways that increase yields. The
MPMC’s have also undertaken programs to train additional people,
which is expected to professionalize the quality of human enterprise
available to larger sized farms. Tapping into the need for trained
human cadres that can help grow herd and farm sizes. Engro, for
instance, with funding support from the European Union, other
European country development banks, and governments has
developed its proprietary Dairy Development Program which has
trained male workers as farm supervisors and females as livestock
74

See Tahir et al., supra note 20, at 8.
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extension workers.78 In 2019, the program had trained 1,263 workers
of whom 35% are female.79 Nestle, however, has chosen to tackle
another problem that stands in the way of larger farm sizes. Mainly,
the lack of capital and financing that smaller farmers face in growing
their farms to larger sizes, thereby improving their economic
returns.80 The Kisan (farmer) Club subsidizes farm inputs, such as
chillers, cow purchases, and breed improvement, through helping
finance bank loans,81 or through innovative partnerships for digital
micro-finance lending.82
MPMC’s have also put in place testing and quality assurance
checks at the points of collection. They perform various qualitative
and quantitative tests at the Village Milk Collection centers, as well
as at their Regional Milk Collection centers.83 “These include
organoleptic, temperature, clot on boiling, fat%, solids not fat, total
solids, and specific gravity. Tests for aflatoxins, antibiotics, and
physiochemical characteristics are performed at RMC to ensure
product processing quality and safety.”84 “At the second place during
processing or intermediate steps, various systems for quality and
safety management, e.g., ISO 9000, FSMS 22000, total quality
management (TQM), hazard analysis and critical control point
(HACCP), and many other ISO certificates are adopted.”85 Further,
the companies have also adopted incentive systems, in the form of
payment premiums for the volume of milk supplied, the regularity
with which a farmer supplies milk to the company, and for other
microbial tests.86
One key constraint in raising milk yields is the limitations in
the commercial availability of fodder, or feed. Agricultural dairy
farmers, in particular, face choices of the amount of their plots on
which to plant fodder for their dairy animals as against other cash
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and food crops.87 For livestock farmers the equation, of course, is
different given that they rely on purchasing the necessary feed from
agricultural markets. Overall at the national level there is a:
15 to 30% deficit in total digestible nutrient
requirements for livestock.88 On average, livestock
obtain about 50% of their nutrients from green
fodder, 38% from crop residues and the remainder
from grazing vacant lands and cropping land postharvest [in original], and cereal by-products and oil
cake/meals.89 Such estimates highlight the
limitations in digestible energy and protein supply at
a national level.90
Not only is this a major hurdle in raising dairy cattle that
produces consistently high yields, but given that these are national
averages, more localized research is needed to develop an
appreciation of incentives as they operate on the farm level. As the
Australian dairy mission pointed out, to sustainably increase yields,
there is need for more localized assessments of feed availability for
different agro-climatic zones.91 Without such granular research, it
will be difficult to design effective policy that addresses the choices
farmers are faced with on a daily basis.
C. Women and the Production of Milk
Women are active workers whose labor and knowledge is
vital to the agricultural economy, it employs 67% of the female
workforce and they are involved in most tasks from the planting of
crops to their harvesting.92 Small ruminants and animals (goats,
buffalo, and, cows) are a part of the household’s food basket whose
primary care, milking, and feeding duties fall to women along with
87
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responsibilities related to other agricultural tasks.93 Women’s role in
household and farm livestock management is particularly extensive.
Ranging from the daily watering and milking needs of cattle to
making and forming the dung cakes to be used as fuel for household
cooking. Essentially, working with livestock is seen as an extension
of chores related to the household.94 Meanwhile, about 60% of their
work remains unpaid and to correct this disbalance, extensive
mobilization will have to be undertaken.95
Because of women’s involvement in livestock management,
development agencies have funded training programs aimed at them
by NGOs and private companies.96 For example, USAID financed
the training of 5,000 women as extension workers under its Dairy
Project.97 These training programs are conducted by more formally
educated and trained women. This enables easier access by
overcoming cultural and communication barriers with the women
farmers being trained.98 As the rationale for the training emphasizes,
when women’s work becomes the means through which the family
can earn a regular income, their status in both the family as well as
the community is enhanced.99 USAID’s internal audit of the project
found that its targeted material gains along with enhanced incomes
for the female extension workers did not materialize because of
social and cultural barriers.100 Clearly, the structural barriers to such
development projects are limited. Meanwhile, the actual work of
women in the care of livestock continues.
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V. Developing Markets: Firms and Finance
While the change that occurs through dairy management
practices improves yields and the welfare of animals to the extent
that they get easier access to water, shade and feed. It also accelerates
the market forces operating on farms to consolidate, increase herd
size, improve herd quality through imported crossbreeding, and to
change attendant farm practices. With the pressures to increase
efficiencies, significant changes have occurred to date in the herd
stock, crossbreeds now make up 13% of Pakistan’s cattle
population.101 The crossbreeds have higher yields, longer lactation
periods, and shorter carving intervals making them ideal for more
intensive dairying practices.102 The MPMC’s are particularly keen
for their adoption and to move farmers toward intensifying dairying
practices.103 MPMC’s are leveraging their strong corporate and
financial positions to partner with banks. This allows them to tap into
the government’s economic development and lending schemes to
unlock loans to dairy farmers who want to grow their businesses, but
are hampered by the lack of access to formal channels of credit.104
For instance, Nestle has partnered with JS Bank, a major local bank
and financial conglomerate, to provide dairy development loans
under the Prime Minister’s Youth Business Loan (PMYBL) scheme
to farmers in its network at 6% interest with whom it’ll work to grow
farms along professional lines.105 JS Bank has extended its provision
of financing for dairy farmers to procure machinery and livestock
through a partnership with Engro and bring loans to their network of
farmers under the PMYBL.106 Under the terms of the loans, farmers
are eligible to borrow for up to 8 years. During that time, the
understanding is they will remain part of their respective company’s
network, while also being able to access the latest information and
guidance to be able to grow their businesses along professional
lines.107 Additionally, Nestle has partnered with a major private
101
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sector bank, Bank Al Habib, under a State Bank of Pakistan Policy
to support the financing of small and medium-size enterprises.108
Under the scheme, farmers who have been working with Nestle for
at least two years are eligible to apply for financing to meet their
operational costs. (i.e., purchase animals, purchase livestock or dairy
equipment and machinery, or pay distribution and transportation
expenses).109 The State Bank of Pakistan defines small enterprises as
having up to 50 employees and a minimum annual sales turnover of
PKR of 150 million.110 At the time of writing, the USD to PKR
exchange rate is approximately 1 = 160 which would mean a small
commercial dairy farm would have close to USD 938,000 in annual
sales.111 A medium enterprise meanwhile may have up to 250
employees and annual sales of PKR 800 million,112 which in USD
would be an annual turnover of approximately USD 5 million.113
Given these are huge sums of money and nowhere near what any, but
perhaps a handful of the large to very large commercial dairy
operators, may be achieving. We can certainly question the policy
rationale for having such financing available for the dairy sector.
More importantly, for our purposes, the very existence of the policy
indicates a certain kind of vision. A vision showcasing the
desirability of large, commercially operated dairy farms supported
by both international and national development policy-makers plus
investors. These large commercially operated dairy firms have the
right model for the development of the sector.
Let us recall that the MPMC’s started out by paying dairy
farmers for milk sales weekly – these were by necessity, relatively
small amounts.114 Over the years, they’ve amassed a vast trove of
working knowledge about the dairy economy and have now turned
into conduits for much larger infusions of financing into the dairy
economy. In order to transform and build it in the forms most
profitable for their corporate objectives of encouraging the transition
to larger more professionally managed dairy operations. It helps that
these interests are also supported by national goals of economic
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development supported in turn by the expertise and enabling finance
of international development agencies.
A. Dairy Companies and the long path to the Sector’s
Transformation
In India, the milk value chain was formalized beginning in
the 1960’s through the world’s largest dairy development
cooperative, Amul, under its ‘white revolution’ in which the farmers
are the owners.115 In Pakistan the creation of the dairy value chain is
led by the private sector.116 The members of the Pakistan Dairy
Association, an industry association headquartered in Punjab, are
drawn from some of the country’s largest MPMC’s, such as Nestle,
Engro, and Fauji Foods.117 Recognizing the growing viability of milk
as an investment vehicle, the country’s military has also entered the
formal milk market with its acquisition of the Nurpur brand of milk
and other dairy products such as butter.118 While the advertising for
its UHT full cream milk follows the norm of an aspirational middle
class119 morning as seen in advertisements for other brands.120 Their
introduction of a low-fat milk for fitness conscious individuals broke
from the norm by showing an intense workout featuring a female and
male model.121 Fauji Foods is a division of Fauji Foundation, the
welfare organization formed in 1954 for the benefit of retired army
personnel serving nearly 9 million beneficiaries.122 With such big
115
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Ads, YouTube (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7dH6tFnCr4.
122
‘Fauj’ means ‘Army’ in Urdu, Pakistan’s national language. The Fauji Group
was formed in 1954 as a welfare trust for ex-servicemen and their families. It has
since grown to a massive listed and traded conglomerate with holdings as diverse
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players entering the market for the profit potential, we can expect to
see significant changes in the sector in the years ahead. These
changes will most affect the livelihood potential, nutritional status of
livestock farmers, and small farmers who are agriculturists from the
sale of their cattle’s milk. Activists and NGO’s have warned of the
potential harm to rural households for years.123 As they’ve identified
a main problem of desperately poor livestock farmers and small
farmers being forced to sell that very source of nutrition their families
need for nutritional safety.124 This causes their families’ income to
be insufficient for them to be able to purchase food that provides
them with a better source of nutrition.125 Regardless, the financial and
technical support of the international development community and
private sector led formalization of the dairy chain in the country
continues unabated.
A coffee table book, Drops of the Divine, produced by Nestle
tells the story of packaged milk in Pakistan including the company’s
entry into the milk sector.126 The foundations of the country’s first
packaged milk brand, MilkPak, were laid in 1974.127 It formed a
lasting partnership with Nestle in 1988 because it saw the need for
the foreign company’s expertise.128 The Swiss conglomerate
formally took over its operations in 1992.129 The formalization of the
milk value chain in Pakistan through a framework, that at its core
supports the development of markets, developed by the private sector
is undergirded by the policy and financial support of bilateral donors
such as the United States Agency for International Development

as selling milk and butter under Fauji Foods Ltd., to fertilizer manufacturing and
marketing as well as operating power plants. See generally The Fauji Group, FAUJI
FOODS, https://www.faujifoods.com/the-fauji-group/ (last updated 2020). While
the process of allocating land and resources towards military purposes is an ancient
one, the particular form of the Army’s present involvement in the rural agricultural
domain can be traced to land grants to the military during British colonial rule of
the Indian Sub-continent. See ALI, supra note 54, at 109–57.
123
Nadeem Iqbal, Development-Pakistan: ‘Milk Economy’ Hurts Rural
Households, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Oct. 10, 2003),
http://www.ipsnews.net/2003/10/development-pakistan-milk-economy-hurts-ruralhouseholds/.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
See generally NOOR SHEIKH, DROPS OF THE DIVINE: A STORY OF MILK IN
PAKISTAN (Raisa Vayani ed., 2017), available at
https://www.nestle.pk/sites/g/files/pydnoa361/files/assetlibrary/documents/press_releases/nestle-dairy-book-pdf.pdf.
127
Id. at 40.
128
Id. at 42.
129
Id. at 41.
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(USAID).130 Nestle’s Agricultural Services conducts trainings for
farmers and has developed farming manuals with IFC’s support.131
In 2017, IFC provided $145 million in financing to the Dutch dairy
company FrieslandCampina for its acquisition of a majority stake in
Engro Foods. (‘Engro’)132 It reiterated that the investment would
have significant developmental impact including: “Food Safety
improve product quality and safety standards; Farmer Benefits:
Increased benefits to small-holder dairy farmers; Job Creation and
Inclusive Growth; Improved Competitiveness: Enhanced supplychain efficiencies in milk collection; [and] Promote FDI to
Pakistan.”133 In short, international development agencies base their
support of the private-sector led development of the country’s dairy
sector because of the potential for dual impact in both the rural areas,
through an improvement in farmer incomes, and the country’s urban
areas, for consumers’ ability to access high quality milk. Engro’s
market share for its flagship Olper’s brand stands at 45% of the
market for packaged milk.134 Together, with Nestle, the two
companies control just over 90% of Pakistan’s market for packaged
milk.135 In the creation of this value chain, there are significant gains
for the private companies that create the brands on which consumers
rely. I suggest, limited gains for livestock farmers and small farmers
coupled with significant detriments to their interests.
Accompanying this positive assessment is an evaluation by
MPMC’s, namely Nestle and Engro, with their dominance of the
packaged milk sector. The MPMC’s are responsible for the sector’s
formalization and development of markets that connect farmers to
urban markets in the context of the more traditional marketing
functions they know well through the development of brands and
advertising targeting various segments of the markets they create and
130

USAID’s Dairy Project is aimed at supporting 49,000 dairy farmers in Punjab
province by providing them with information to upgrade their dairy practices. The
project also aims to train 6,000 female extension workers and 2,500 male artificial
insemination workers so that they can become self-employed workers in the
agricultural value chain in the province. Dairy Project, supra note 97.
131
News Desk, How is Nestle Pakistan Empowering Dairy Farmers?, GLOBAL
VILLAGE SPACE (July 17, 2019), https://www.globalvillagespace.com/how-isnestle-pakistan-empowering-dairy-farmers/.
132
Jim Cornall, IFC Helping FrieslandCampina with $145m Package for Engro
Purchase, DAIRYREPORTER.COM (Feb. 6, 2017, 12:14 GMT),
https://www.dairyreporter.com/Article/2017/02/06/IFC-helpingFrieslandCampina-with-145m-package-for-Engropurchase?utm_source=copyright&utm_medium=OnSite&utm_campaign=copyrigh
t.
133
MOSES, supra note 60, at 17.
134
Alam, supra note 10.
135
Id.
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serve. For the most part, it is these commercial companies that are
doing the work of creating the forms of the market and the dairy
industry that is taking shape. Given the critical role of companies in
creating the overall structures of the dairy industry, and this is in
sharp contrast to India, their actions need careful scrutiny of both the
actions they choose to undertake and the tasks they leave unattended
as functions they believe are the proper domain either of
governments or the responsibility of farmers themselves. To give an
example of neighboring India, functions such as “animal breeding,
animal nutrition, and animal health and hygiene” are all the
responsibility of the cooperative.136 While the companies have
developed training programs with donor support that are meant to
enhance animal health and hygiene137 they leave unattended other
key areas such as animal breeding as well as animal nutrition – a key
contributor to low yields.138 For instance, in an interview the Engro
CEO made clear that as far as the company is concerned the problem
of low yields can be addressed if farmers give a proper feed to their
cattle: “That is the biggest issue in getting affordable (packaged)
milk to people.”139 The problem however may be more complex than
what Engro’s CEO identified. On a major study mission of Pakistan’s
dairy sector, Australian experts identified the problem of inadequate
feed leading to low dairy yields as a complex problem by situating
dairy animals and their roles in rural life beyond the evaluation of a
single metric – low yields being linked to inadequate nutrition.140
Their analysis bears quoting at length:
Between 1990 and 2005, there has been a trend
towards reduced areas of fodder crops, while
production per ha has remained static. At the same
time, the livestock population has increased,
circumstances that suggest nutrient requirements for
maintenance have increased, reducing availability
for production. This critical constraint of
insufficient feed consumed by dairy animals is
recognized by scientists, as is the fact that this is
aggravated by continuous increases in the milking
animal population. Why are these trends occurring?
Do farmers not understand basic principles of
136

White Revolution, supra note 115.
See MOSES, supra note 60, at 20 (“We are grateful to IFC for the technical
expertise. . . . The knowledge we received has
been very useful. We hope that the value additions will prove beneficial for the
farmers who will receive the knowledge and insights.”).
138
See Alam, supra note 10.
139
Id.
140
See WYNN ET AL., supra note 31, at 5–8.
137
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requirements for maintenance and production? Are
there other factors at play, such as risk management
because of high mortality or opportunities in meat
and livestock trading to commercial milk producers?
Clearly, large ruminants have traditionally provided
milk for household consumption in Pakistan and
will continue to do so. However, they also fulfil
other roles, such as:
•providing supplementary income from milk,
•being an easily liquidated asset, thus providing
security against crop failure,
•providing manure important to maintaining soil
fertility,
•meat production,
•sale of milking or breeding cows to commercial
milk producers,
•an avenue to convert crop by-products into saleable
foods,
•gainful employment of available family Labour,
and
•in some systems, providing draft power.141
To address the issue of nutrition as it leads to milk
production, a host of incentives that go beyond those operating on
feed markets, and of what Engro has identified perhaps simplistically
as sub-optimal behavior on the part of farmers, will need to be
addressed. This also raises the question of the role and capacities of
various levels of government responsible for the regulation and
development of the dairy sector more broadly. Given Pakistan’s
federal constitutional structure, agriculture and thereby dairy, is a
provincial subject142 with a potentially very significant role for
provincial governments and NGO’s within the context of the broader
financing interface of the federal government with bilateral donors
and international development finance institutions.143 The interplay
of the two levels of government has a significant impact on
developments on the ground in a given province especially since the
141

Id. at 7.
Agriculture is a residuary provincial power in the Constitution of Pakistan.
Understanding Agriculture’s Constitutional Arrangement, BUSINESS RECORDER
(Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.brecorder.com/news/561266/.
143
USAID for instance funds an NGO, the Dairy and Rural Development
Foundation for its project in support of the Government of Punjab. See Shumaila
Jamil, USAID DRDF Dairy Project Corporate Documentary, YOUTUBE (Jan. 28,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XyBTecw5v74 (explaining that
USAID, for instance, funds an NGO, the Dairy and Rural Development
Foundation for its project in support of the Government of Punjab).
142
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federal government is the ultimate guarantor of development loans
and the primary arranger of such international development
financing.144 The most significant impacts of the relations between
the federal government and any particular provincial government
arise in cases in which the provincial government is from a party that
is not an ally or is in opposition to the federal government in a given
province.145 This is especially the case because the federal
government is often the conduit for channeling development
financing for the overall skill development and enhancement of the
dairy sector in a particular province.146 Without such access to
financing for provincial development initiatives, farmers and the
overall state of the dairy and livestock sector within a province end
up suffering.
The particular form of actions that the two largest MPMC’s,
Nestle and Engro, adopt impacts not just the operations and
incentives of the dairy farmers within their networks, but also the
actions of other commercial entrants into the dairy sector. Fauji
Foods as a significant, new operator in the milk and dairy value chain
launched a dairy creamer Dostea, a play on the Urdu word for

144

See Centre-province Ties, DAWN (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.dawn.com/news/1462149 (explaining that center-province relations
under the present government have been getting progressively more protracted
especially in relation to when a particular provincial government is from the
opposing party to the party in power at the center); see Mishal S. Khan et al., How
do External Donors Influence National Health Policy Processes? Experiences of
Domestic Policy Actors in Cambodia and Pakistan, 33 Health Pol. Planning 215,
215–23 (2018) (explaining that while the influence of donors on actual policy
development and outcomes is complex, because donors are perceived as being
policy experts who can also unlock financial resources for a country, policy
makers at lower tiers of government find it relatively challenging to engage with
them for the purposes of policy formulation and implementation). For a mapping
of Pakistan’s significant donors and the geographic scope of their projects, see
generally UNITED NATIONS PAK., PAKISTAN DONOR PROFILE AND MAPPING (2014),
available at http://climateinfo.pk/frontend/web/attachments/datatype/UN%20(2014)%20Pakistan%20Donor%20Profiles%20and%20Mapping.pdf.
The US in particular has been Pakistan’s top donor of on-budget, grant-based
assistance that is directed via the federal government. See generally U.S.
Assistance to Pakistan, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN PAK.,
https://pk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/us-assistance-topakistan/.
145
This is the case with the current provincial government in Sindh province being
from the PPP – the party of the assassinated former Prime Minister, Benazir
Bhutto while Imran Khan the former cricket star turned philanthropist and
politician is now the prime minister with his party, PTI in power at the federal
level. See ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 14.
146
Id. at 9.
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friendship147. Now they are working to build their brand through
heavy advertising, in ways that are very familiar to consumers of
packaged milk.148 The series of launch advertisements show an
unusual and progressive family that breaks gender norms – e.g., the
wife is a doctor and the husband is a chef and many such interesting
turns in the extended family.149 In addition to this trio of large
companies, dozens of smaller companies have cropped up to mimic
this transformation of the dairy value chain supplying their brands,
mainly in smaller towns which may not be the primary focus of the
bigger firms and not worth extending their distribution network to
particularly given the higher price point for their brands.150
As can be expected with the presence of these heavy hitters
seeking profits from the dairy sector, rural practices are changing
rapidly. In this process the country’s dairy farmers are being tied to
the increasing demand for milk and branded milk products of the
growing middle class by the actions of large companies. These
include, but are not limited to, extremely sophisticated and wellfunded corporate media advertising and branding operations.151 The
MPMC’s work with extensive advertising budgets to make packaged
milk desirable to the aspirational urban consumer.152 The level and
scale of the television, print, and outdoor media advertising the
MPMC’s have undertaken is stunningly large. Created with very
high-quality production values, through the use of trusted household
actors and singers drawn from the country’s media industry.153
Advertising agencies, including the local partner agencies of
international firms headquartered in New York City, have taken the
lead in developing the marketing campaigns of all the country’s
major brands.154 These are elaborate productions telling the tale of a
nation. The biggest thematic campaigns are organized around several
themes: the safety and health that mothers can give their children by
147

See Our Story, DOSTEA, https://www.faujifoods.com/our-brands/dostea/ (last
updated Oct. 5, 2020).
148
See id.
149
Dostea, Restaurant - #Rishton main bharo #Dostea key rang!, YOUTUBE (June
2, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlF3Pqc6dwI&feature=emb_logo;
see Dostea, Rishta - #Dostea se banain apnay ghar ko #DosteaGhar, YOUTUBE
(June 2, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ4t3DxE44&feature=emb_logo.
150
See generally Ansari et al., supra note 64, § 4.
151
See Andrew, supra note 22; see Shoaib Pervaiz & Farooq Tirmizi, The Next
Phase of the Milk Wars, PAK. TODAY (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/01/14/the-next-phase-of-the-milk-wars/.
152
Andrew, supra note 22; Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150.
153
See Andrew, supra note 22; see Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150.
154
See Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150. See generally About, OGILVY,
https://www.ogilvy.com/about#ogilvy.
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giving them packaged as opposed to unhygienic loose milk; the role
of milky tea (chai) in gatherings of family and friends, which plays
on and updates the traditional role of young women of marriageable
age serving tea to a prospective groom and his family who have come
to seek her hand in marriage; enlightened husbands serving their
wives tea after she comes home from work; and the biggest annual
advertising campaigns of the year capitalize on the idea of piety
associated with the Muslim holy month of Ramzan, the month of
fasting and feasting in which the morning and evening cups of tea
are major desirables.155 Whereas MPMC’s started out by positioning
their respective milk brands as providing their customers with the
highest quality of milk, guaranteed to be free of the impurities
normally associated with loose milk. Loose milk, as we’ve seen,
retains its overwhelming share of the milk market despite years of
efforts to the contrary. To get a full sense of their promise about the
quality they hoped to convince consumers of, one need only look at
their lavish advertising campaigns. These are centered around
television commercials with high production values, featuring
national celebrities in glamorous settings, custom background
scores, and songs.156 It has become the norm for milk brands to
release new, big budget advertising campaigns around the Muslim
calendar month of Ramzan (Ramadan in Arabic) that is followed by
the festival of Eid as occasions for fasting followed by feasting.157
The idea is to capitalize on special occasions and build and reinforce
customer loyalty around family holidays. Only big brands can do
that, whereas the small farmer or loose fresh milk category does not
advertise. Additionally, there is no consortium on its behalf, such as
155

See Andrew, supra note 22; see Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150; see The
Vision Factory, Olper’s – Ramzan IV, Directed by Asim Raza (The Vision
Factory), YOUTUBE (Aug. 21, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kf3fybQaL8o.
156
A look at illustrative television commercials (TVCs) from some of the major
brands gives us a flavor of broad themes presented by MPMC’s. For instance, an
ad for Haleeb Milk shows a perfect mother getting her kids ready for the day by
giving her two young children glasses of milk while her husband in an early
morning scene of domestic bliss hands her a cup of tea. Benetone Films, Haleeb
Milk, YOUTUBE (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pKl1YaXcwc. The ad continues with the
mother-in-law making dessert with the help of her grandson by using Haleeb milk.
Id. The day ends with a party in their garden serving the desserts they’ve made
together as a family at a moment in which the mother-in-law is clearly proud of her
daughter-in-law and they are showing receiving the appreciation of their guests. Id.
A particular form of an aspirational life dominates. See id.
157
See The Vision Factory, supra note 154. An Olpers ad opens with a craftsman
from Brunei, an artist from Pakistan, an engineer from Morocco, a dervish from
Turkey, a doctor from Dubai and a scientist from Egypt highlighting their common
Muslim bond and invitation of peace towards all in the holy month. See id. It
closes with scenes of people opening the fast together in a mosque. Id.
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a dairy council or cooperative, that would engage in promoting fresh,
raw milk as a category.
One other aspect to consider is the form of the market that is
being created through the operations of the commercial MPMC’s in
the dairy value chain. Particularly, the procurement of milk from
dispersed farmers by tying them to corporate distribution networks.
A large exogenous factor may be needed for farmers to move outside
of these commercial dairy value chains. This is especially the case
due to the newer forms of commercial financing being in-network
enables for the farmers. In addition, small farmers are by definition
geographically limited and depend on local, traditional milk sellers
or MPMC’s to buy their milk since they are unable to sell to nonlocal procurers.158 Once assured of relative price stability within an
established value chain, farmers would consider taking on the
potential risk of self-organizing in cooperatives. This is particularly
so because the small farmers and landless agricultural workers, we
are primarily concerned with, have little financial capacity to
undertake any investments which could result in future gains.
Clearly, government is not ready to intervene in any such
organizational effort, given its demonstrated reliance on donors and
corporates to create the dairy value chain.159 This leaves little room
for the introduction of a potentially disruptive, exogenous factor.
Small farmers already living on the margins don’t have much choice,
particularly in the form of market they wish to participate in.
As indicated above, unlike neighboring India with its iconic
post-independence Amul dairy cooperative, in Pakistan there is no
large-scale discernible movement towards forming dairy farmers’
cooperatives with their own milk processing and acquisition
facilities.160
B. History and Development Affecting the Small Dairy
Farmer

158

ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 19.
See id. at 9; see CVS NESTLÉ, supra note 6, at 28–29.
160
While there are nascent trends of small-scale dairy cooperatives being
developed around smaller urban areas in parts of Punjab province, the bulk of
formal market development is being undertaken by the MPMC’s; on the
emergence of cooperatives. See ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 9; see Co-operatives
Are Empowering Dairy Farmers in Pakistan, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE (July
21, 2015), https://www.ica.coop/en/media/news/co-operatives-are-empoweringdairy-farmers-pakistan.
159
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The prevailing understanding of how important agriculture
and dairy are in the makeup of the country is one, among many
illustrations of how trends, far away in time and place, continue to
have a major impact on livestock and small farmers. As per the
Government of Pakistan:
Besides its importance and share in the national
economy, the history of livestock raising is
embedded in the rural life since inception of our
civilization. It is still a sign of prestige for the people
associated with agriculture sector. It is an integral
part of socio-economic activities of the rural areas
and plays a very supportive role in mitigating the
effects of poverty by providing essential items of
daily use.161
In addition, multilateral organizations, such as IFC, are
committed to the development of the private sector in developing
countries and are a primary driver of the huge structural shift
underway.162 IFC situates the development of dairy as a key theme
of its agribusiness agenda.163 It also conceives the existence of
smallholders in the dairy supply chain as a challenge for the
development of the sector, and diversified ownership as a barrier to
investment.164 Moreover, in identifying reasons why projects fail, it
highlights cooperatives (owned by farmers) as a paradigmatic
example.165 In the popular discourse around the higher quality milk
that is now more easily accessible to middle class Pakistani families,
these connections are neither made explicit nor acknowledged.166 For
our purposes, however, it is critical to situate the significant changes
in Pakistan’s dairy sector within the broader international
development financing framework that has enabled and continues to
support the changes underway.
Given the IFC has a significant commitment to what is the
growing field of bottom-of-the-pyramid inclusive businesses, but
161

Livestock Census 2006, supra note 38, at XVII.
See About IFC, INT’L FIN. CORP.,
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_sit
e/about+ifc_new (last visited Sept. 28, 2020).
163
See generally MOSES, supra note 60, at 3.
164
Id. at 8.
165
Id. at 12.
166
See FrieslandCampina Enters Fast Growing Pakistani Dairy Market Through
Engro Foods, FRIESLANDCAMPINA (July 3, 2016),
https://www.frieslandcampina.com/news/frieslandcampina-enters-pakistani-dairymarket-engro-foods/.
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256

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 16

does acknowledge it is difficult to find a solution to the challenge of
nutrition for base of the pyramid consumers.167 Let us pause here for
a moment to acknowledge that having dairy cattle, plus access to
milk within the household, is a key source of animal protein for
landless dairy farmers and smallholders. One view is that precisely
when they enter the market to sell any surplus their nutritional safety
is impaired due to the low prices farmers receive, preventing them
from purchasing foods of higher nutritional value.168 It is at this point
when we must make the underlying presumption of development
agencies explicit. Such that it is accepted as true, developing and
sustaining robust markets meets the twin goals of either: reaching the
poor with services; or somehow raising the conditions of their lives
by giving them access to markets. The markets are a means by which
they can increase their earnings. An important study by a local
grassroots NGO, Punjab Lok Sujag,169 reached the conclusion that
the operations of large MPMC’s, such as Nestle, were in fact the
result of farmers being forced by market pressures to sell their
“surplus” milk and their sales were “poverty driven.”170 Large
companies are thus hugely profitable, but their profits result from
deep, rural misery and rising nutritional insecurity.171
If the goal of “development” becomes the development of
markets, then theorists, policy makers, and citizens should, or must,
ask whether the market-primacy presumption is acceptable, or
desirable. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then a
follow-up question needs to be asked: What particular form should
those markets take? It is a comparative question that meets the
broader goal of the symposium of which it is a part. The aim of this
comparative project is to learn from the ways in which developments
in the dairy sectors of other countries have occurred and to draw
lessons for the directions which Pakistan’s dairy sector may develop.
For the sake of argument, if the commitment was to design a milk
procurement and marketing supply-chain in Pakistan. Then the
particular forms the process takes, particularly because of its
distributional effects, has significant consequences.
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MOSES, supra note 60, at 13; see BETH JENKINS ET AL., INCLUSIVE BUSINESS
SOLUTIONS: EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY AND ACCESS AT THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID 2
(Int’l Fin. Corp., 2010).
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Iqbal, supra note 123.
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Meaning people’ awareness/awakening.
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See PUNJAB LOK SUJAG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILK IN PUNJAB: A
PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVE 6–7, 13, 15 (2003).
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Id. at 11–12.
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C. Hormonal Injections – and Claims to Quality and Purity
In addition to what may be relatively benign changes in
overall animal welfare (free access to drinking water and shaded
stalls to house cattle instead of tying them inside hot brick rooms as
advised by company representatives), there is a related and understudied aspect of the goal to increase milk yields. The concern is with
the unregulated use of hormonal injections given to cattle. Milk
sellers in Karachi, when faced with a ban on recombinant bovine
somatotropin (rBST172) pointed to its approval by the FDA, based on
which it was given subsequent approval in Pakistan in 1998.173 This,
they claim, is justification for the injection’s safety and hence regular
use in the country.174 However, the Drug Regulatory Authority of
Pakistan eventually banned three previously authorized hormonal
injections (including rBST and rBGH).175 Health officials, however,
admitted that rBST’s excessive use started after its approval.176 At
the hearing before the Supreme Court bench, a senior advocate
assisting the court submitted that not only was the hormone harmful
to human health, but also had detrimental effects on cow and buffalo
health.177 There is also the significant threat of potential harm to
human health later in life from consuming milk from animals that
receive these injections, including breast and prostate cancer178. This
shows that there are both negative effects on livestock health and
lifespan, as well as on human health.179 The push for greater yields is
pushing the limits of regulation – with the forces for higher yields
continuing to push the limits of regulation.
Another hormone is oxytocin. More commonly known as the
cuddle hormone, or in Urdu and Hindi as the ‘doodh ki dawa’ or
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Dairy Farmers Seek Time to Implement SC Ban on Hormonal Injections, THE
CATTLE SITE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.thecattlesite.com/news/52527/dairyfarmers-seek-time-to-implement-sc-ban-on-hormonal-injections/ [hereinafter THE
CATTLE SITE].
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See generally Bovine Somatotropin (bST), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 21,
2020), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/product-safety-information/bovinesomatotropin-bst.
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THE CATTLE SITE, supra note 170.
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Drap De-lists Three Hormone Injections, DAWN (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.dawn.com/news/1381717 [hereinafter Drap].
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Hasan Mansoor, Sindh Slaps Ban on Hormonal Injections, DAWN (Feb. 20,
2018), https://www.dawn.com/news/1390418.
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APP, Import and Sale of Hormone Injections Banned, DAWN (Jan. 7, 2018),
https://www.dawn.com/news/1381337; see Drap, supra note 173.
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See Dangerous Hormones, DAWN (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.dawn.com/news/1382316.
179
See id.
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‘milk medicine,’ is also given to cattle to increase milk yields.180
Administered into the neck or leg of the animal before milking, up to
twice a day on a regular basis because of its impact on milk
production. It has the effect of not only making milking easier, but
also releasing the milk normally stored in the udders and retained
there for use by calves thus depriving calves of the important antibodies found in mother’s milk.181 This effect in itself will increase
milk production overall by a few liters.182 In addition to depriving
calves of a valuable food source, because it causes uterine
contractions (gynecologists may administer it to women during labor
to induce contractions under specific conditions), it causes
significant pain to the livestock.183 This experience of pain
undergone at each milking must become the norm for the livestock
that have to endure it on a regular basis. It is quite likely that livestock
treated this way also become barren in as little as 1-3 years, leading
them to be sold for their meat.184 Not only does the hormone have
significant harmful effects on animal welfare, it also has negative
effects on human health. These effects come in the form of early
onset menstruation, via early puberty, weight gain, and an increase
in dark facial hair in girls at a time in their lives in which they are
particularly vulnerable to the physical and psychological effects of
such changes.185 While the unregulated use of oxytocin is banned in
Pakistan, as in neighboring India, with significant fines as well as
prison time for its administration. The unlicensed use as the
undercover operation from India, likely remains a problem.186
The problem of quality of the milk supply such that concerns
are not just limited to loose, fresh milk available at neighborhood
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milk sellers,187 but also the quality and contents of some MPMC
packaged milk brands remains suspect.188 Approximately 97% of the
milk sold in the country is in raw, loose, and fresh form where quality
problems are, by the very nature of fresh and unregulated milk being
transported without refrigeration and sold through small milk shops,
most pressing.189 The remainder of the 3% of the milk supply in UHT
packaged form while safer, nevertheless is not free from quality
concerns. A recent study of eight major packaged milk brands
marketed by the country’s major MPMC’s found chemical
adulterants in all of them.190 These included formalin, cane sugar,
glucose, alkalinity, and benzoic acid.191 In some ways adulterated,
packaged milk is of greater concern since quality is a significant part
of the positioning of the milk brands sold by the MPMC’s.192
187

While loose milk remains under-regulated and thereby potentially more
unhygienic, it is certainly the case that it is in the interests of the MPMCs to
highlight its dangers and thereby increase their share of the milk market. Alam,
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bicarbonates must be kept in milk samples as higher alkalinity values can cause
milk alkali syndrome resulting in systemic alkalosis, renal failure, high blood
pressure, hypertension, cardiac failure and edema (Troy, 2005). Benzoic acid is a
natural component of milk but if its concentration in preserved milk exceeds 2000
mg/kg it can be dangerous for health (Wibbertmann, 2000). Formalin is added to
milk as preservative but may cause vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, increased
body temperatures, shallow respiration, weak irregular pulse, unconsciousness,
blindness and it is also a potent carcinogen (Gwin et al., 2009).”).
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Olper’s Milk, Olper’s Milk #SachKaSafar, YouTube (Sept. 24, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LK4OICoUFP8. In a long television
infomercial format by Engro Foods’ Olper’s titled #SachKaSafar – the Journey of
Truth, a questioning consumer is guided by a well-known television news talk
show host on a journey that shows him the company’s entire milk collection and
packaging chain as he raises questions to company representatives that are
typically raised by consumers comparing raw milk vs. packaged milk brands. Id.
For instance, during a tour of the factory, the main character of the ad while
conveying common consumer concerns asks for example why milk fat does not
rise to the surface when packaged milk is boiled which it does when raw milk is
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Television commercials stake a claim to branded milk being clean
and of high quality, as being free of adulteration and undergoing
significant quality checks.193 Engro Foods, the owner of a major
brand, Olpers amongst others, undertakes 27-28 physicochemical
tests from point of collection to point of packaging.194 Nevertheless,
after ordering an inquiry into reports of unchecked hormone
injections being given to cattle the country’s Supreme Court took suo
moto notice under its original jurisdiction powers in the
constitution.195 They issued notices to companies selling UHT milk
to explain their quality control policies and practices.196 To increase
yields in cattle raised on a commercial scale, the use of rBST
hormonal injections has become common.197 The court reiterated it
was a matter of public health and imperative that milk be free of
cancer-causing hormonal injections.198 The court also warned dairy
boiled to which the representative responds that it is because in packaged milk the
milk fat is dispersed throughout the milk (it is homogenized) which makes it
nutritious and delicious. Id. He goes on to say that boiling kills harmful bacteria
but also reduces milk’s nutrients whereas there are no harmful bacteria in
packaged milk, and it retains its nutrients. Id. In an interaction with a well-known
internet personality and influencer uploaded to his channel titled Doodh Ka
Doodh, Paani Ka Paani (a play on an Urdu saying that roughly translated means
once put to a test, what is milk will become clear and what is water will become
clear), Haleeb Foods gives him and his friends who arrive unannounced a tour of
its factory and shows them all the ways in which the company has a rigorous
testing regime in place that ensures that its milk is pure and free of adulterants.
Junaid Akram, Doodh Ka Doodh – Paani Ka Paani | Junaid Akram, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBK0tPkezHI.
193
Best Pakistani ADS, Manao Happy Subha With Olper’s AD – Pakistani Milk
TVC (2018), YOUTUBE (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNBwrDDT0i0. The TVC for Olper’s Happy
Subha (morning) shows a happy cow giving high quality milk that has a high fat
content (as a perception of quality: high fat content is linked to a nutritious and
delicious product). Id. To make its point, in what looks like an Olper’s consumer, a
middle-class mother, is the one who is going to a cow in its pen in the morning. Id.
Of course, this depiction is only to make the point and we should not see it as
being actually representative of the typical usually much poorer dairy farmer.
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Masses, THE NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/268303-cjpterms-packaged-milk-a-fraud-with-masses.
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farmers it would send them to “prison if they tried to pressurize the
administration by creating artificial milk shortage.”199 For the
moment, the competing narratives about safety continue to play
themselves out in the court of public opinion.
D. Significantly, a Turn to Imports
Stepping into this vacuum, MPMC have begun to offer
highly marketed brands of creamers, particularly powdered tea
whiteners.200 It is critical to explore the dynamics of what may at first
look like contrary developments, but in fact the turn to imported dry
milk powders and efforts by MPMC’s to build successful brands
around a new kind of manufactured product are entirely rational.
Despite being the world’s fourth largest producer of milk, Pakistan
remains a milk-deficit country.201 Milk without refrigeration has a
shelf life of about four hours and is highly prone to spoilage plus
bacterial growth without refrigeration in high temperatures.202 In this
climate, manufactured non-dairy creamers, particularly powdered,
have tapped into a keen consumer need. As expected, there has been
pushback too. The country’s ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
taking notice of the quality of packaged milk reiterated that tea
whiteners are not a substitute for milk and their packaging must state
that they are a manufactured product, not milk.203
Pakistan is said to be having its own version of a "White
Revolution."204 A revolution, that is, in milk production.205 An
ultimate goal of this revolution is to raise the quality of milk available
in the country while also becoming a net exporter of milk-based
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products.206 Despite being the fourth largest producer of milk in the
world, there has been a steady increase in the imports of dry and loose
milk powders, both skimmed milk and whey powder, at the cost of
local fresh milk production.207 The country remains a net importer of
milk.208 The question is, how a stated policy commitment to
increasing local milk production to not only be able to meet local
needs but also to capture export markets reconcile with significant
dry milk powder imports that are mixed with vegetable oils to make
dairy liquids as well as whiteners for tea and coffee to meet local
needs. Since 2007 there is a discernible shift in what the MPMC’s
are doing such that from positioning themselves from selling pure
milk procured from Pakistan’s dairy farmers, towards selling what
are referred to as ‘recipe products’ – pure milk substitutes that are
manufactured from imported milk powders mixed with vegetable
oils.209 There has been a steady rise in the market share of tea
enhancers to approximately one-third of the packaged milk
category.210 These shifts in product lines are not only more profitable
for the companies but have seen a growth as they tap into a key unmet
need in consumption habits – that is of the fact that refrigeration for
fresh or UHT milk boxes is limited due to the unavailability or
unreliability of a regular supply of electricity.211 Dry milk coffee or
tea creamer by contrast is always handy in diverse settings across the
country. Nestle’s Everyday -Dairy Whitener for Tea made from milk
solids, vegetables oils and sugar is the country’s iconic brand backed
by extensive advertising that aims to help consumers make the
perfect cup of tea every time.212 The MPMC’s are being called out
due to the gap between their initial stated intentions and their actual
practices through the extensive push of manufactured dairy
products.213 These practices are increasing profits for them, but
206
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creating less nutritionally sound products for their customers and
harming small farmers in the process.214

E. Swiss and Dutch Conglomerates in Pakistan’s
Dairy Sector
As we’ve seen, Pakistan’s two largest dairy firms are foreign
companies committed to the professionalization of the dairy value
chain along the lines of their (in the case of the Dutch conglomerate,
FrieslandCampina that took over Engro Foods in Pakistan, this as
we’ll see below is not true of its home base in the Netherlands where
it is organized as a cooperative owned by its farmer as owners model)
global practices.215 Nestle for instance as we saw is working with
commercial banks to finance and upgrade the infrastructure of
existing farms, introduce mechanization, and foreign breeds to
produce high-yielding animals.216
The particular larger operations that this model of
professionalized and internationalized dairying privileges will be at
the detriment of both Pakistan’s smaller dairy producers as well as
the small-scale middlemen who operate at relatively local scale to
bring milk from dispersed farms to market.217 Thus, when
considering the role of private sector markets, we must distinguish
between smaller dispersed middlemen who have traditionally been
the conduits to bring milk to markets and the larger professionalized
companies selling packaged milk that are moving ever-closer
towards actualizing vertical integration within their business models.
1. Engro’s Own Farm – foretelling the way forward?
“[Engro] established its own dairy farm in 2008.”218 As per
the company’s filing:
[t]he farm covers an area of 557 acres (220 acres
owned, 337 acres leased) which is sufficient to
house 10,000 animals. It also includes cropping land
214
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for growing fodder. As part of the Company
strategy, E Foods (Engro) imported cows for its
Dairy farm as opposed to using local breeds. E
Foods dairy farm remains one of the largest farms
housing 2591 animals at Dec 31, 2010 (1,476 adult
cows and 1,035 immature cows and 80 male calves
and bulls). Currently E Foods dairy farm is
producing more than 20,000 LPD (liters per day). At
present, the Dairy farm milk is used in various
ambient and powder dairy products. This highest
quality milk can be compared to the world’s best.
The optimal use of this milk will come when E
Foods will enter into various infant nutrition
products and pursue its exports strategy.219
This brief corporate filing shines light on the envisaged
future of Pakistan’s dairy sector from the perspective of the MPMC’s
who at present have so much do with shaping it. The company
informs us that its entire breed at its farm is imported which clearly
shows that for the most part, it is much more efficient to import and
house high-yielding breeds than to work with the much slower and
uncertain efforts to increase yields of local breeds both through
breeding programs and cattle management practices. Given the
reliance on government efforts for the purposes of improving local
breeds and on individual farmers for any improved management
practices and facilities they can build, it is no wonder that corporate
houses prefer to internalize the entire operation such that factors are
under their control. Importantly, the size of the farm ensures that
Engro can grow the fodder the cattle will require on its own land
further limiting its reliance on uncertain and external fodder markets.
Further, given the size of the average family holding of dairy cattle,
a farm that can house 10,000 heads of cattle is clearly huge by
comparison and can certainly be said to be organized on a
commercial scale.220 Given the amount of high-quality milk supply
that that gives the firm, it thereby reduces its need to collect much
smaller quantities from a dispersed group of smaller individual
farmers. The question for national and international development
policy should become, when such efficiency is the main driver for
investments, what happens to the interests of livestock farmers and
small farmers who ostensibly are the ones that are being
economically uplifted through their participation in commercial milk
value chains as President General Parvez Musharraf claimed at the
219
220
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opening of Nestle’s plant.221 The stakes of this question become even
higher when in contrast to more run-of-the-mill traditionally
understood development studies, eliminating poverty is also tied to
national and international security paradigms such as fighting
extremism and terrorism.222
2. The Origins of a Dutch Cooperative
In 2008 the European competition authorities gave
permission to two Dutch dairy farmer cooperatives, themselves the
amalgamation of several local and regional cooperatives with origins
in the 19th century, to form FrieslandCampina, now a major global
dairy company whose products are sold in over 100 countries.223 As
they describe the bountiful regions of the Netherlands, their main
home (their farmer cooperatives also extend to Germany and
Belgium), “Friesland is a region in the north of the Netherlands
known for its green meadows, blue skies, many lakes and splendid
Frisian dairy herds. Campina is a wooded region of grasslands and
meadows in the south of the Netherlands, so named by the Romans
more than 2000 years ago.”224 Explaining its origins, the company
suggests that dairy farmers in the latter half of the 19th century
organized themselves in cooperatives in part to help overcome the
challenge of getting their milk supplies quickly to markets and
customers given the lack of refrigeration.225 Another reason for the
farmers to join forces within a structure of farmer cooperatives was
to gain more power in the market compared to when they used to sell
their milk to companies.226 Given their history, they claim that “the
member dairy farmers have built an international dairy company that
now spans the world.”227
We can see their sense of importance of history and the value
of farmer cooperatives in the dairy sector of the Netherlands. Given
the importance of their sense of history and the value of farmer
221
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cooperatives in the overall organization of the dairy sector within the
Netherlands. It is important to note that since the company’s
formation as a corporation, and its attendant overseas expansion, it
has not adopted a strategy of organizing the dairy sectors of the
countries in which it operates into the cooperative structure of its
founding, nor continuing present structure in the Netherlands.228 The
reason it is important to note the difference in the organization of the
company in its home jurisdiction and in its overseas operations. In
the home jurisdiction, it is owned by the members of the cooperative
whose interests it operates. In its overseas operations it is organized
as a commercial, for-profit company, engaged in the procuring of
raw milk from independent farmers and selling it commercially
under its own brands (after its takeover of Engro Foods’ milk
brands). This illustrates how the company does not extend the
cooperative model to the countries they expand their operations to.
The disjunct between the organization in the ‘home’ jurisdiction
whose value, in its own words, it clearly recognizes and the nonextension of that beneficial model in Pakistan, makes clear in whose
primary interests the firm operates. Highlighting this disjunct is not
at all to make the claim that somehow it is the responsibility of the
conglomerate to extend the cooperative model to its overseas
acquisitions or that only a cooperative model can best serve the longterm interests of small farmers. But, noting the difference in the
corporate structure is surely important along the lines of what’s good
for the goose . . . .
VI. Encouraging Consolidation
“The dairy industry makes no secret of its objective to have
the consumption of loose milk banned altogether. So what should the
hundreds of thousands of ragtag milkmen do to get out of the hair of
a handful of corporate Goliaths?”229 A major thrust of IDFA
education and training programs is to motivate farmers to improve
their cattle management practices, and to consolidate or increase the
size of their cattle holdings and dairy farm operations.230 USAID’s
funding for a project with the provincial DRDF does just that through
a combination of field trainings, arranging for farmer visits to model
farms, and training or advertising videos with consistently framed,
standardized messages to reach farmers.231 Through the development
228
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of these forms of media in which experts, or villagers, who have
obtained prior training and are thereby held up as having more
knowledge impart teachings to farmers who need to be educated in
improved dairy practices. They can be motivated by the new forms
of learning and internalize goals for the development of themselves
and the industry. In addition, a particular thrust of the videos is how,
through improved cattle management practices, the farms can
become larger.232 For instance, one farm improvement practice is to
keep livestock under a roof in well-ventilated sheds that are open on
all four sides. While exploring their farms for installing such a shed,
farmers are encouraged to plan for expansion such that to construct
with an eye for expanding their cattle holding.233 The videos and
training models recommend a host of other improvements, but all
without any discussion of the costs of such expansion. As if the
additional capital investments can be made without any
consideration of where and how livestock farmers, or small farmers,
could access such financing.234 As we’ve seen, the MPMC’s have
enabled themselves, through partnerships with banks, the very
mechanisms via which large investment capital can move into the
dairy sector, but of course that capital is only accessible by farmers
deemed investment worthy. This highlights the fundamental
disconnect between what the programs purportedly aim to do (uplift
the existing bulk of livestock farmers and small farmers) versus what
they essentially do (encourage private capital at scale to move into
dairy development).
A. The Price Gap and Some Tentative Conclusions
An example of the gap between the gains by livestock
farmers and small farmers, compared to the growth of dairy company
revenues is illustrative. Engro estimates that an average small farmer
provides it with 1,000 liters of milk annually for which the farmer is
paid the equivalent of $480 annually that equals PKR 6,300 or
approximately $40 per month.235 In 2019 meanwhile, the company
reported annual revenues of PKR 28.9 billion or just over $180
million USD.236 The structural, institutional, developmental, and
232
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regulatory question to ask is: whether this particular developmental
model of the state and market, is in fact operating in the best interests
of the farmers, or of consumers and society more broadly.
In essence, there is a significant difference in the average
price at which MPMC’s buy milk from farmers (Rupees 80 per liter)
and the retail price of packaged milk, which is approximately double
what the companies pay to farmers.237 This approximately 100%
price markup, the increasing gains to be had from consolidation, and
introduction of manufactured non-dairy products may lead the bigger
players, either the MPMC’s or larger farmers, to move to setup large
dairy farms with fully in-house vertical production units. As we’ve
seen this process was initially begun by Nestle.238 Or, it might enable
other private capital to move into intensifying dairy production for
which the large companies become the exclusive buyers. Given their
larger size, as well as greater ability to procure adequate and
nutritious feed, it is clear that larger players will have the ability to
move beyond the capacity constraints of small farmers. There are
already indications these companies are moving to structure feed
markets to meet the higher food needs of livestock presently
constrained by the green fodder farmers can, and for the most part
have to, grow on their land.239 Almost certainly, they will also move
towards greater mechanization of their large farms with its attendant
impacts on animal welfare and the accompanying process of driving
smaller farmers out of business because they will be increasingly less
able to find ready buyers for their milk supplies. Larger farmers who
have the ability to avail of the financing the MPMC’s have thus far
enabled will likely do well in the formalized dairy value chains that
are being created.
Without their own consolidation in the form of cooperatives,
as done in India in the early years after Independence in 1947,240 it is
unclear how easy small farmers will find it to survive on even the
lowest rungs of commercial dairy production. Perhaps a true White
Revolution can only begin through the collective efforts of small
https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2020/10/16/frieslandcampina-engro-postsrs321m-profit-for-third-quarter/ (last visited Jan 28, 2021).
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farmers. For as Pakistan’s experience shows us, anything else may
be less than revolutionary.

Herding History: Law and Collective Subjectivities in the
Dairyspheres of Ukraine
Monica E. Eppinger*
Abstract
In response to the limitations of socialism and capitalism in
meeting basic needs, this article explores the alternative version of
modernity offered in post-Soviet Ukraine and its agriculture. Tracing
a century of fundamental transformations through the story of milk,
it finds a history that troubles universalized framings of indigeneity
and colonialism. This article argues that under socialism milk
became a product of collectivized effort and a reservoir of household
resilience; and then, with post-Soviet disintegration of some forms
of collective life and emergence of others, that milk has come to
delineate spheres of both collective action and individual striving.
This research finds in Ukrainian farming communities a tale of two
privatizations, one concentrating wealth and the other, distributing it
in more equalizing ways. In the dispersed structure that results, much
Ukrainian milk production avoids some of the more environmentally
harmful forms for which the contemporary milk economy is famous
elsewhere. This study reveals the pragmatic play of gender dynamics
within legal disputes and social transformation. Though now
enmeshed in global economic networks and policy agendas, milk has
remained the ground of specific social networks; this article shows
the resilience of intimate relationships between dairy cows and their
keepers and the political strength, untapped nationally but salient
locally, of dairy maids.
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I. Introduction
In 1992, the milkmaids of Gruzenske village in northern
Ukraine1 demanded a meeting with their collective farm director to
discuss the alarming number of cattle gone missing from the village
herd. With the Soviet Union recently dissolved2 and its structures of
command economy and Party discipline evaporating, the milkmaids
suspected the director of selling off the farm's herd and pocketing the
profits. They were furious both with the apparent theft of an asset
and with the disappearance of cows whom they had nurtured and
spent hours with, daily, since calfhood. Thus it was, in a scene
repeated across Ukraine (and a decade before legislation instituted
rural decollectivation de jure), that each village family went home
with a cow and the milkmaids decollectivized the dairy holdings of
Gruzenske.3 Although commonly glossed as a national matter of
economic policy,4 "privatization" here is revealed as a local dispute
1

This paper follows disciplinary conventions in anthropology for protecting
confidentiality of interlocutors in the field. See, e.g., MARIANE C. FERME, THE
UNDERNEATH OF THINGS: VIOLENCE, HISTORY, AND THE EVERYDAY IN SIERRA
LEONE ix (2001) (foregrounding the anthropological practice of concealing
identities of specific interlocutors). Accordingly, throughout this article, I have
anonymized names of people and places in references to my own fieldwork;
"Gruzenske village" is an example. Names of publicly recognized historical events
and places, or contemporary officials, public figures, or works of published
authors, however, are referenced without alteration. Translations, except as noted,
are the author's.
2
Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine [hereinafter PVRU],"On the Declaration of
Independence of Ukraine," № 1427-XII, Aug. 24, 1991 in VIDOMOSTI
VERKHOVNOI RADI [RECORD OF THE PARLIAMENT OF UKRAINE, hereinafter VVR]
1991, № 38, at 502, adopting DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE,
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Aug. 24, 1991
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1427-12 (declaring Ukraine independent by
act of Parliament); Belavezha Accords, Dec. 8, 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia
(agreement signed by heads of three Soviet Republics -- of the four original
signatories to the 1922 treaty establishing the U.S.S.R. -- proclaiming the Soviet
Union ceased to exist); Alma-Ata Protocol, Dec. 21, 1991 (agreement signed by
representatives of eleven of twelve then-remaining U.S.S.R. republics, confirming
extinguishment of the U.S.S.R.).
3
Interviews with Tyotya Doyarka, head dairy maid of Gruzenske village collective
farm, Sept. 15-19, 2009.
4
See, e.g., First Plenary Session of U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission, Joint
Statement of the Kuchma-Gore Commission, May 16, 1997, reprinted at
http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/1997/219724.shtml (showing that
privatization was seen as both a national project and an economic matter for
Ukraine); see also, e.g., Law of Ukraine, "On the Privatization of State Property"]
№ 2163-XII, March 4, 1992 in ВВР, 1992, № 24, at 348, Art. 1
http://www.spfu.gov.ua/en/documents/3050.html (describing privatization as the
alienation of state property in exchange for payment and specifying privatization
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within gendered domains of practice over emergent norms and
divergent practices: the director's alleged action, pursued in secret
and publicly reviled, and the milkmaids', carried out in public view,
permitted at the time and valorized in the retelling.
The dissolution of dairy collectives in Ukraine was part of a
vast national political and economic transformation.5 As the episode
from Gruzenske shows, post-Soviet "privatization" in Ukraine has
involved disputes over legitimacy; norm formation in real time;
conflicts settled within the parameters of legal conduct that may go
on to reshape the basic grounds of legality itself;6 and assertions of
agency alongside the re-formation of legal subjects within shifted
modes of power. As dairy cattle became a part of a village economy
reestablished around households, multinational food processing
companies organized morning milk collection throughout rural
Ukraine7 and administrative measures introduced health and safety
regulations to make Ukrainian dairy products compatible with
European markets.8 Presidential decrees ordered dissolution of
collective farms and legislation instituted private property ownership
of collective farm assets.9 Law reestablished the conditions of
possibility for dairy production. Ukrainian milk has become big
business and, with daily milk sales one of the steadiest sources of
cash for otherwise autarkic-tending households, milk has become a
point of articulation into an international economy.
At the same time, milk remains deeply local. In fact,
contemporary Ukraine and the place of milk in it presents a puzzle to

as a national project undertaken "with the aim of improving the socio-economic
efficiency of production and raising funds for structural adjustment of the national
economy").
5
For work describing its complex of legal, economic, political, and social effects,
see Monica E. Eppinger, Property and Political Community: Democracy,
Oligarchy, and the Case of Ukraine, 47 GEORGE WASHINGTON INT'L L. REV 825
(August 2015).
6
See Monica E. Eppinger, On Common Sense: Lessons on Starting Over from
post-Soviet Ukraine, in STUDYING UP, DOWN, AND SIDEWAYS: ANTHROPOLOGISTS
TRACE THE PATHWAYS OF POWER (Rachael Stryker and Roberto Gonzalez eds.,
2014) (outlining contestations of legitimacy and reshaping the grounding of
legality in post-Soviet Ukraine).
7
See text infra notes 173-175 below.
8
See generally Monica E. Eppinger Nation-building in the Penumbra: Notes from
a Liminal State, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (2009) (giving an overview
of legal aspects of European integration).
9
See text infra notes 137 - 146 below.
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some analytic frameworks10 in which milk has come to be understood
as emblematic of settler-colonialism.11 As elsewhere, in Ukraine the
milk economy may, in part, index market hegemony,12 but
colonialism is a different matter. Debate over how to characterize
Ukraine's past, either within Russian or Austro-Hungarian empires13
10

See, e.g., Kelly Struthers Montford, Securing Animal-Based Ontologies in
Canada, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 48 (2020) (seeing milk in the Canadian context as
sign and perpetrator of settler-colonialism); Maneesha Deckha, Something to
Celebrate?: Demoting Dairy in Canada’s National Food Guide, 16 J. FOOD L. &
POL’Y 11 (2020) (viewing milk's presence with a healthy skepticism). See also
Merisa S. Thompson, Milk and the Motherland? Colonial Legacies of Taste and
the Law in the Anglophone Caribbean, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135 (2020)
(analyzing the place of milk among colonial legacies in the Anglophone
Caribbean).
11
"Settler colonialism," a term coined by Australian anthropologist Donald
Denoon, describes an imperial formation distinct from the "de-development"
typical of colonialism. Donald Denoon, Understanding Settler Societies, 18
HISTORICAL STUDIES 511 (1979). Though also premised on exogenous
domination, setter colonialism "seeks to replace the original population of the
colonized territory with a new society of settlers ... ." Tate A. LeFevre, Settler
Colonialism, in OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (May 29, 2015)
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo9780199766567-0125.xml. In it, "the colonizers came to stay," making "invasion
... a structure, not an event." PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY: THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF AN
ETHNOGRAPHIC EVENT 2 (1999). For further discussion of this analytic, see also
Monica Eppinger, The Challenge of the Commons: Beyond Trespass and
Necessity, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 1 (June 2018). For extension of metaphors of
milk and power to critique of post-colonialism, see, e.g., FRANZ FANON, BLACK
SKIN, WHITE MASKS 28-30 (Richard Philcox trans., 2008 (1952)) (calling
colonized peoples' identifying with whiteness a pathological "striving for
lactation": at the expense of "'the originality of that part of the world in which they
grew up,'" they try to "save the race" by "ensur[ing] its whiteness").
12
Xiaoqian Hu, "A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation": Global Markets, State
Power, and the Rise, Collapse, and Restructuring of China's Dairy Farms, 16 J.
FOOD L. & POL’Y 78 (2020) (looking at milk as both a sign of market intrusion and
as indexing state power in contemporary P.R. China); Erum Sattar, Can Small
Farmers Survive?: Problems of Commercializing the Milk Value Chain in
Pakistan, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 228 (2020) (examining market incursions and
transformations of the "traditional" in regard to milk in Pakistan). But see
Mathilde Cohen, Toward an Interspecies Right to Breastfeed, 26 ANIMAL L. REV.
1, 13–14 (2020) (analyzing ideologies and practices, such as rights, that would
limit markets and reconfigure the bases for circulation and exchange in regard to
milk).
13
On Ukraine as a "colony" or zone of exploitation of the Russian empire, see
generally OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 268-269 (1988) (summarizing
social critics' and historians' analysis of Ukraine under the Russian empire),
quoting, e.g., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "it [Ukraine] has become for Russia what
Ireland was for England: exploited in the extreme and receiving nothing in
return," cited in Lénine et la question ukrainienne en 1914: le discours
'séparatiste' de Zurich, 25 PLURIEL 83 (Roman Serbyn ed., 1982); and citing, e.g.,
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or under Soviet governance,14 is largely beyond the scope of this
article, but in order to assess dairy in Ukraine as a "colonial" import,
in Part II the body of the Article starts with a very brief treatment of
origins in order to reconsider and argue for milk's indigeneity.
Even if indigenous, milk in Ukraine does not figure in a
simple or straightforward story, as succeeding sections of the Article
show. It is laden with power and inequalities that take some
background understanding of context to recognize, and the Article
brings to bear sources and methods of both history and anthropology
(including my own fieldwork conducted 2002-2019)15 to decipher
the present. Milk provides a through-line through which to follow
the transformation of subjectivities and structures via some of the
Mykhailo Volobuev, Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky, in DOKUMENTY
UKRAINSKOHO KOMMUNIZMU 132 (1962) (characterizing Ukraine within the
Russian empire as a "European" rather than "Asiatic" type of colony, industrially
well-developed and yet deprived not so much of its resources as of its capital and
potential profits). For those arguing contra, see SUBTELNY, id., citing IVAN
HURZHYI, UKRAINA V SYSTEMI VSEROSIISKOHO RYNKU 60-90KH ROKIV XIX ST. 16878 (1968). On Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) Empire
during the same period, see SUBTELNY, id. at 212-219 (summarizing reforms that
raised the status of peasants in what is now Western Ukraine, but still left them in
an "oppressed and backward state").
14
For a view of Soviet governance as a version of colonialism, see, e.g.,
SUBTELNY, id. at 537 (describing Soviet Ukraine's situation as "the Great
Discrepancy," with Ukraine playing a large economic role and boasting a
"numerous, well-educated population," but "still unable to decide its own fate").
For scholarship recognizing roles that Ukrainians played in the Soviet project, see,
e.g., Orysia Maria Kulick, When Ukraine Ruled Russia: Regionalism
and Nomenklatura Politics after Stalin, 1944-1990, doctoral dissertation, Stanford
University, 2016; MAYHILL C. FOWLER, BEAU MONDE ON EMPIRE'S EDGE: STATE
AND STAGE IN SOVIET UKRAINE (2017). See also, e.g., Orysia Maria Kulick, Soviet
Military Production and the Expanding Influence of Ukrainian Regional Elites
under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 25 UKRAINA MODERNA (2018)
http://uamoderna.com/images/archiv/25-2018/UM_25_texts/UM-25-Kulick_120142.pdf.
15
I conducted field research over several periods of longer duration, for fourteen
months over 2006-2007 and for five months in 2017, as well as several intense
shorter periods in summer 2002, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2019, and in autumn 2009
and 2016. My fieldsites included an agricultural consulting enterprise in Kyiv, and
former collective or state farms in northern Ukraine (Sumy oblast'), western
Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast'), central Ukraine (then-Kirovohrad oblast'), and
southern Ukraine (Kherson oblast' and Crimea). My methods included interviews
(with farmers, agricultural experts and consultants, managers in agricultural
holding companies, agricultural traders, food processing concerns, policy-makers,
members of parliament, and consumers), life histories, and participant-observation
(both on farms and among agricultural experts in Kyiv). I use statistics,
journalistic reporting, experts' assessments, private consultants' and government
advising documents, official reports, as well as legal and regulatory material to
inform the account I draw from the qualitative data.

2020]

HERDING HISTORY IN UKRAINE

275

most formative social experiments of the past century, through the
present day.
The Article thus turns to its main focus, tracing processes of
collectivization and decollectivization of agriculture in Ukraine
through the story of milk. In Part III, the Article follows how Soviet
law and practice collectivized agricultural production in Ukraine, and
how milk production figured in the new rural register. It relates how,
as a part of a household economy within collective agriculture, milk
production provided a residual source of nutrition and income that,
through periods like the Great Famine and the Nazi occupation,
proved crucial to family survival. It further explores how, against
vast state practices in applying science to agriculture, milk
production resisted mechanization and industrialization.16 In Part
IV, it traces Ukraine's post-Soviet transformation through the story
of milk. Building on the approaches of Sol Tax, Sidney Mintz and
Laura Nader,17 it situates study of micro-practices within the context
of national laws, international trade, and global shifts in modes of
power, following the reach and limits of multinational corporations
into the daily routines of remote villagers. In local enactments, it
finds both the disintegration of some forms of collective life and the
emergent reorganization of daily life along the lines of new
collectivities,18 including gendered dynamics within legal disputes
and social transformation. The Article concludes that milk has
served as the ground of specific social relationships and networks,
and analyzing it as such, this Article brings to light the resilience of
relationships between dairy cows and their keepers, and the
organizational power of dairy maids.
II. Origins and Indigeneities
The record is clear that dairying on Ukrainian territory, or
milk in Ukrainian diets, is neither of recent nor "external" origin.
Archeological evidence places dairying in the earliest sites of human
occupation on the territory of Ukraine thus far uncovered there, from
the 4th millennium B.C.E., making it perhaps the earliest practiced
in Europe.19 Historical linguistics corroborates the early and
16

See Part III below.
See, e.g., SOL TAX, PENNY CAPITALISM: A GUATEMALAN INDIAN ECONOMY
(1953); SIDNEY MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN
HISTORY (1985); LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY (1990).
18
See Part IV below.
19
For evidence of dairying as early as the 4th millenium B.C. in "mega-sites" of
the Tripillya culture of Neolithic Ukraine, see Olive E. Craig, The Development of
17
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enduring presence of dairy with words in Slavic (a linguistic group
believed to have originated in the vicinity of Ukraine in roughly the
5th century B.C.E., and still the native language family of most
current-day residents of Ukraine) for "cow" and for "milk" traceable
from contemporary Ukrainian and Russian through proto-Slavic
(approximately 2500 B.C.E.-500 C.E.) to Indo-European
(approximately 4500-2500 B.C.E.) origins.20
Moving from prehistory to history, in the oldest written
records describing lifeways of the Ukrainian steppe, milk stands out.
Herodotus distinguished its people in their "living not by tilling the
soil but by cattle rearing,"21 famous in the ancient Greek imagination
as the Galaktophágoi -- "Milk-eaters" -- of the northern Black Sea
Dairying in Europe: Potential Evidence from Food Residues, 29 DOCUMENTA
PRAEHISTORICA 97 (2002)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228581338_The_development_of_dairyi
ng_in_Europe_potential_evidence_from_food_residues_on_ceramics; R.P.
Evershed, et al., Identification of Animal Fats via Compound-Specific δ13C values
of indiviual fatty acids: assessments of results for reference fats and lipid extracts
of archeological pottery vessels, 29 DOCUMENTA PRAEHISTORICA 73,
https://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/DocumentaPraehistorica/article/view/29.7. See also J.
Chapman and B. Gaydarska, The Provision of Salt to Tripolye Mega-Sites, in
TRIPOLIAN SETTLEMENTS-GIANTS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM MATERIALS
(National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Institute of Archeology, 2003) at 203
http://community.dur.ac.uk/j.c.chapman/tripillia/pdf/Chapman_and_Gaydarska_20
03.pdf. See also Oliver E. Craig et al., Did the First Farmers in Anatolia and
Europe Produce Dairy Foods? 79 ANTIQUITY 882 (Dec. 2005)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/antiquity/article/did-the-first-farmers-ofcentral-and-eastern-europe-produce-dairyfoods/284138196CFD83FA06340C061EDF5F93 (identifying even earlier
evidence for dairying in Ukraine, dating back to the Early Neolithic (5900-5500
B.C.)); RENATE ROLLE, THE WORLD OF THE SCYTHIANS 100-101 (F.G. Walls trans.,
1980) (describing later populations of Bronze Age Cimmerian people (predating
the Scythians) among whom horse-, sheep-, and especially cattle-rearing
predominated).
20
See, e.g., entries for: корóва укр./р. ["korova (Ukrainian)/(Russian)"], or "cow,"
traced back to the Proto-Slavic *korva, meaning "cow," in turn traced to the IndoEuropean root *ker- [horn]; and молокó укр./р [moloko (Ukrainian)/(Russian)],
"milk," to the Proto-Slavic *melko, in turn traced to the Indo-European root
*melg-, "to milk," in M.F. VASMER, ETYMOLOGICHESKIY SLOVAR' RUSSKOGO
YAZYKA (1964-1973), entries available respectively at
https://endic.ru/fasmer/Korova-6357.html and https://endic.ru/fasmer/Moloko8234.html. See generally MARIJA GIMBUTAS, THE PREHISTORY OF EASTERN
EUROPE. PART I: MESOLITHIC, NEOLITHIC AND COPPER AGE CULTURES IN RUSSIA
AND THE BALTIC AREA (1956) (locating the Proto-Indo-European homeland
between the Bug and Volga Rivers, with center around the Dniester and Don in
present-day southern Ukraine).
21
HERODOTUS, THE PERSIAN WARS, vol. II, Book IV, chapter 46, at 247 (Loeb
Classical Library edition, A.D. Godley trans., 1920 (first written around 425
B.C.)).
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littoral.22 Southern steppe nomads' reliance on milk supported an
admired reputation for practical, virtuous austerity,23 impressing
ancient Greeks as "the lordly Hippemolgi [literally, 'mare-milkers'],
they that drink the milk of mares."24 Pastoral impressions continued
to dominate later travelers’ accounts of verdant Ukraine; one in 1651,
for example, was struck by grain "growing uncultivated" and that
dairy products were "no less abundant there than grain, whether
because of the great number of pastures or the abundance of ponds."25
22

HOMER, THE ILIAD, VOL. II, Book XIII, Ch. IV, Section I (Loeb Classical Library
edition, Augustus Taber Murray trans., 1924) (describing
Γαλακτοφάγοι Galactophagoi, the "milk eaters" of the southern Ukrainian steppe).
See also Claudia Ungefehr-Kortus, Galactophagi, in BRILL'S NEW PAULY (Hubert
Cancik and Helmut Schneider eds., English edition Christine F. Salazar ed., first
published online 2006) https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-newpauly/galactophagi e417740?s.num=27&s.start=20; STRABO, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
STRABO, Book VII, Ch. III, Sect. VII (Hans Claude Hamilton and William
Falconer trans., 1903 ed. (est. 7 B.C. or 17-18 A.D.)
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0198
%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D3%3Asection%3D7 (attesting that, four hundred
years after Homer, on the northern Black Sea littoral "even now there are Wagondwellers and Nomads, so called, who live off their herds, and on milk and cheese,
and particularly on cheese made from mare's milk, and know nothing about storing
up food").
23
D. Braund, Greeks, Scythians, and Hippake, or 'Reading Mare's Cheese,'" in
ANCIENT GREEKS WEST AND EAST (Gocha R. Tsetskhladze ed., 1999) 521, 527
("Hippake [mare's milk cheese consumed by Scythians of the southern Ukrainian
steppe] was austere alterity at its best. For Greek audiences, it combined practical
utility with a localised simplicity of lifestyle"). See also, e.g., THEOPHRASTUS,
ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS VOL. II, Book IX, Ch. XIII, Sect. 2 , 281, (Loeb Classical
Library edition, E. Capps, T.E. Page, D. Rouse eds., Arthur Hort trans., 1916 (350
B.C.-287 B.C.))
https://archive.org/stream/enquiryintoplant02theouoft/enquiryintoplant02theouoft_
djvu.txt (boasting of Scythian milk and stamina that they could, relying only on the
liquorice-plant related "Scythian root" and mare's milk cheese, "go eleven or
twelve days without drinking"). See also IGOR' KHRAPUNOV, THE CRIMEA IN THE
EARLY IRON AGE: AN ETHNIC HISTORY (Nikita Khrapunov trans, 2012) at 71,
http://открытаяархеология.рф/sites/default/files/Igor_Khrapunov._The_Crimea_i
n_the_Early.pdf (describing osteological finds on Crimea evidencing cattle-,
sheep-, and goat-raising among the pastoralist pre-Scythian Kizil-Koba (Tauris)
culture).
24
HOMER, supra note 22, at Book XIII, Ch. IV, Sect. I. See also Aeschylus,
Prometheus Unbound [Promētheus Lyomenos], in AESCHYLUS, AESCHYLUS II:
AGAMEMNON, LIBATION-BEARERS, EUMENIDES, FRAGMENTS at Fragment 111
(Loeb Classical Library edition, Herbert Weir Smyth trans, 1926 (5th century
B.C.), https://www.theoi.com/Text/AeschylusFragments2.html (referring to the
law-abiding, "well-ordered Scythians that feed on mares' milk cheese").
25
Venetian Michele Bianchi served as envoy from a papal nuncio in Warsaw to
Ukrainian military-political leader Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi in 1651 and then
published a book of traveller's notes under the pseudonym Alberto Vimina. The
quoted excerpt comes from ALBERTO VIMINA, HISTORIA DELLE GUERRE CIVILI DI
POLONIA 7-9 (Venice, 1671), quoted in Frank Sysyn, Framing the Borderland: The
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The archeological, linguistic, and historical records concur in finding
milk and milk products a part of Ukrainians' production patterns and
diets for millennia prior to empires and colonial projects. Presentday Ukrainians -- as it turns out, with scholarly corroboration -consider milk indigenous.
Though the settler-colonialism critique has made crucial
interventions in the social analysis of food systems and power, its
application to the Ukrainian context in regard to milk is not as apt a
fit. Ukraine thus offers a compelling contrast case of milk holding a
firm place in the consumption of the contemporary and, as Part III
shows, in the construction of the modern, but not as a dietary
transplant. It is in part in this dually situated position -- its
indigeneity and its modernity -- that the story of milk in Ukraine may
offer some insights of broader interest. This Part has argued a
relatively straightforward case for indigeneity based on origins. The
next Part examines milk in modernity, some features of which may
deromanticize the story and trouble any simple assertion that
indigeneity precludes hegemony.
III. Cows and Collectives
A. Land of Milk, Honey, and Tragedy
Post-Soviet Ukrainian milk production was built out of the
system of collective farming that independent Ukraine inherited
upon dissolution of the Soviet Union. Understanding the post-Soviet
requires some understanding of Soviet precursors. This Part offers a
short historical overview of the Soviet system of collective farming,
attempting to outline both its cataclysmic beginnings and the
modernization it achieved over a seventy-year span,26 in order to
understand some of the social, legal, and affective structures that still
frame dairy in present-day Ukraine.

Image of the Ukrainian Revolt and Hetman Bohdan Khemel'nyts'kyi in Foreign
Travel Accounts, in FROM MUTUAL OBSERVATION TO PROPAGANDA WAR:
PREMODERN REVOLTS IN THEIR TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATIONS (Malte Griesse
ed., 2014) at note 32.
26
For discussion of building collective life, see Eppinger, Oligarchy, supra note 5.
For discussion of the association of tragedy with collectivization, see Monica
Eppinger, Cold-War Commons: Tragedy, Critique, and the Future of the Illiberal
Problem Space, 19 THEORETICAL INQU. L. 457 (July 2018)
https://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/til/article/view/1579.
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Collectivization of agriculture, though central to Soviet
socialism, actually got underway more than a decade after the
Socialist Revolution of 1917. Although abolishing private property
was an end in itself for Bolsheviks,27 war and other emergencies
initially sidelined it28 until Stalin's drive for rapid industrialization
put it back on the agenda in 1927.29 Industrialization required grain,
both to raise export revenues for purchasing industrial equipment and
to feed urban workers;30 peasants resisted selling grain to state
procurement agents at the state's prices;31 and so, Stalin argued to a
Communist Party Congress in 1927, a resulting "grain crisis"
demanded that the U.S.S.R. transition to collectivized agriculture to
facilitate grain production and collection.32
Accordingly,
government bodies authorized collectivizing agricultural
production33 and the Party adopted, for the first time, a five-year plan
for agriculture with collectivization as its central pillar in April
1929.34
27

Decree of All-Russian Central Executive Committee, "On Socialist Land
Reform and on Measures Leading to Socialist Farming," Sobr. Zakon. i
Rasporiazh. RKP RSFSR [hereinafter SZR RSFSR] No.4 It. 43 (1919), (reaffirming
Soviet government’s intention to outlaw individual types of farming and set up
collectives), reprinted in SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY 118 (Zigurds L. Zile ed., 1992)
[hereinafter Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY]. See also, e.g., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin,
Otvet na zapros krest'ianina, in VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, POLNOE SOBRANIE
SOCHINENII 1953 (1919).
28
Early on, the Soviets did redistribute crown and church estates (but not other
kinds of private lands) to local peasants. Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets
Decree "On Land," SZR RSFSR No. 1, It. 3 (1917-1918), reprinted in Zile, SOVIET
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27 at 116-117.
29
Decree of U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee (CEC) and the Council of
People’s Commissars (CPC) [otherwise known by its Soviet neologism,
Sovnarkom] “On Collective Farms,” SZP SSSR No. 15 It. 161 (1927).
30
On the relationship between food policy and industrialization, see Lynne Viola,
Introduction, in WAR AGAINST THE PEASANTRY, 1927-1930, VOLUME 1: THE
TRAGEDY OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE 1-20 (Lynne Viola et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Viola, WAR ON PEASANTRY] (arguing that the timing of collectivizing
Soviet agriculture was driven by demands arising from a drive for rapid
industrialization).
31
On the grain crisis, see, e.g., U.S.S.R. People’s Commissar of Trade A.I.
Mikoian, “On the Progress of Grain Procurements,” Speech to Collegium of Trade
Commissariat (October 3, 1927) (transcript available in Russian State Archive of
the Economy, f. 5240, op. 9, d. 102, ll. 45-49), reprinted in part in Viola, id., at 2729. See also R.W. DAVIES, THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE: THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF
SOVIET AGRICULTURE 1929-1930 39-40 (1980) [hereinafter DAVIES,
COLLECTIVIZATION].
32
XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). Stenographic
Record. 56 (1928), cited in Viola, id., at 386 n. 24.
33
Decree of CEC and CPC “On Collective Farms,” SZR SSSR No. 15 It. 161
(1927).
34
Viola, Introduction to Chapter 3, The Great Turn, 4 May 1929 – 15 November
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Although grain concerns propelled the change, the
collectivization drive had deep implications for dairy as well.
Collectivation entailed fundamental change to legal doctrines and
Soviet law innovated to encompass socialist forms of property and
agricultural organization,35 over time resulting in a hierarchy
affording different forms of property differing levels of legal
protection.36 At the top, state property such as "state farm" (sovkhoz)
holdings, including any dairy cattle, formally belonged to "the people
as a whole" and the resident farmers were wage-laborers.37 Slightly
lower, collective farm (kolkhoz) assets (including the dairy herd, if
any) belonged indivisibly to a distinct group of citizens formed into
a collective unit.38 At the bottom, “personal property” served
personal needs and included single-family houses, personal
belongings, and, if any, a household cow.39 Its use for profit-making
was largely prohibited.40
Beyond legal reforms, the process of collectivizing
agriculture in Ukraine changed the social landscape within which
dairying took place. Initially participation in collective farming was
voluntary (and in 1928, only 1.7% of Soviet peasant households were
1929, in Viola, WAR ON PEASANTRY, supra note 30, at 122.
35
Art. 5, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) ("Socialist property in the USSR exists either
in the form of state property (belonging to the people as a whole) or in the form of
cooperative and collective-farm property (property of collective farms or
cooperative societies"). All references to the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1936 cited
here and hereinafter, reprinted in ISTORIIA SOVETSKOI KONSTITUTSII V DOKUMENTAKH,
1917-1956 729 (1957) and excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note
27, at 280.
36
VICTOR P. MOZOLIN, PROPERTY LAW IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 10 (1993)
(proposing a Soviet hierarchy of property rights afforded differing levels of
protection at law).
37
Art. 6, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) (defining state socialist property) and
MOZOLIN, id. (explaining state property could not be used as security and was
inalienable).
38
Art. 7, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) ("The enterprises of collective farms and
cooperative organizations, with their livestock, buildings, implements, and output
are the common, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative
organizations. ..."). See also W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 169-176 (1983).
Cooperatives were later disfavored and agricultural holding limited to state farms
and collective farms until the re-institution of cooperatives under perestroika. Law
of the U.S.S.R. "On Cooperatives," June 1, 1988, VED. SSSR 1988, no. 22, item
355, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS, VOL. 28 723-753 (William G. Frenkel
trans., 1989), excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27 at 507. See
also Art. 8, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) (permitting a kolkhoz to occupy its land
free of charge and in perpetuity).
39
Art. 10, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936). See also MOZOLIN, supra note 36, at 10-11.
40
Butler, supra note 38, at 174.
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members of agricultural collectives41), but by the end of 1929, the
Party abandoned voluntary participation and kicked off a campaign
of mass collectivization.42 In two intense months, Ukrainian
landholding went from 16% collectivized to 64%.43
Behind these dry figures stands dramatic change involving
widespread violence, most recognizably, acts of straightforward
physical violence. In January 1930 the Politburo issued a secret
decree directing urban Party members to the countryside to effect
"dekulakization," the “liquidation” of rural small-holders (so-called
"kulaks") by February 20, 1930.44 Dekulakization meant seizing
assets from small-holders who were then either put into detention,
sent into exile or prison in Siberia, or killed on the spot.45 Some rural
small-holders got wind and fled in so-called self-dekulakization.
Through these processes of exhortation combined with
dekulakization, dairying was also socialized: by January 1, 1932
(U.S.S.R.-wide), there were 20,811 dairy collectives with a total herd
of 3,334,000 cattle.46
Production and distribution through the new collectives fell
catastrophically short.47 In 1932, to address dairy shortfalls, the
Soviet government created a new type of organization, the
41

DAVIES, COLLECTIVIZATION, supra note 31, at 112, 147; KAK LOMALI NEP 2, 8
STENOGRAMMI PLENUMOV TSK VKP(B), 1928-1929, VOL. 5 (V.P. Danilov et al.
eds., 2000).
42
Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (hereinafter CC of
CP) “On the Pace of Collectivization and State Assistance to Collective-Farm
Construction,” Jan. 5, 1930, CPSU IN RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF
CONGRESSES, CONFERENCES, AND PLENUMS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, VOL. 5,
72-75 reprinted in Viola, WAR ON PEASANTRY, supra note 30, at 201 (calling for
'"wholesale" (sploshnaia) collectivization, meaning no less than 75% of every
village).
43
Timothy Snyder, Professor of Modern Central European history at Yale
University, lecture at Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (November 8, 2005)
(reporting the rate of collectivization between January and mid-March 1930).
44
Politburo Decree "On Measures for the Liquidation of Kulak Farms in Raions of
Wholesale Collectivization," Jan. 30, 1930, Russian Government Archive of Social
and Political History f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 64-69 reprinted in Viola, WAR ON
PEASANTRY, supra note 30, at 228-234.
45
See the implementing order of the secret police (the OGPU), OGPU Order on
Measures for the Liquidation of the Kulak as a Class, February 2, 1930, No. 44/21,
GARF f. 9414, op. I., d. 1944, ll. 17-25. reprinted in Viola, id. at 238-245.
46
U.S. Dep't Agric., Bureau Agric. Econ., Div. Foreign Agric. Service, Russian
Collective Dairy Farming, 24 FOREIGN CROPS AND MARKETS 478-79 (1932) quoting
SOCIALIST AGRIC. (Feb. 26, 1932), cited in AGRIC. ECON. BIBLIOGRAPHY entry 385
at page 91 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Bureau Agr. Econ., 1937).
47
DAVIES, COLLECTIVIZATION, supra note 31, at 104–05.
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"commercial dairy farm" (known by its abbreviation from Soviet
Russian, the MTF). An MTF might operate as a branch of a
collective farm working on other kinds of agriculture and or it might
coordinate efforts between dairy-producing collective farms. Either
way, the MTFs were tasked with supervising and rendering
assistance to dairy units of the collectives.48
While on one hand Soviet authorities were attempting
organizational innovations like MTFs to facilitate production, on the
other, the violence attending collectivization was thwarting them.
Beyond the physical violence of dekulakization, structural violence
was manifest in mass confiscation of rural foodstuffs by state
agents.49 Recall that a primary impetus for collectivizing agriculture
was to facilitate the state collecting grain from the countryside. In
rural Ukraine, state agents collected grain even if it took confiscation,
producing in rural residents "visible confusion and 'lostness'" and a
palpable sense of "unknowability" regarding "what will become of
them" as hunger and desperation loomed.50
Under these conditions, some rural residents hid grain and
slaughtered their cows. Evidence suggests it was to avoid starvation,
although at the time the Soviet leadership suspected peasants of
48

U.S. Dept. Agr., supra note 46, quoting 3 SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION AGRIC.
1931, cited in AGRIC. ECON. BIBLIOGRAPHY supra note 46 at 91.
49
For discussion of structural violence, see Johan Glatung, Violence, Peace, and
Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167 (1969). On the distinction between the
physical exertions of political and everyday violence on one hand, and structural
violence on the other, see Philippe Bourgois, The Power of Violence in War and
Peace: Post-Cold War Lessons from El Salvador, 8 ISTMO (2004)
http://istmo.denison.edu/n08/articulos/power.html.
50
A January 1933 mission in central Ukraine, reporting back to the Central
Committee on local reception of rural grain seizure, found that neither notification
about impending grain seizure nor the actual carting off of grain had met "active
protest": "This measure is generally accepted in silence. But," it continued, "when
you have become more attentively acquainted with the moods of individual
collective farmers, you see that this operation has acted upon them en masse in an
overwhelming, depressing way. Among a significant portion of collective farmers
it produces a visible confusion and 'lostness,' a fundamental unknowability of what
will happen next, of what will become of them." Grigoriev, Head of Dep't of MassAgitation Campaigns of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
(Bolshevik wing) of Ukraine (hereinafter CC CP(B)U)], Rep. of the Dep't of MassAgitation Campaigns of the CC CP(B)U "On the Mood of the Population of
Velikotokmak and Bozhedariv Districts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in Connection
with Confiscation of the Seed Fund into the Requisitioned-Grain Account,"
Archives CC of CP Ukr., F.1. Op. 101. Spr. 1244. Ark. 2-5, Jan. 8, 1933, available
at https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig1933.php#nom-246, at record number 140 (translation my own).
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killing cattle to avoid surrendering them to the new collectives.51
Authorities used the law to clarify the situation and bring the hammer
down. In regard to livestock and other assets funneled into the new
collective entities, in addition to what was literally "state property,"
collective farm or cooperative property would also be considered
"public property" and as such would be legally held to be "sacred
and inviolable" and protected as strictly as if it were the state's own
property.52 Farmers' consuming the produce they grew, livestock
they raised, or milk they collected would be considered theft.
Severe confiscations compounded the physical violence of
the collectivization campaign. Within two harvests after its start,
10% of the Ukrainian population (by conservative estimates) would
die from famine: of a Soviet Ukrainian population of 33 million, an
estimated minimum 3.5 million starved to death between 1932 and
1933 alone.53 With food requisitioned for urban consumption,
mortality fell harder on the countryside, village death tolls far
exceeding the 10% average. Some Ukrainian villages were
completely depopulated in this short period that has come to be
known as the Holodomor, or Famine.

51

Decree of CEC and CPC "On Measures to Combat Rapacious Slaughter of
Livestock," Jan. 16, 1930, SOBR. POST. PRAV. SSSR 1930, no. 6, item 66, reprinted
in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27, at 213.
52
The CEC and CPC of the U.S.S.R. "hold public (state, collective farm,
cooperative) property to be the foundation of the Soviet system. They regard such
property as sacred and inviolable, and all persons making any attempts on its
integrity -- as enemies of the people. In view of this, it is the foremost duty of the
Soviet authorities to wage a decisive sturggle against misappropriators of public
property. ... [They hereby decree] ... To equate collective farm and cooperative
property (harvestable crops, common reserves, livestock, cooperative warehouses
and stores, etc.) with state property and to intensify the protection of such property
from misappropriation." Decree of CEC and CPC "On Protecting and
Strengthening Public (Socialist) Property," Aug. 7, 1932, U.S.S.R. Decrees 1932,
no. 62, item 360, reprinted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27, at 265,
265-66.
53
Total registered deaths (which likely reflects under-reporting) for 1931-33 in
Ukraine is 3,091,809, reflected against a estimated 1930 population of 28,710,628.
See R.W. Davies’ latest calculation at www.soviet-archives-research.co.uk/hunger.
Davies and Wheatcroft, adjusting for statistical birth and death rates, estimate 1.54
million “excess deaths,” i.e. people who died from famine who would not
otherwise have died at that time, in 1932-1933 alone in Ukraine. R.W. DAVIES AND
STEPHEN G. WHEATCROFT, THE YEARS OF HUNGER: SOVIET AGRICULTURE, 19311933 415 (2004).
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B. Socialized Cows and Household Survival
1. Milk and Famine
a. Dairy, Distribution, and Directives
Within the context of the Famine that accompanied
collectivization in the early 1930s, dairy took on particular
significance in the Ukrainian countryside. Milk, like grain, was
subject to requisition and a peculiar form of scarcity took hold in
rural areas.54 The new collective farms introduced a compensation
system including a unit, the normative "workday,"55 as a standard
measure for labor effort56 and terms of trade in the new compensation
system shifted disastrously against the Ukrainian villager. One
"workday" of a Ukrainian collective farmer was pegged at a value57
54

The Ukrainian Famine of the early 1930s was, in Amartya Sen's terms, a case of
"food entitlement decline": even when food was available -- farmers had grown it
-- they were not entitled to it and thus starved. AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND
FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION (1981).
55
Trudoden', "workday," as a unit of measure for labor on collective farms,
introduced in law in Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel (Collective Farm),
approved by Decrees of CEC and CPC, March 1, 1930 and of April 13, 1930 and
by resolution of the Kolkhoztsentr SSSR [USSR Collective Farm Center] of June
7, 1930, USSR Decrees 1930, no. 24, item 255, reprinted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 207 [hereinafter Model Charter] (instituting, inter alia,
the "workday" compensation-accounting system).
56
See text infra notes 85-88 for more full discussion of the "workday" and its role
in post-War collectivization of dairy production.
57
Records from the time of the Famine show one "workday" of a collective farmer
in Ukraine evaluated as being worth roughly 3 rubles. See, e.g., P. Lyubchenko,
deputy head of the CPC of Ukr. S.S.R. and P. Postishev, Secretary of CC CP(B)U,
[Resolution of the CC CP(B)U and CPC of the Ukr. S.S.R. “On the removal of
Kamenniy Potolok village, Kremenchug district, Kharkov region from the 'Black
Board'” Oct. 17, 1933 (archived Nov. 9, 2017) Archives of the CC CP Ukr., F.1,
Op. 6, Spr. 285, Ark. 144-145, available at
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom246, at record number 246.
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insufficient to purchase a liter of milk.58 In other words, even had it
been market-available, milk would have been beyond the purchasing
power of the farmers on collective farms producing it.
At the height of the Famine, some local authorities in
Ukraine attempting to save rural people from starvation officially
turned to the dairy herd. The winter of 1932-33 had decimated
villages. By early spring 1933, amidst masses of people in the
countryside so staggered by hunger that they lay where they fell,
local officials ordered district agents to collect those "found laying
down," hospitalize them, and try to fatten them up -- or at least stave
off the final throes of starvation (particularly, it seems from internal
communications, to save enough bodies to get labor into fields for
spring planting). To do this, they temporarily suspended milk
requisitions from collective farms. "In view of the exceptionally
difficult food situation in Skvyrsky, Belotserkovsky and Volodarsky
districts," as one local government order in Ukraine in March 1933
reads, "we hereby suspend the requisition of milk by state
procurement agents in these areas, in order to turn it to elimination
of the manifestation of starvation, to be used exclusively for the
feeding of children and the hospitalized ill."59 A March 1933 order
from Kyiv district obliged Party workers to organize assistance to
starving children in the form of milk provision "so that each child
would receive half a glass" daily.60 Another demanded a "norm" of
58

Milk in 1933 cost 4.5 rubles per litre. M. Khataevych, Secretary of the Oblast'
Comm. CP(B)Ukr., Supplementary note of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party
Comm., People's Commissariat of Supply of the USSR, and the CC CP(B)U "On
Deterioration of the Food Supply of Industrial Enterprises of the Region and
Measures for the Implementation of Plans for Centralized Delivery of Food,"
March 21, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr. F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2187, Ark. 103-107,
available at https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig1933.php#nom-246, at record number 198 (giving the price for a liter of milk as 4
rubles 50 kopeks).
59
Demchenko, Secretary of Oblast' Comm. CP(B)U, Decision of the Kyiv
Regional Committee of the CP(B) "On the Provision of Milk Assistance to
Children and the Ill in in Skvyrsky, Belotserkovsky and Volodarsky Districts of
the Oblast," March 18, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr., F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2189,
Ark. 172, available at
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom246, at record number 193.
60
"Oblige the RPK to organize assistance to desperate children in the form of
milk, so that each child would receive a half a glass of milk daily." Demchenko,
Secretary of the Oblast' Comm. CP(B)U, Resolution of the Kyiv Oblast' Comm. of
the CP(B)U from the Resolution of the Kyiv Oblast' Comm. of the CP(B)U "On
Strengthening Party, Soviet, and Economic Organs, On the Rendering of Food
Assistance to the Population and On the Responsibility of Leaders for the
Realization of these Measures," March 19, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr.,
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700-800 calories per day be reached for each child but did not
allocate food relief, instead declaring that milk, eggs, and other
products of animal husbandry "can and must be mobilized on site."61
b. Model Rules and Milk Memoirs
Milk thus played a role in official Famine responses. It also
proved key to household survival strategies. Crucially, not all cattle,
or milk, had been incorporated into the collectives. The state
promulgated a Model Code for collective farms that allowed any
rural household who had dairy cattle before collectivization to retain
one cow for household use.62 As local authorities initiated
emergency measures in the face of mass starvation, officials exhorted
villagers to rely on "internal food resources," significantly among
them local milk.63
Villagers needed little urging. Memoirs of the Famine
reflect the importance of that single cow to a household struggling to
survive. One grandmother from Zhytomir oblast, for example,
recalls how fellow villagers, unable to withstand hunger, slaughtered
their cows for meat and subsequently starved, while her family
refrained and survived on their cow's milk.64 Another remembers at
F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2190, Ark. 1-2, available at
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig1933.php#nom-246, at record number 194.
61
Kharmandaryan, Deputy People's Commissar of Health of the Ukr. S.S.R.,
Supplemental Note of the People’s Commissariat of Health of the Ukr. SSR CC
KP(b)U "On the State of the Health of the Population of Kyiv region in
Connection with Food Difficulties," June 3, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr.,
F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2130, Ark. 41-47 available at
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom246, record no. 232.
62
"Milk cows of single-cow households are not socialized. In multi-cow
households, one cow is left in personal use; the rest are socialized ... ." Model
Charter, supra note 55, at 207. The 1936 Soviet Constitution reenforced this onecow per household allowance. Art. 7, CONST. U.S.S.R. (1936).
63
See, e.g., Resolution of the CC CP(B)U "On the Approach for Preparing for
Spring Sowing and Organization of Food Aid to the Population of Kyiv Region,"
sect. 9(d), March 31, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr., F.1, Op. 6, Spr. 282, Ark.
107-110], available at
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom246, at record number 204 (urging Kyiv regional officials to undertake emergency
aid, including to"strengthen local initiative . . . in the search for internal food
resources (milk, eggs for children, etc.)").
64
Oleksiy Hordiev, A Cow, in “LET ME TAKE THE WIFE TOO, WHEN I REACH THE
CEMETERY SHE WILL BE DEAD”: STORIES OF HOLODOMOR SURVIVORS (Euromaidan
Press, Nov. 24, 2018) http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/11/24/let-me-take-the-
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age ten surviving (after her mother's death and father's exile to
Siberia) thanks only to milk from the family cow. She and her sister
grew so skinny that it was painful to sit because they were "all bone,"
reduced to hiding their milk jar from hunger-stricken neighbors, but
"the milk saved me.”65 A villager from central Ukraine, Havrylo
Prokopenko, recalls of his boyhood:
We . . . shared joint ownership of a cow with Lina
the seamstress. We fed and milked her on alternate
days. The cow lived in our adobe block shed. On the
street side of one of its white walls was a sign written
in red clay: “The struggle for grain is a struggle for
socialism.” Zirka was a dry cow and gave little milk,
but it was tasty and had a high fat content. The shed
had heavy oak doors covered with an iron grate and a
screw lock. . . .
By springtime . . . thanks to God, we were alive.
But in the village and all around us an apocalypse was
unfolding. Almost every day the bodies of people who
had starved to death were transported past our house
on the way to the cemetery ...
Disaster struck the day after Easter [1933]...
Havrylo opened the door of the shed and found Zirka gone.
Half of the wall with the sign had been smashed onto the
road. The boy was then accused at rifle-point by the village
council secretary of having sold the cow (which as kulaklike behavior could have put his life in jeopardy), but was
exonerated when, the following day, "they found Zirka’s
head and hide, and a bucket of lard. Our 'good' neighbours
[sic] had stolen the cow and slaughtered it."66

wife-too-when-i-reach-the-cemetery-she-will-be-dead-stories-of-holodomorsurvivors/ (recalling a grandmother from Pylyponka, Zhytomyr Oblast, who
survived "thanks to a cow," unlike fellow villagers who couldn't stand the hunger
and slaughtered their dairy cow for meat but then subsequently perished from
hunger).
65
Hilary Caton, Holodomor Surivivor in Burlington shares famine story,
BURLINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2013) https://www.insidehalton.com/newsstory/4230737-holodomor-survivor-in-burlington-shares-famine-story/ (relating
Famine survival memories from eastern Ukraine of survivor Maria Sagan).
66
Havrylo Nykyforovych Prokopenko, Eyewitness Testimony, in HOLOD 33:
NARODNA KNYHA-MEMORIAL 195-97 (Lidiia Kovalenko and Volodymyr Maniak
comp., 1991).
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Famine memoir, an emergent genre in post-Soviet Ukraine,
captures paradigmatic features that distinguish Ukrainian from other
experiences of Soviet collectivization. Soviet historiography left out
the Ukrainian Famine; post-Soviet Ukrainian memoirs insist upon
remembering and re-collecting it. They relate how, within an
increasingly dire regime of food confiscation, milk provided a
lifeline for several reasons. The household dairy cow was a legally
permitted source of sustenance. Features inherent in dairy
production -- daily harvest, the fragmented nature of its collection
(individual cows milked separately, with milk going into individual
buckets) -- made milk harder to monitor. Helping oneself was easier
to pull off and, during severe caloric crisis, more difficult for the state
to see and seize.67
For all of its demographic disaster and trauma,
collectivization took hold: by 1940, on the eve of World War II, 97%
of Soviet farming worked collectively.68 In Ukraine, for those who
managed to survive its inception, the village collective's herd and
household cow allowance proved significant both in dairy production
and household survival, as the coming years of War and occupation
would again show.
2. Hungerpolitik: Dairy under Wartime Occupation
Recuperation from the Famine over the last half of the 1930s
was interrupted by the Nazi invasion of 1941.69 All of Ukraine was
occupied (and then, four years later, liberated), meaning that the front
swept across Ukraine twice, first with Nazi attack and then with Red
Army counter-attack. In retreat, both the Soviet (1941) and Nazi
(1944-45) command ordered a "scorched earth" policy in regard to
Ukrainian village agriculture. As Himmler instructed his troops, "It
67

For the creation of collective farms as part of a modernist scheme of rural
surveillance, see JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES
TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 209-220 (1998).
68
Zvi Lerman, Karen Brooks, Csaba Csaki, Land Reform and Farm Restructuring
in Ukraine, 270 World Bank Discussion Papers 23 (1994)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/122021468109448366/pdf/multipage.pdf at 23.
69
Adolph Hitler, Reichfuehrer Adolph Hitler’s Proclamation on War with Soviet
Union (Berlin, Germany, June 22, 1941)
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410622a.html (statement of the Fuhrer of
Germany declaring war on the U.S.S.R.); Joachin von Ribbentrop, Statement by
Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, On the Declaration of War on
the Soviet Union (Berlin, Germany, June 22, 1941)
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410622b.html (statement of the Foreign
Minister of Germany on Hitler's declaration of war against the U.S.S.R.).
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is necessary that in retreating from the regions of Ukraine we do not
leave behind a single person, head of livestock or measure of grain
... "70
Once again, in addition to overt violence, the village was an
object of structural violence through food policy. In areas under
Soviet governance, the "workday" system was pressed into wartime
service. The law specified a minimum number of obligatory
"workdays" devoted to collective work per year and provided
criminal sanctions to enforce it.71 Payment in-kind, i.e. in foodstuffs,
to farmers was suspended. Food was once again subject to
requisition; farmers were made to pay; and terms of trade again
turned against rural Ukrainians.
In areas under German occupation, a different picture of
rural-urban suffering emerged. Nazi forces exterminated a large
portion of the civilian population72 and pressed others into forced
labor in Germany. Of the remaining inhabitants, Nazi policy dictated
that the Slavic subhumans, the Untermensch of Ukraine, would (still
collectively) farm its steppe and feed Germany, at least for the
duration of the war.73

70

Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer of the SS, quoted in I. RYBALKA AND V.
DOVHOPOL, ISTORIIA UKRAINSKOI RSR: EPOKHA SOTZIALIZMU 366, cited in
SUBTELNY, supra note 13, at 477.
71
Resolution of the CPC of the U.S.S.R. and the CC of the All-Union CP(B), April
13, 1942 cited in Trududen', VIKIPEDIYA [Russian-language Wikipedia],
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BE%
D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%8C#cite_ref-1 (last checked Feb. 7, 2020)
[hereinafter Trudoden' workday].
72
Current scholarship estimates 1.5 - 1.6 million Jewish citizens were killed in the
Holocaust in Ukraine. Wendy Lower, Introduction to Special Volume on the
Holocaust in Ukraine: Selected Articles from Holocaust and Genocide Studies,
HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 2 (United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum 2014)
https://academic.oup.com/DocumentLibrary/HGS/holocaustinukraine_intro.pdf.
73
Reichskommisar of Ukraine Erich Koch, upon his arrival in Ukraine in
September 1941, told his staff, "Gentlemen, I am known as a brutal dog. Because
of this reason I was apponted as Reichskommisar of Ukraine. Our task is to suck
from Ukraine all the goods we can get hold of, without consideration of the
feelings or the property of the Ukrainians. Gentlemen, I am expecting from you
the utmost severity towards the native population." Erich Koch, German
Reichskommisar of Ukraine, quoted in SUBTELNY, supra note 13, at 467; policy of
adapting Soviet collective farming to German ends summarized in SUBTELNY, id.
at 468-69.
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In fact, food lay behind some of the Nazis' acquisitive
military designs on Ukraine,74 food policy and territorial acquisition
interconnecting with Nazi racial ideologies. A Nazi goal of reducing
dependence on food "imports" would be reached by expanding
Germany's borders to encompass a larger "domestic" agricultural
base (incorporating the rich "black earth" lands of central and
southern Ukraine into Germany), through conquest.75 Meanwhile,
Nazi race theory considered inhabitants of Ukraine racially inferior
"useless eaters" who, once defeated militarily, could be "dealt with"
by lowering their food rations below subsistence levels.76 After a
"Holocaust by bullets," food confiscation was an intentional Nazi
strategy for feeding its army and, through mass civilian starvation,
for clearing Ukrainian territory for eventual resettlement by
Germans.77 As historian Gesine Gerhard puts it, the Nazis counted
"without regret" on the "massive starvation" to come78: under
German occupation, food policy became Hungerpolitik, "hunger
policy."
Indeed, of the food supplies that Nazi Germany obtained
from the occupied U.S.S.R., an estimated 85% came from Ukraine.79
Between military operations and starvation, the toll was beyond
decimation: approximately one in six inhabitants of Ukraine
perished.80 In reverse of the pattern during the Soviet collectivization
74

Gesine Gerhard, Food and Genocide: Nazi Agrarian Politics in the Occupied
Territories of the Soviet Union, 18 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 45, 45 (2009) [hereinafter
Gerhard, Food and Genocide].
75
Id. at 55-56. See generally GESINE GERHARD, NAZI HUNGER POLITICS: A
HISTORY OF FOOD IN THE THIRD REICH (2015).
76
Gerhard, Food and Genocide, supra note 74 at 46 (outlining Backe's plans for
feeding the German army and homeland during the war by starving Ukraine).
77
On the "Holocaust by bullets," genoicidal massacres at the time of invasion or
shortly thereafter in which half a million people, the majority Jews, were shot
within the first nine months of the war, see United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum, Einsatzgruppen: An Overview, From Security Measures to Mass
Murder, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/einsatzgruppen. On starvation
as a strategy, see Gerhard, Food and Genocide, supra note 74 at 58-59. See also
Alex J. Kay, Germany's Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of May
2, 1941, 41 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 685, 685 (2006); Aktennotiz über die Besprechung
der Staatssekretäre am 2.5.1941, partially reprinted in DER KRIEG GEGEN DIE
SOWJETUNION 1941-1945. EINE DOKUMENTATION 44 (Reinhard Rürup ed., 1991).
78
Gerhard, Food and Genocide, id. at 46.
79
SUBTELNY, supra note 13 at 469.
80
Figures are steadily revised upwards as historians do their forensic work. To
give a general idea of scale, as of 1988 an estimated minimum 5.3 million
inhabitants of Ukraine perished during the War, with some estimates ranging to 7
million, with an additional 2.3 million deported to forced labor in Germany. As of
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Famine, this time cities were targeted first for starvation and their
inhabitants fled, when they could, to the countryside.
During this ruinous time, again, milk provided a crucial
reservoir of calories for Ukrainians. Milk did not feature
prominently in the Nazis' schemes regarding provisions to be
extracted from Ukraine. The time-sensitivity of milk spoilage may
have made it less a target for rendering back to Germany than, say,
crop harvests. Moreover, as during the Soviet collectivization-era
Famine, milk was easier for peasants to conceal or consume directly
after milking. That did not mean that dairy was exempt from wartime
predations; for example, per German army policy, German troops
routinely requisitioned rural households' dairy cows in order to
provision themselves.81 It did mean that a household's access to milk
raised the odds of possible survival if other stars also aligned.
Legal disputes from the War years offer an intimate look into
the lifesaving significance of milk for rural households. Consider
Generalova v. Shagov, a dispute that came before Soviet courts after
liberation.82 During the occupation, German forces demanded six
cows of a village; owners of two cows agreed that one (Ms.
Generalova's) would be surrendered and the other (Mr. Shagov's),
milked by the two households and the milk, shared. After liberation
from German occupation, Mr. Shagov refused to continue the milkshare arrangement; the householder who had surrendered her cow to
the occupying forces for the common good, Ms. Generalova, brought
suit. The parties pursued the case up to the Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R. which affirmed the trial court judgment for Generalova,
reasoning with an almost Coasian logic that villagers entered into the
agreement "to distribute equally, to the extent feasible, the burden of
the forcible extortion by the Germans" and thus "it corresponded to
the interests not only of those who gave up their cow to meet the
German demands, but also of those who kept in their possession
cows for the benefit of the owners who had to give theirs away."83
2014 historians estimated that an additional minimum of 1.5 million from Ukraine
were murdered in the Shoah. SUBTELNY, id. at 479 (giving casualty tolls aside
from the Shoah); Lower, supra note 72 (giving figures of those citizens of Ukraine
murdered in the Holocaust).
81
On the policy for troops to feed themselves from the Ukrainian countryside,
formulated during a meeting of top war-planning bureaucrats on May 2, 1941, see
Gerhard, Food and Genocide , supra note 74 at 58 –59; Kay, supra note 77 at 685.
82
The case, though from a village in Russia, offers a fact pattern illustrative of the
Ukrainian experience as well.
83
Case of Generalova v. Shagov, Civil Division of the Supreme Court of the
U.S.S.R., 1943, in 4 SUDEBNAIA PRAKTIKA VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR, 1943 31-32,
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C. Cattle and Dairy in High Socialism
1. Collectivization in Legal Imagination and in Practice
After World War II, the structures of collectivism were
harnessed to incentivize production for post-war reconstruction in
new ways. As already discussed, the state's "Model Charter for
Collective Farms" contained a one-cow provision84 that secured the
household milk supply to which many who made it through Famine
and the War owed their survival. Recall also that the Model Charter
had introduced a unit of measure for collective farm labor, the
trudoden', a standardized "workday," for calculating compensation,
pegging different farm tasks to different numbers (or portions) of
"workdays" earned based on level of difficulty, skill, or prior training
required.85 An individual's "workdays" were recorded weekly,86 with
collective farm proceeds divided up annually proportionate to each
member's accrued "workdays."87 The milkmaids' "workday" aligned
with output; in 1956, for example, a milkmaid accrued 1.8-2

reprinted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27, at 329.
84
Model Charter, supra note 55. See also text infra notes 55-57.
85
See Model Charter, id. Discussion here is also informed by the Trudoden'
workday entry, supra note 71. See also text infra notes 55-57 and infra note 71 for
discussion of the "workday" in the context of the Famine and World War II,
respectively.
86
The system encouraged labor zeal by recognizing both its service to group aims
and the individual's heroic feats of labor. See, e.g., LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM,
STAKHANOVISM AND THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN THE U.S.S.R, 1935-1941
(1988) (describing the movement inspired by a heroic Donbas (Ukraine) coal
miner. See also R.W. DAVIES, THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA, VOL. 2,
THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM, 1929-1930 (1980); SHEILA FITZPATRICK, STALIN’S
PEASANTS: RESISTANCE AND SURVIVAL IN THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE AFTER
COLLECTIVIZATION (1994); MARY BUCKLEY, MOBILIZING SOVIET PEASANTS:
HEROINES AND HEROES OF STALIN’S FIELDS 115133 (2006) (describing collective
farming labor practices patterned after heavy industry). See generally OLEG
KHARKHORDIN, THE COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN RUSSIA (1999) (describing
conditions of possibility within Soviet labor collectives for the development of a
certain kind of individual).
87
Obviously, this compensation system was disastrously disrupted by the forced
requisitioning of foodstuffs that precipated mass famine in Ukraine. Adopting the
"workday" as a unit of measure obviated the need for cash to enter into the "mutual
settlements" (взаиморасчёты) internal to the collective farm. See Trudoden'
workday, supra note 71. Excluding cash payments increased the corresponding
importance of internal grain distribution and thus increased collective farmers'
vulnerability to external (state) grain confiscation. See Part III.A. supra
(describing mass commodity seizures and Famine in Ukraine 1930-33).
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"workdays" for every 100 liters of milk (which entailed, generally,
her milking 8-10 cows).88
These and other measures were meant to foster collectivized
subjectivities through collective responsibility. Another decree
provided that a collective farmer's income be based on the
productivity of her work "brigade" and of a new inter-brigade unit
called the zveno, or "link,"89 predicating individual compensation on
group performance. Milkmaids' brigades, too, were linked; in
collective farm milk production, they were in it together. The law
eventually permitted individual collective farms some latitude in
setting compensation rates90 and the "workday" as a normative unit
of measure was eventually replaced in 196691 by fixed compensation
88

"For hand milking in the collective farm for every 100 liters of milked milk a
milkmaid receives on average 1.8-2 workdays (for the servicing of 8-10 cows)."
V.A. Olenev, Yu. I. Belyaevskiy, researchers in the laboratory of the All-Union
Scientific-Research Institute of Electrification of Agriculture, "Effectiveness and
Benefits of "Milking Sites" (1956), reprinted at Istoriya doeniya [History of
Milking], available at
http://agrotehimport.ru/national_history_of_dairy_equipment_ussr/effektivnosti_i_
preimushhestva_doilnyix_ploshhadok/ [hereinafter Olenev and Belyaevskiy,
Milking Sites].
89
Decrees of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. "On Measures for the
Improvement of the Organization, Raising the Productivity, and Streamline
Payment of Labor on Collective Farms," April 19, 1948 cited in G.A. AKSENENOK,
V.K. GRIGOR'EV, P.P. PYATNITSKIY, COLLECTIVE FARM LAW, CH. IX Legal forms of
organization and payment of labor on collective forms, §4 Payment of Labor,
available at http://istmat.info/node/23766 (providing for the zveno, or "link,"
organization).
90
Decree of CC of CPSU and Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., March 6,
1956, cited in Trudoden' workday supra note 71 (allowing each collective farm to
set its own minimum number of "workdays"); see also Charter of Agricultural
Cartel, Art. 11 (1956), described in entry for Dokhody kolkhozov ["Income of
Collective Farms"] FINANSOVIY-KREDITNIY SLOVAR' TOM I 406 (V.P. D'yachenko
ed., 1961) 406, available at https://economyru.info/page/015051140096162202142062081044017249179120054120/
(allowing collective farms, after having fulfilled annual obligations to the state,
flexibility to distribute the collective income in a manner decided by a group
meeting of all farmers). Some farms formed cash and in-kind funds to be
distributed to individuals as a monthly advance, with a final settling of work
accounts at the end of the year. Trudoden' workday, supra note 71.
91
Decree of the CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., "On
Raising the Material Interestedness of Collective Farmers in Development of
Societal Production," May 18, 1966, discussed in Sergey Ivanovich Shubin,
Istoriya Trudodnya (1930-1966) Kak Mery Truda I Instrumenta Yevo
Stimuliravaniya 31, 34 (at text infra his note 10) available at
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/istoriya-trudodnya-1930-1966-kak-mery-truda-iinstrumenta-ego-stimulirovaniya/viewer. See also, e.g., Rekomendatsii po oplatye
truda v kolkhozach Ukrainskoi SSR 107 (Kiev, 1977).
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rates more like wages (like those already used on state farms),92
though the "link" unit persisted.93
In milkways, such organizational forms of high socialism
left surviving legacies. Milking workers had long since emerged as
a gendered cohort. Though not exclusively performed by women,
normatively milking was "women's work": something women were
considered better at and better suited to, and as a practical matter,
under a near-monopoly of milkmaids,94 who became a distinct and
privileged labor and social group within the collective farm.95 The
collectivist practices of high socialism intensified relationships
between village milkmaids working in the collective farm dairy,
establishing and reenforcing patterns of cooperation, pressure,
support, and self-organization that left their imprint on milkmaid
cohorts in Ukrainian villages long after the "workday," or even the
collective farms, had disappeared. The "workday" also left a lasting
legacy in its influence on the adoption of mechanized milking (or
lack thereof), which the next subsection briefly describes.
2. Milk Dreams: Reconstruction, State Science, and the
Limits of Big Agriculture
a. Cattle Feed and Consumption
Premier Khruschev in 1958 promised to raise U.S.S.R.
agricultural production over capitalist countries'96 and linked
92

Shubin, id. at 34-35 (decrying abolition of the workday as leading to the
eventual demise of the collective farm) and at 32 (calling for a more "objective"
reappraisal of the workday).
93
On Khrushchev’s enthusiasm with “links” and further literature on them, see
GEORGE BRESLAUER, KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV AS LEADERS 94 (1982).
94
This gendered division of labor, with women primarily responsible for milking,
has lasted to the present. "Rural women are key players in milk production as they
are largely responsible for cow milking and care." Improving Milk Supply in
Northern Ukraine, FAO Investment Center/EBRD Cooperation Program Report
Series, no. 18 at xiii (September 2013), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3346e-pdf
[hereinafter FAO/EBRD Report No. 18].
95
Soviet Ukrainian milkmaids typically earned more than their counterparts in the
intellegentsia and, like (mostly male) tractor and combine drivers, were privileged
to purchase cars and imported clothes at special stores in the district center
reserved for nomenklatura. Oksana Hasiuk, personal communication, Jan. 3,
2020.
96
Control Figures for the Economic Development of the U.S.S.R., 1959-1965:
Theses of N.S. Khrushchov's Report to the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU, at
7-8, 9-10, 11-12 (1958), excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27,
383, 384.
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increasing production with restoring consumption. As the Program
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 1961 promised, "In
the current decade (1961-70) the Soviet Union ... will surpass the
strongest and richest capitalist country, the U.S.A. ... ; everyone will
live in easy circumstances; all collective and state farms will become
highly productive and profitable enterprises ... "97
Where before and during the War collectivization had
organized the countryside in a way visible to the state and thereby
facilitated seizing foodstuffs,98 in decades after the War, emphasis
switched to facilitating delivery of knowledge and other inputs,
including applied agricultural science, considered crucial to the drive
to enrich Soviet consumption. One example is cattle feed. During
World War II, Soviet scientists had begun large-scale production of
single-celled protein (SCP)99 from microbial biomass to meet human
protein needs.100 The Soviet Council of Ministers decided in 1960 to
pursue SCP as a source of protein-rich animal feed additive101 and
set up a new administration, the Main Administration of the
Microbiological Industry, to organize efforts.102 By 1990, U.S.S.R.wide production of SCP was reported at 1,680,000 tons, roughly
equivalent to the addition of 8.4-11.8 million tons of grain to feed
supplies.103
b. Mechanization: Losing Time, Losing Touch

97

Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Adopted by the TwentySecond Congress of the CPSU, Oct. 31, 1961, excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 384, 385.
98
See Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2, supra; see also SCOTT supra note 67 (interpreting
measures like collectivization as ways of making the countryside legible to the
state).
99
Single cell protein was called in Russian "protein-vitamin concentrate," (belokvitamin konsentrat, or BVK for short).
100
Anthony Rimmington, Soviet Biotechnology: The Case of Single Cell Protein,
in TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 76 (R. Amann and
J. Cooper eds., 1986).
101
A.E. Humphrey, Soviet Technology: the Case of Single Cell Protein, 23
SURVEY 102:81 (1977-78).
102
Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., "On the Development of
Microbiological Industry and on the Administration of that Industry," Feb. 18,
1966, in 6 DECISIONS OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ON AGRICULTURAL
QUESTIONS (1968) at 19-21.
103
ANTHONY RIMMINGTON & ROD GREENSHIELDS, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSITION:
A SURVEY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND THE BALTIC STATES 12
(1992).
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While the state intensively applied science and industry to
livestock husbandry in attempt to expand meat and milk production,
the milking process itself remained stubbornly un-industrialized.
Although engineers designed devices to mechanize milking,104 even
disseminating detailed disinfection instructions,105 milking machines
themselves remained rarely used and dairying remained literally in
the hands of milkmaids. As of the mid-1950s, compared with an
estimated 50% use in the West, only 30,000 milking machines had
been procured for 3 million dairy cows across the U.S.S.R. -- and of
those, less than an estimated one-fifth (that is, a maximum 6,000
machines for 3 million cows) were in actual operation.106
Why did milking resist mechanization? In 1956, two
agricultural machinery designers from the All-Union ScientificResearch Institute of Electrification of Agriculture undertook to
answer that very question.107 Their analysis is a remarkable resource,
affording a contemporaneous view of sociological and organization
features of Soviet dairying under high socialism and revealing how
bovine subjectivity -- considerations like cow comfort, preferences,
or well-being -- feature in their situational awareness. A few
exemplary points:
•

104

Machines made milkmaids' and cows' lives worse, imposing
a "whole series of manual operations" that milking by hand
did not entail108 while failing to accommodate adequate care
for cows. For example, on a mass-production line a

See, e.g., Milking system Milk pipeline-100, Milk pipeline-200 ''Daugava''
brand: Operation and maintenance manual (1966) (operation and maintenance
manual for a milk machine for 100 head of cattle produced in the Latvian S.S.R.
intended for use in milk operations across the U.S.S.R.), description of holding in
Russian State Library available at https://search.rsl.ru/ru/record/01008921371.
See also, e.g., Milk pipeline 100 head restored,
https://molservis.com.ua/p1267456-molokoprovod-100-golov.html (showing
images of a restored "Milk pipeline-100" system, the piping system for a milk
machine serving 100 head, currently for sale on the used agricultural products
market in Ukraine) (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).
105
See, e.g., Sanitary Rules for Care of Milking Stations, Apparatuses, and Milk
Dishes, for Monitoring their Sanitary Condition and the Sanitary Quality of Milk,
confirmed by the Head of the Veterinary Administration of the Ministry of
Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. and with the agreement of the Head of the SanitaryEpidemiological Administration of the Ministry of Health of the U.S.S.R., Jan. 12,
1967 available at http://www.alppp.ru/law/hozjajstvennaja-dejatelnost/selskoehozjajstvo/62/sanitarnye-pravila-po-uhodu-za-doilnymi-ustanovkami-apparatamii-molochnoj-posudoj-kontrol.html.
106
Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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milkmaid could no longer wash her cow's udder with clean,
warm water as soon as she was finished milking, but rather
washed udder after udder "out of the same bucket of rapidly
cooling water."109
Existing spatial arrangements catered to cows and
milkmaids, not machines.110 Making architecture work for
the piping systems, washing rooms, and other parts of the
mechanized milking system would reconfigure space in
ways less cozy, comfortable, or convenient for cows and
milkmaids.
Mechanization violated rhythms and temporality best suited
to cows and milkmaids. Tending multiple cows at a machine
required a milkmaid interrupt herself and cow to empty milk
from bucket, adversely affecting "both the process of
uniform milking and the condition of the animal."111
Milkmaids milking by hand worked in rhythm and cows fed
in rhythm; machines meant some finished earlier, throwing
the work collective out of sync and "violating the general
feeding rhythm of the herd. . . "112 Moreover, a stationary
milking installation "[could not] be used in summer camps
or in pastures," keeping all indoors during the glorious
temperate months.
Machines played havoc with milkmaid compensation.
Equipment could malfunction; the electricity supply, prove
inconsistent; or milkmaids, "lose a lot of time on transitions
and downtime,"113 all of which, along with measuring
malfunctions, occurred at the expense of milkmaid
compensation.114
Mechanization would decrease
compensation-per-liter by a third (from 1.8-2 "workdays"
accrued for every 100 liters hand-milked115 to 0.6-0.4
"workdays" for every 100 liters machine-milked).116 Despite
techno-optimists urging slow transition in "workday"
evaluation norms117 lest milkmaids simply refuse to adopt
milking machines,118 milkmaids and machines got off on the

Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88.
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. (which entailed, generally, "serving" 8-10 cows).
116
Id. (which involved "serving" 40-50 cows").
117
Id.
118
Id.
110
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wrong foot, and at least some of that seems attributable to
milkmaids' understanding of machines' future effects on
compensation.
Mechanized milking could thus create perverse incentives
for the milkmaid-turned-machine operator, resulting in
discomfort the cow and depressing production. For best
results, a "pulsator operating mode" should be set at 45-50
pulsations per minute,119 but some milkmaids, seeking to
speed up the process, would increase pulsations to 80-90 or
more,120 a frequency at which "the milk-issuing process is
not accelerated, but rather, slows down as the sucking cycle
is shortened."121 A second example: machine-inexperienced
milkmaids would fasten the apparatus too high, causing "the
exit of milk from the nipple canals to become difficult ... ."122
A third: one milkmaid working simultaneously on eight
devices "can not manage to serve her cows in good time,
overexposes the udder to the apparatus, and cannot properly
monitor the milking process."123 In addition to reducing milk
yield,124 these glitches also sound painful to the cow. When
hand-milking, a milkmaid knew that the typical cow would
not tolerate being mishandled; she could kick over the pail,
switch her tail at the milkmaid, or step on or kick the
milkmaid. When contact with the cow was mediated
through machine, and moreover when the milkmaid had to
attend to multiple cow/machines simultaneously, she could
not stay attuned to the comfort of each.

That leads to the overall problem the Soviet machine
designers identified: even if operating flawlessly, milking by
machine created "depersonalization in caring for cows," and of all
Soviet animal-tenders, they singled out Ukrainian milkmaids as
particularly rejecting depersonalized cow care.125 Dairy cows in
Ukraine, I would add, had an expected lifespan of around 25 years;
the cows in question were at most one or two generations removed,
the calves or grand-cows, of those milk-producers who had seen
119

Id.
Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88. The word the authors
use here, obezlichka, is very interesting. It can mean "depersonalization,"
"anonymity," or "a lack of personal responsibility."
120

2020]

HERDING HISTORY IN UKRAINE

299

villagers through Famine and War. Of those state farms in Ukraine
that tried it at all, most dropped mechanized milking after but brief
experiments. Even advocates attributed rejection of mechanization
to a problem they could not design a way out of, "depersonalization"
of the interaction with the cow.126
The last decades of Soviet governance saw a few forays into
mass milk production and mechanization,127 but these examples
remained relatively uncommon.128
Whatever its theoretical
advantages, machine milking actually "depresse[d] the
interestedness of cattle-tenders, which often, instead of being
champions of mechanization, impede[d] its implementation" or
hastened its abandonment.129 The features identified as reasons for
this still echo in Ukraine today, and Soviet Ukrainian milkmaids'
largely successful rejection of machine milking130 portends their
political potency on post-Soviet farms.
3. Milk at the Small Scale, Milk in Aggregate

126

Id.
In 1970, a Ukrainian agricultural research specialist pointed to the example of
the "Kutuzovka" farm on which cows were not, primarily, pastured, and were
milked in "milking parlors." I. A. Danilenko, The Technology of the Production of
Milk on an Industrial Basis (1970), reprinted at Istoriya doeniya, available at
http://agrotehimport.ru/national_history_of_dairy_equipment_ussr/texnologiya_pr
oizvodstva_moloka_na_promyishlennoj_osnove/ This same technology was the
centerpiece of several new dairy operations, enormous by the standards of Soviet
dairying practice, in Ukraine -- 800 cows each (on the "Red Army" sovkhoz in
Kharkiv oblast' and the "Karl Mark" kolkhoz in Donetsk oblast') and 1000 cows
(on the "Banner" sovkhoz in Luhansk oblast') -- on which construction began in
1970. Id.
128
Consider the milking "carousel," for example, common in U.S. dairy operations
since the 1960s. See George Frisvold, The U.S. Dairy Industry in the 20th and
21st Century, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 197 (describing technology employed,
including dairy carousels, in U.S. dairy production). Nearly unknown in the
U.S.S.R., the only exemplar failed to increase production and, in fact, was blamed
for high mortality rates of cows brought to it. Viktor Madison, Invent a "Wheel"
for Livestock Raising, DairyNews.ru, April 29, 2014,
http://www.dairynews.ru/news/izobresti-koleso-dlya-plemennogo-skotovodstva-k10.html (describing an early 1980s Moscow-region dairy complex with German
technology designed to support 2,000 cows, "the only [such modern] enterprise in
the USSR," and reporting that milk production at this "palace" with its
"unprecedented milking-'carousel,' . . . began to fall below the level of those
households from where heifers had hurriedly been collected for [it]").
129
Id.
130
Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88 (attributing the rarity of
milking machines in Soviet dairy production to the pre-existing organization of the
work and to milkmaids).
127
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One indicator of how limited large-scale big-science
interventions (like the feeding program) were in transforming the
intimate codes of the dairysphere comes from a small amendment to
the criminal law of the Russian Federation of 1963. "In order to stop
the feeding of bread and other grain products to cattle and poultry,"
it reads, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.F.S.F.R. makes
punishable by incarceration for a second offense, "The buying up in
state or cooperative stores of baked bread, flour, groats, and other
grain products for feeding cattle and poultry . . ."131 Farmers, we can
infer, had taken to supplementing livestock feed with bread and other
products meant for human consumption. The need for this
amendment may speak to unmet demand for richer fodder, but it also
points to a feature to which my post-Soviet fieldwork attests: the
intimacy of the relationship between caretaker and cow, such that
each cow's food preferences are known and, when possible, catered
to.
Whether a cow belonged to a rural household or was part of
a collective or state farm herd, the act of milking remained part of a
close and tactile relationship between milkmaid and cow. The part
milk played in the survival of rural households through the tumult of
the 1930s and 1940s if anything strengthened appreciation for the
place of milk in village diets and cows in village life and deepened
affective bonds between villagers and their dairy cows. To this day,
Ukrainian villagers take their cows personally.132
That said, while the relationship of cow to milkmaid
remained personal, affective, and tactile, the surrounding rural milieu
became the object of intense modernization. After violent
beginnings, collectivization -- the pooling of resources, labor, and
know-how and the forging of a collective rural subjectivity133 -became the social idiom through which modernity came to the
Ukrainian countryside, from rural electrification to tractor stations,
combines, and mechanized harvesters, to scientific interventions.134
While the act of milking itself was not mechanized, milk processing
was, and milk in excess of its rural producers' uses was trucked to
industrial facilities for processing, bottling, and distribution, whence
131

"On Increasing the Liability for Feeding Cattle and Poultry Bread and Other
Grain Products," Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R.,
May 6, 1963, 11 SOVIETSKAIA IUSTITSIA 7 (1963), excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 447.
132
See fieldnotes from periods of observation cited supra note 15.
133
For explanation and description of the forging of collective subjectivities, see,
e.g., Eppinger, Oligarchy, supra note 5. See also generally KHARKHORDIN, supra
note 86.
134
See text infra notes 98 - 126 supra.
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milk linked villagers to urban consumers in anonymous networks of
production and consumption.
The processes described in the foregoing overview trouble a
simplistic description of milk in Ukraine as "indigenous." Over a
century of revolution and experimentation, war and self-cultivation,
milk production and consumption in Ukraine were the object of
intense interventions. In milk, the indigenous, tactile, and personal
became enmeshed in the modern, industrial, and impersonal.
IV. From Sheds to Stalls
A. Decollectivization by Law: Land in the Limelight
Beginning in the late Soviet period, the collectivized
landscape would face vast transformation anew. Reformers
associated with Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the first steps towards
decollectivizing agriculture through a late-Soviet law allowing
“private farming” on a 99-year leasehold; though response was
limited and by 1991, only 3,000 farmers across the U.S.S.R. had
availed themselves, the idea was germinating.135
After Ukraine became politically independent in 1991, the
new Ukrainian government introduced measures towards bringing
private ownership of herds and lands to Ukrainian farming.136
However, even initiatives instituting private property rights were
shaped by conceptual categories, allegiances, and habits from
collectives. One 1995 presidential order divested the state of
agricultural ownership, converting all state farms into collective
farms (collectively but undividedly owned by the residents of the
farm).137 A second provided that each member of a collective farm
135

Interview with Bohdan Chomiak, director of agricultural programs for USAID
Kiev (June 20, 2002).
136
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukr. "On the Privatization of Land Plots,"
Decree No. 15-92, Dec. 26, 1992, reprinted in PRAVO VLASNOSTI NA ZEMLYU TA
IOHO ZAKHIST: ZBIRNIK NORMATIVNIKH AKTIV 168-169 (2002) (allowing lateSoviet leaseholders to purchase their plot outright from the government and
permitting them to resell it). This would, incidentally, be the last time that the
post-Soviet Ukrainian government permitted legal sale of agricultural land for
nearly three decades, until at least 2020. See, e.g., Verkhovna rada pristupila k
obsuzhdeniyou zakona o rinkye selkhozzemel, Tass news service (tass.ru) Feb. 7,
2020, reprinted in The Dairy News, https://www.dairynews.ru/news/verkhovnayarada-pristupila-k-obsuzhdeniyu-zakona-.html.
137
Order of the President of Ukr. “On the Parcelization of Land, Given into
Collective Ownership to Agricultural Enterprises and Organizations,” Order No.
720/95 of Aug. 8, 1995 reprinted in ZAKONODAVSTVO UKRAINI PRO ZEMLYU 162-

302

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 16

be issued a “land and asset certificate” documenting the person’s
ownership share (including in dairy cattle). Entitlement to a
certificate, in principle based on one's belonging to the collective,
would be determined by a “Land Committee” set up by the farm.138
This measure introduced the concept of divisibility and created an
exercise by which farmers imagined division of assets, including the
collectively-owned herd. On the other hand, it also reinforced some
of the bonds within the collective by forcing local committees to
consider who "belonged" to the farm and who did not. Further, it did
not change the governance structure of the collective farms and the
director (a Soviet-holdover role), not the farm shareholders, still held
sway.139 The government depended on collective farm directors to
distribute collective farm assets, leaving them significant
discretionary power.140 In regard to dairy cattle, this structural power
and de jure authority set the stage for further showdowns between
milkmaids and directors like the one recounted above.141
Passage of a new constitution for independent Ukraine
ensured that private ownership in land was not per se illegal and
brought the right to own land under constitutional protection.142 In
the executive branch, President Leonid Kuchma's team experimented
with issuing land share certificates to collective farmers late in his
first term, and when they proved electorally popular, Kuchma
disbanded agricultural collectives entirely as a matter of law.143 In
the legislative branch, a new Land Code providing for private
ownership of land passed the parliament in October 2001. The
record on public reception of privatization shows some ambivalence.
Six months after the new Code passed into law, 41% of eligible

163 (2002) [hereinafter UKR. LAND LEGISLATION] (converting state to collective
farms and reserving 10% of each state farm's landholding to be retained in state
ownership and administered by the village council (silska rada)).
138
A Temporary Order for Carrying Out Work of Given Government Acts to
Collective Agricultural Enterprises, Agricultural Cooperatives, Agricultural JointStock Companies, and those formed on the Basis of Sovkhoz and Other
Governmental Agricultural Engerprises, on the Right of Collective Ownership to
Land, confirmed by Order of the State Committee of Ukraine on Land Resources,
No. 18, March 15, 1995 reprinted in UKR. LAND LEGISLATION, id., at 162-163.
139
Interview with Steve Dobrolovic, Kiev lawyer working for Chemonics on
national land titling project, (July 3, 2003).
140
Interview with Chomiak supra note 135.
141
See INTRODUCTION, supra.
142
CONST. UKR. Art. 41 (1996).
143
"On the Uninvested Means concerning Accelerating Reform of the Agrarian
Sector of the Economy," Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 1529/99, Dec. 3,
1999 reprinted in UKR. LAND LEGISLATION, supra note 137, at 85.
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farmers had already claimed a land parcel,144 but within five years, at
least 20% of the overall population, roughly 10 million people,
nearly all rural out-migrants, had left their homes and farms.145
B. Decollectivization by Act:
Democracy in the Dairy

Disappearance and

1. Mystery Meat
My introduction to some of the puzzles of cows and cattle
within the context of the privatizing Ukrainian landscape came in the
summer of 2007. Coming across a word unfamiliar despite decent
proficiency in Ukrainian and Russian languages, govyadina,
("beef"), made me aware that in twelve years of working in and on
Ukraine, I could not recall encountering the word for "beef" in meals
at friends' homes or on restaurant menus.146 Alerted, I subsequently
systematically took note in my fieldwork and documented, indeed,
not encountering the word for "beef" in normal daily life,147 a striking
absence in a culinary culture that otherwise reveled in meat. Also
striking, when traveling through the Ukrainian countryside, is the
pervasively derelict state of large cattle sheds. Nearly every village
has a long shed for cattle, and, by the summer of 1995 when I first
observed the rural landscape, nearly every one gave (and still gives)
every appearance of having been abandoned.148
A connection between these two observations eventually
became clear through interviews with investors in Ukrainian
agriculture. While not able to verify the story of beef they tell, I have
now attested repeated versions across Ukraine. The story is, in the
last year or so of the Soviet period and the first year or so of
Ukrainian independence, two brothers (usually described as hailing
from Lebanon, explaining or perhaps exoticizing the exogenous
element of the story) traveled the Ukrainian countryside, village by
village, buying up the cattle. They would strike a deal with the local
collective farm director, transfer the cattle from the collective farm's
144

A Good Deed Indeed for Owners of Farmland, KYIV WEEKLY, June 14, 2002 at

21.
145

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION KYIV MISSION, LABOUR
MIGRATION ASSESSMENT FOR THE WNIS REGION (October 2007).
146
Field observation, "говядина" [govyadina, beef], sandwich-board menu in front
of beachfront restaurant, Sudak, Crimea (June 9, 2007).
147
Field notes, supra note 12.
148
Observations during author's period of diplomatic service at U.S. Embassy
Kyiv, 1995-1997, and thereafter, periods of anthropological fieldwork as noted id.
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pasture to the nearest truck or train transport depot, get them loaded
up, transported to the port of Odessa, and shipped out by sea. No one
knew if they went to populate herds elsewhere, or if they were
destined for slaughter for meat or leather goods. The collective farm
director would pocket the proceeds; the two brothers would move on
to the next village. In different villages, locals would point to a
satellite dish or a post-Soviet automobile at the home of the former
collective farm director -- expensive goods that no one else could
afford -- and tell me, "That's our herd."149
The apocryphal tale of the sell-off of Ukraine's beef herd,
whether accurate in its details or not, reflects local causal
explanations of an observed phenomenon, the disappearance of beef
cattle, that is borne out in official statistics. The numbers are
astonishing. The number of head of beef cattle in Ukraine, estimated
at 25,195,000 in 1990 (the year before the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R.), fell to 4,100,000 by 2015.150 Beef production by
agricultural enterprises (as opposed to households) crashed from
1,808,000 tons in 1990 to 97,000 tons in 2011.151
As related in the Introduction, a second part of the tale -- also
fitting a narrative pattern, but this time related by eyewitnesses or
participants rather than hearsay -- involves the milkmaids of the
collective farm dairy noticing the disappearance of local beef cattle,
organizing to confront the collective farm director in a group
meeting, and "decollectivizing" the village dairy herd by each
milkmaid taking home a cow. In addition to descendants of the
household cow allowance under collective farming,152 the
milkmaids' action swelled the ranks of cow-owning post-Soviet
Ukrainian households. Village architecture came to include, in the
small outbuilding behind each home previously built for a pig, a new
stall for each cow.

149

Field notes, id.
Rob Cook, Ukraine Cattle Inventory (1988-2015), Beef2live, October 15, 2019,
http://beef2live.com/story-ukraine-cattle-inventory-1988-2015-85-122064 (report
by a market analyst published by a beef grower's association). The figures given
are illustrative of the estimated crash in numbers of beef cattle, but I offer them
without claim to exactitude. Beef cattle statistics vary somewhat from source to
source. See, e.g., S. Bohdanko, Nevtishni realii, 2 2 AGRO PERSPECTIVA 40 2009,
cited in O.G. Kukhar, Suchasni Tendetsii Rozvitku Tvarinnitstva v Ukraini, 8
EFEKTIVNA EKONOMIKA 2013, http://www.economy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=2267
(giving the figures as falling from 21,083,000 to 1,511,000 in 2011) [hereinafter
Kukhar, Current Trends].
151
Kukhar, id.
152
See Part III.B.1.b. supra.
150
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2. Milking Machines and Moral Obsolescence
The story of the local revolt of village dairy maids that
reached me from participants and eyewitnesses raises the question,
How widespread was such action? As with the story of beef cattle,
the dairy maids' tale of confrontation and village herd
decollectivization is confirmed more widely, at least in its effects, by
statistics. Against a backdrop of mass bovine export and slaughter
which reduced the beef herd to 1/5 of its late-Soviet ranks, the
holding of dairy cows by households skyrocketed over the same
period both in absolute numbers and as a percentage relative to
agricultural enterprises. In 1990, dairy cows husbanded by
Ukrainian households amounted to 3.54 million cows, and by 2000
that number had increased to 4.38 million cows.153 Between 1990
and 2000, the number of dairy cows raised in individual households
increased from 14.4% to 46.5%.154 By 2010, 65% of the total cattle
population (and thus, an even greater percentage of total dairy cattle)
was concentrated in household ownership.155
In many villages, this shift has resulted in a new informal
"recollectivization" of cow herding duties. Back in Gruzenske
village, after the confrontation with the collective farm director, each
milkmaid returned home with a cow. Rather than duplicate pasturage
duties, the milkmaids organized cow-owning families into a
cooperative effort, each family taking a turn tending to the group of
village cows for a day (multiplied, in the case of a multiple-cow
family, by the number of cows a family owned). By 2009, 18 years
later, this arrangement had stabilized into a set routine, both for
dairy-owning households and for cattle. Cattle leave their own
family's courtyard each morning and join the herd heading up the
central dirt road of the village out to the nearest pastures. Locals
jokingly refer to this as "the morning commute," and the 33 head of
cattle plodding together are indeed the most traffic the village road
will see in a day. At the end of the day, a member of each family
waits at the entrance of the family courtyard to open the gate and let
the family's cow or cows in. There is no need to direct or herd the
cow; each cow knows her home and trots in at a brisk pace. The joke
is, in fact, that one needs to look sharp and get out of the way or a
cow could run you over in her eagerness to get back to her stall,
where she is fed her favorite foods and her owner-milkmaid attends
to her milking.156
153

Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note 150.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Field observation, Gruzenske village, Ukr., Sept. 2009.
154
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Taken in sum, the results of these processes -- monetization
of the beef herd and decollectivization of the dairy herd -- are
profound. Practically every village in Ukraine ended up with some
households who kept, and still keep, their own dairy cow.157 Beef,
in village diets and urban menus, is largely absent158 and correlated
statistics concern those fixated on beef over dairy.159 These shifts
have also transformed the rural landscape. Nationally, acreage
devoted to growing forage has fallen160 as villages convert to
pasturing dairy cattle rather than fattening up beef.161 Nearly every
village has a large cattle shed, part of the former collective farm
buildings, that by 1995 was emptied of animals, by 2000 looked
abandoned, and by 2020 is largely dilapidated.162
Household cows are milked by hand. Some current
proponents push for retooling and marketing anew milking machines
of the Soviet era that were designed for smaller-scale operations;
157

Of 5.3 million rural households in Ukraine in 2013, nearly 2 million keep their
own dairy cow. Milk Supply in Northern Ukraine, FAO/EBRD Report No. 18,
supra note 94 at xiv.
158
In the words of a USDA report of 2017, "Beef cattle numbers will remain
insignificant." Alexander Tarassevych, Ukraine Livestock and Products Annual
Report 2 (September 1, 2017), U.S.D.A. Foreign Agricultural Service Global
Agricultural Information Network,
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filena
me=Livestock%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_9-1-2017.pdf
159
See, e.g., Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note 150 (fretting as an agronomist
over data that might indicate a problem in beef production but not in dairy, such as
in 2000, the average daily increase of cattle amounted to 255 grams/day, 40% less
than in 1990, although admittedly the average daily increase in 2011 reached 481
grams/day, exceeding 1990 rates). See also, e.g., legislative attempts to promote
breeds with greater potential to put on weight as in Law of Ukraine "On the
Breeding Business in Animal Husbandry," passed into law by PVRU № 3773-XII,
Dec. 23, 1993, in VVR 1994, № 2, at 7-8,
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3773-12, and as subsequently amended in
1999, 2003, 2010, 2012, and 2015, final amended text available at
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3691-12.
160
Between 2009-2011, the number of hectares devoted to growing forage fell by
an astonishing 80%, from 11,999,000 ha to 2,477,000 ha. TVARINNITSTVO
UKRAINI ZA 2011 RIK. STATISTICHNII ZBIRNIK (N.S. Vlasenko ed., State Committe
of Statistics of Ukraine, 2012), as analyzed by Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note
150.
161
As of 2013, feed for cattle in Ukraine was composed of 19-20% silage, 18%
hay and straw, 30% "green forage" of sown grasses, natural meadows, and
pastures. O.M. Ribachenko, Osnovni problem rozvitku kormo virobnitstva v
Ukraini, 10-12 AGRO INKOM (2011)
http://archive.nbuv.gov.ua/portal/chem_biol/agroin/2011_10-12/RYBAHENK.pdf,
cited in Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note 150.
162
See notes 12 and note 156 supra.
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however, say skeptics, both the layout of current facilities and the
social organization of villages are unsuited to them, or rather, as one
specialist from Russia, Vladimir Kirsanov, recently concluded, the
old equipment is "morally obsolete."163
Regarding household acquisition of dairy cattle, the most
notable legal point here, it bears emphasizing, is the absence of
formal law: milkmaids' confrontations with local authority, namely
their collective farm director, happened largely before presidential
decrees had turned state farms into collective farms, turned collective
farms into joint stock companies, or specified procedures for
dividing assets, or even before parliament had passed privatization
laws. Likewise, they did not wait for law to bring accountability or
official new governance structures, but rather collectively decided on
a solution they found fair (or at least, fairer than the risk of the dairy
herd disappearing) and brought it into realization. Local experience
with holding authority accountable -- in particular, a gendered
confrontation between village dairymaids and the nearly all-male
collective farm directors -- became a defining feature of early postSoviet rural political life. Prior experience with milkmaid brigades,
understanding the significance of dairy to village diets and incomes,
and the kinds of bonds between milkmaid and cow provided
organizational, intellectual, and affective grounds for action.
C. Corporations, Consumption, and Caretaking
Ukrainian cuisine boasts a rich variety of milk products,
including many forms meant to preserve milk for later consumption:
sour cream, cottage cheese, kefir, a baked whey concoction called
"ryazhenka," and other products for which there is no direct English
translation.164 Village dairy maids are adept at preserving milk and
extending the period in which it may be consumed.165 Nonetheless,
163

Vladimir Byacheslavovich Kirsanov, Strukturno-Tekhnologicheskoye
Obosnovaniye Effektivnovo Postroyenniya i Funktskionirovaniya Doilnovo
Oborudovaniya, doctoral dissertation (2001), at 1, relevant portion available at
https://www.dissercat.com/content/strukturno-tekhnologicheskoe-obosnovanieeffektivnogo-postroeniya-i-funktsionirovaniya-doiln.
164
Entries in UKRAINIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (University of Toronto press, C.H.
Andrusyshen comp., 1955).
165
In households, "[m]ilk is produced for family needs and for sale in neighboring
urban centers in either fluid milk form or processed into traditional basic dairy
products such as soft cottage cheese, sour cream and cream." USDA Foreign
Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – UP1824 – Dairy and Products Annual (Oct.
16, 2018)
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filena
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nearly every cow produces more milk than can be consumed or
bartered by village households locally.166 The demise of the Soviet
system interrupted former modes and networks for getting milk to
food processors and thence to consumers, and a patchwork of
practices and new routes and methods arose.
A detailed recounting of the post-Soviet history of food
processing is beyond the scope of this article,167 but several features
bear noting. Despite the introduction of milking machines,
carousels, and "milking robots" to the imaginary of specialists in the
Ukrainian milk-production sphere,168 most milking of cows is still
done by hand, in villages, largely by women, and now largely by
women of the family that owns the cow.169 Processing the milk into
me=Dairy%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_10-16-2018.pdf.
166
The Soviet term for "commercial dairy farm," known by its abbreviation MTF
(see text infra note 48 supra), is still used to refer to commercial enterprises in
Ukraine today that specialize in producing raw milk for milk processers and
bottlers. Of raw milk sent to dairy processers, 78% is from MTF and 22%, from
personal farms. Analysis of the Dairy Industry in Ukraine, MilkUA.info,
September 26, 2019. The average milk yield per cow from household dairy cows
is 4480 kg. Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, 2017 STATISHICHNIY ZBIRNIK 144 (Kyiv, State
Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2017),
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2018/zb/05/zb_tu2017pdf.pdf
[hereinafter Tvarinnitstvo Ukraini]. Compared with the 4480 kg/cow of milk
produced annually, average annual consumption of milk per person in Ukraine is
110 kg of fluid milk (second in the world only to Belarus). Global Per Capita
Consumption of Fluid Milk in the World, By Country (Statistica Research
Department (Jan. 22, 2020)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/535806/consumption-of-fluid-milk-per-capitaworldwide-country/
167
The latest annual figures (from 2018) show that 26% of the the agricultural
sector is involved in animal husbandry, including dairy, and 74% in crop
production. Sotsial'no-ekonomichno pokazniki 2018: Sil'ske hospodarstvo, State
Service of Statistics of Ukraine, http://ukrstat.gov.ua. For an excellent overview of
the Ukrainian food processing sector as regards milk, see Anna Gereles and László
Szöllösi, The Current State and Latest Trends of the Ukrainian Dairy Sector,
ANNALS OF THE POLISH ASS'N OF AGRICULTURE AND AGRIBUSINESS ECONOMISTS,
June 3, 2019.
168
See, e.g., V mire doilnoi mekhaniki – traditsii i sovremennost', NOVOE SELSKOE
KHOZYAISTVO (April 9, 2009), reprinted at THE DAIRY NEWS, DairyNews.ru,

https://www.dairynews.ru/news/v_mire_doilnoj_tehniki-tradicii_i_sovremennost.html (describing circa 2009 the latest in milking
technology in Western Europe, including futuristic "milking robots" that would
eliminate the human hand from the work of milking).
169
A Dairy Revival in Ukraine, Chemonics report, June 12, 2019,
https://chemonics.com/impact-story/a-dairy-revival-in-ukraine/. That is not to say
dairy enterprises with large herds do not exist at all. See, e.g., Zarplata doyarki 20
tis. hrn ta rivni dorohi: yak zhive hromada na Cherkashchiny, Fakty ICTV
broadcast of April 23, 2018 available at https://decentralization.gov.ua/news/9259
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a variety of products for home and village consumption falls first to
rural women.170 Milk beyond that needed for family consumption or
for barter within the village, or home-processed for sale in markets
in nearby urban areas, 171 is collected, largely in metal containers
(although increasingly in plastic), and sold to milk processing
concerns that operate on the supra-village level.172 Some milk
processors have, since Ukraine gained independence, put together
fleets of refrigerator trucks that travel through villages every morning
after cows are milked and sent to pasture, to collect each contributing
household's container(s) of milk.173
The income provides
supplemental cash to village households. It is not atypical for a
household to be self-sufficient in regard to unprocessed foodstuffs,
stove-fuel firewood, and winter silage. Cash from milk sales
supplements pensions and off-farm wages to pay for gas heating (if
the village is connected to the gas grid); for electricity; for other
processed foods like flour and sugar; for clothing and other small
consumer goods; for taxes; and, notably, for contributions to family
members' education. In other words, in regard to foodstuffs, the
village household of independent Ukraine is remarkably autarkic.174
Milk, providing a residual source of cash for necessities that the
household does not produce or barter for locally, is a primary nexus
(reporting on a rural community that manages its own cattle herd of 1,800 cows,
with its milkmaid-employees earning up to 20,000 hryven/month. (compared with
official average monthly salaries across all employments, nationally,of UAH 8480.
Nominal'na ta real'na zarobitna plata u 2018-2019, State Service of Statistics of
Ukraine, http://ukrstat.gov.ua.)). Such large dairy concerns, however, are the
exception rather than the rule. See Part V below.
170
FAO/EBRD Report No. 18, supra note 94, at xiii and 69.
171
Gereles and Szöllösi, supra note 167, at 72 ("Household milk is processed by
families into basic, cheap, dairy products and sold on open-air markets without any
statistical record").
172
Food processing enterprises, including those specializing in dairy, were
privatized at a much faster clip than agricultural enterprises early in Ukraine's postSoviet history. By January 1, 1996, 63 percent of food processing plants legally
subject to privatization had been privatized and by mid-1996, that included 55
percent of Ukraine's dairy and cheese plants. Yuri Yekhanurov, The Progress of
Privatization, 38 EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMICS 77, 80 (2000) (describing the
fast pace of privatization of food processing industries early on in the post-Soviet
Ukraine, in contrast to agricultural enterprises, which resisted privatization). Raw
milk that needed a destination found one in a privatized enterprise.
173
Described briefly in USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report –
UP1824 – Dairy and Products Annual 2-3 (October 16,
2018) https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?
filename=Dairy%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_10-16-2018.pdf
174
Interview with Tytotya Doyarka, September 17-21, 2009; see also Serhiy
Moroz, Rural Households in Ukraine: Current State and Tendencies, 60
ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE 565 (March 2017) at Table 7, Structure of Total
Resources of Rural Households.
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to the national and international cash economy for many village
households.
The food processing companies dealing in dairy products
include enterprises built on the foundations of Soviet-era food
processors, new Ukrainian enterprises, and foreign corporations who
have entered into business in Ukraine since the end of the U.S.S.R.175
Dairy processors produce for domestic consumption (largely urban
consumers) and for export.176 The reach of the state contracted at
independence; subsequent years saw the state setting up, anew, legal
parameters for food production and processing. Basic legislation
regulating food safety was passed in 1998,177 seven years after
independence, and it has been subsequently amended and expanded
upon in measures, for example, aimed at consumer protection and
information.178 Although the state's capacity for oversight is
limited,179 there are multiple and overlapping state institutions and
175

Gereles and Szöllösi, supra note 167. The chart of the top ten dairy companies
in Ukraine by market share in 2017 is particularly illuminating. Id. at Fig. 3. See
also Chain Comparison of the Dairy Sector in Ukraine and in the Netherlands,
Ukrainian Agribusiness Club, October 31, 2017,
https://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/binaries/agroberichtenbuitenland/documen
ten/publicatiens/2017/10/31/2017---dairy-comparison-study-nlua/2017++Chain+comparison+of+the+dairy+sector.pdf (listing the top 20
producers of dairy products in Ukraine in 2015).
176
Gereles and Szöllösi, supra note 167.
177
Law of Ukraine, "On Basic Principles and Requirements for Food Safety and
Quality," № 771-97, December 23, 1997, in VVR, 1998, № 19, at 98,
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/771/97-%D0%B2%D1%80.
178
See, e.g., Law of Ukraine, "On Food Information for Consumers," № 2639VIII, December 6, 2018, in VVR, 2019, № 7, at 41,
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2639-19. Ukraine dropped the Soviet system
of standards (acronymed GOST) after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and
subsequent Russian support for armed secession in southeastern Ukraine. Ukraine
Scraps Soviet GOST Standards, UNIAN News Service, Dec. 16, 2015,

https://www.unian.info/economics/1213976-ukraine-scraps-soviet-goststandards.html However, state regulators still use GOST as a frame of reference.
Enterprises must comply with them if they want to label dairy products
"manufactured in accordance with GOST," or alternatively must indicate the
technical conditions of their non-compliance in product labeling. Mykola Moroz,
Director General of the Directorate for Food Safety and Quality, quoted in Olena
Holubeva, Milk Market of Ukraine: EU Standards vs. Peasant’s Income, 112.ua,
Dec. 18, 2018, https://112.international/article/milk-market-of-ukraine-eustandards-vs-peasants-income-23732.html.
179
A "moratorium on verification" puts sole responsibility for compliance with
dairy product regulations on the manufacturer. Vitaliy Bashynsky, head of the
Public Council under the State Consumer Protection Service, quoted in Holubeva,
id. ("Today, the responsibility for the conformity of food products to the marking
is borne by the manufacturer alone"). See also, e.g., Borys Kobal, director of the
Food Safety and Veterinary Medicine Department of the State Consumer
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structures concerned with regulating dairy and other food
products.180
Exports of dairy products have been affected by two
countervailing forces. First, over the last two decades, the national
government has promoted the export of Ukrainian dairy products
within an overall effort towards bringing Ukraine into membership
with international trade organizations and customs unions. In regard
to dairy, this has entailed legislation regulating production and
bringing safety and quality into conformity with international
standards.181 Regulations on milk products were legislated and
subsequently amended in conformity with Ukrainian commitments
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).182 Popular support for
membership in international trade and customs unions is strong. In
the winter of 2013-2014, massive street protests urged the Ukrainian
government to stay the course in regard to integration with European
structures, and subsequently, the Ukrainian government agreed to a
roadmap, the European Accession Agreement, which sets out policy
measures Ukraine must adopt in order to be considered for EU
membership,183 among them standards for raw milk and for dairy
products meant for export.184 Measures to integrate Ukrainian dairy
products into world markets are succeeding.
The European
Commission, for example, has begun granting permission to
Ukrainian milk products companies to export their goods to the EU
Protection Service, complaining that inspections of milk collection points and of
dairy products manufacturers take place only once every two years, and then with
ten days' notice, and thus are insufficient. Kobal, quoted in Holubeva, id.
180
For example, food safety is controlled by a number of governmental authorities,
including but not limited to the State Committee for Technical Regulation and
Consumer Policy, the State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service, the State Plant
Quarantine Service, the Ministry of Health, the State Sanitary and Epidemiological
Service, the Ministry of Agricultural Policy and Food, and the Ministry for
Environmental Protection.
181
Law of Ukraine "On Milk and Dairy Products," № 1870-IV, June 24, 2004, in
VVR, 2004, № 47, at 513, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1870-15,
English translation available on the website of the World Trade Organization,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/ukr_e/WTACCUKR147_LEG_1.pdf.
182
See id. as amended by Law of Ukraine, № 402-V, Nov. 30, 2006, in VVR,
2007, № 4, at 37, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1870-15 (specifying
amendments "entering into force on the day of Ukraine's accession to the World
Trade Organization").
183
Association Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of
the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/yevropejska-integraciya/ugoda-pro-asociacyu.
184
See, e.g., E.U. Regulation No. 853/2004 (April 29, 2004), setting requirements
for the quality of dairy raw materials, conformity with which implementation of
the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU would demand.
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market.185 As of 2019, agricultural and food exports from Ukraine
amounted to $22.2 billion, 44% of Ukraine's total exports.186
Ukraine is a net exporter of food, with food exports dwarfing food
imports (which amounted to $5.7 billion in 2019).187 Ukrainians
prefer local milk, but are developing a taste for foreign cheese, as
cheese was one of the rare areas in which imports grew between 2018
and 2019.188
Trade triumphalism should, however, not obscure one of the
most significant developments for Ukrainian dairy products
exporters: disruption of relations with Russia, previously Ukraine's
largest trading partner in foodstuffs, since the 2014 annexation of
Crimea by Russia and war with Russian-affiliated forces in
southeastern Ukraine. The government of Russia imposed a ban on
importing Ukrainian dairy products on August 1, 2014.189 Although
185

The European Commission announced the first Ukrainian milk product
companies granted permission to export to the EU market in December 2015. 10
Ukrainian Milk Companies Allowed Exporting Products To EU, 112.ua, Dec. 29,
2015, https://112.international/ukraine-and-eu/10-ukrainian-milk-companiesallowed-exporting-products-to-eu-1973.html. Twenty-seven companies are
licensed to export dairy products to China. Another Nine Dairy Companies are
Licensed to Export to China, Ukrinform, June 22, 2017,
http://agroconf.org/en/content/another-9-ukrainian-dairy-companies-licensedexport-china. In 2018, Ukraine opened 85 export markets for various types of
products and increased the number of enterprises that received the right to export
food products of animal origin. A total of 126 producers of the country can export
food products to EU countries. Ukraine Agrees on Vet Certificate for Dairy
Export to Saudi Arabia, Ukraine Open for Business, June 26, 2019,
https://open4business.com.ua/ukraine-agrees-on-vet-certificate-for-dairy-exportto-saudi-arabia/.
186
Ukraine Agribusiness Club, In 2019 Agri-food Export from Ukraine Increased
by 19%, Feb. 4, 2020,
http://ucab.ua/en/pres_sluzhba/novosti/u_2019_rotsi_eksport_agroprodovolchoi_pr
oduktsii_z_ukraini_zmenshivsya_na_19
187
Id.
188
Livestock products were one of the few areas of food import growth, due to a
growth in cheese imports (as well as fresh and frozen fish) which together totalled
$153.5 million. Id.
189
For the list of Ukrainian enterprises banned from exporting dairy products to
Russia, see Rosselkhoznadzor (the Federal Service for Veterinary and
Phytosanitary Surveillance of the Russian Federation), Ukraine: Enterprises
Licensed to Export to the Russian Federation (Food: Milk and Milk Products)
http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/importExport/ukrain/enterprises.html?product=26&prod
uctType=5&_language=en (last visited February 7, 2020). See also USDA
Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – UP1425 – Ukraine Stops Many
Exports to Russia (August 11, 2014)
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filena
me=Ukraine%20Stops%20Many%20Exports%20to%20Russia_Kiev_Ukraine_811-2014.pdf.
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some workarounds were found, the effects were profound,
particularly on cheese exporters (to the extent that Russia's ban was
referred to as the "cheese war").190 In 2013, exports of Ukrainian
dairy products totaled $458.6 million, of which $308 million worth
went to Russia; in the first 10 months of 2015, the first calendar year
after the war started, total dairy exports decreased to $163.4 million,
of which only $10.9 million worth found their way to Russia.191
Against a background of milk as a base of empowerment for village
milkmaids, the two countervailing trends described here -- growth in
exports to a variety of foreign markets, disastrous contraction with
Russia under conditions of war -- also reveal milk as a point of
integration, making local milk producers vulnerable to political and
structural forces often beyond their control.
D. Foreign Investment and Local Dairy Power
By 2009, some foreign investors, noticing its absence from
Ukrainian markets and diets, had become interested in reintroducing
beef cattle husbandry to Ukraine,192 harnessing economies of scale
and American production models to create an industry that would
out-compete local sources of meat and international competitors in
beef. One such firm, working closely with a local labor force of
former collective farmers, had established a beef operation outside
of Kyiv which I went to observe. Ralph M., an expert from Kansas
brought in as a consultant, commented as we approached the cattle
sheds, "These are the four-year-olds. You will not even recognize
these as the same animals you're used to seeing."193 The cattle were
hefty and healthy -- no surprise there -- but none had been gelded and
all still had horns. In the U.S., he noted, beef cattle of that age would
be considered aggressive enough that their horns are typically
removed, lest they harm farmhands or each other. "These animals
are completely docile. They're more like dogs,"194 which Ralph
attributed to the extent and gentleness with which they are handled

190

Interview with Lina Dotsenko, Director, CNFA, June 15, 2019.
Anastasiya Zanuda, ZVT z ES: skladnii vibir neminuchovo, BBC Ukraina, Dec.
30, 2015,
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/business/2015/12/151223_free_trade_ukraine_eu_
az.
192
The following section reports from field research conducted among U.S.
investors in Ukrainian beef production over the first two weeks of November, 2009
in Kyiv oblast'.
193
Interview with Ralph M. (U.S. beef consultant to Ukraine-based beef start-up),
Nov. 14 2007.
194
Id.
191
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by the workers.195 The farmhands in charge of tending to the beef
cattle were uniformly men. Even among a large herd of several
hundred cattle destined for beef, the workers knew each one,
including where it liked to be scratched.196
Even more pronounced was the relationship of care and
intimacy between the milkmaids and the business' dairy cattle. In the
milking shed, each dairy cow had its name hand painted on a placard
at the front of its stall. The milkmaids -- to a person, the dairy cattletenders were female -- knew each cow's peculiarities. To avoid
causing the cow undue anxiety, they tried not to rotate between cows
but rather devoted the same milkmaid to the same cow, day in and
day out. Just as in the village with the household cows, a milkmaid
knew how her cow preferred to be milked, the rhythm and strength;
how long milking would normally take; how much milk the cow
would normally give.197 John S., the American manager, read my
thoughts and answered my obvious question before I had even posed
it. "You may wonder why we even have dairy cattle. We are not a
dairy operation and we have no aspirations to dairy."198
This kind of phenomenon, of dairy as a sideline, shows up
more widely in general reports; as one recent report puts it, industrial
dairy is small and "currently existing dairy farms . . . function as
subsidiaries of larger agricultural companies oriented towards crop
production."199 Why would crop producers engage in dairy
production? In the jargon of U.S. experts, "Livestock farms are
utilized more as social employment projects rather than profitable
businesses."200 The U.S. investors in beef, carrying a dairy operation
in which they had no interest, put it in more human terms. "We
wanted to get rid of them, but the milkmaids threatened to riot. If we
got rid of even one of these dairy cattle, we would have an

195

Id.
Id.
197
Id.
198
Interview with John S. (U.S. owner/manager of Ukraine-based beef operation),
Nov. 14, 2007.
199
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – UP1824 – Dairy and
Products Annual 2-3 (October 16,
2018) https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloa
196

dreportbyfilename?filename=Dairy%20and%20Products%20
Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_10-16-2018.pdf.
200

Id.
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insurrection on our hands. It's easier, and cheaper just to keep the
dairy cows and keep the milkmaids happy."201
E. Farm to Table
Over the nearly thirty years of Ukrainian independence,
getting dairy to urban markets has depended on the introduction of
new networks of food processors. Some are coops, composed of
associations of local milkmaids; increasingly, large foreign concerns
are involved. How products then get to consumers is in flux. Cities
over the past five years have begun phasing out the open markets
from which dairy products, like other produce, used to be sold to
urban consumers who were allowed to try (a spoonful on the back of
the hand) milk, sour cream, or other dairy products before purchase.
During the same period, with a rise in urban real estate prices, the
corner milk and produce stores are disappearing, replaced by
supermarkets. Milk products increasingly get from processor to
consumers via grocery stores,202 where single-use plastic bottles and
tetra paks have replaced the reusable glass containers that urban
consumers used to fill from dairy-product sellers at open markets.
There are two significant points of resistance to the
hegemonic rise of supermarkets in food retail. One is a new trend
towards small urban outlets selling organic products from known
individual producers.203 The other is the village resistance, an
autarkic dairysphere in which households serve their own needs or
barter with neighbors.204 Regardless of how milk reaches consumer,
the system of dairy production rests on the stall behind many
villagers' homes in which the cow and her caretaker go through their
daily milking routine.
V. Conclusions: On Herds and Humans

201

Interview with Ralph M. (U.S. beef consultant to Ukraine-based beef start-up),
Nov. 14 2007.
202
Consumption of industrially processed milk as compared with household milk
was 3,829,820 tons of processed versus 3,414,460 tons in 2016. European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Ukraine's Milk Production Balance,
Table 4.6 Milk Balance (2016), at Milk Supply and Demand Balance System:
Public-Private Policy Dialogue in the Ukrainian Dairy Sector Project,
milkbalance.org.ua.
203
Field observation, Moloko vid Fermera, ul. Volodymyrska 38, Kyiv city, June
2019.
204
See text infra note 198 supra.
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Today, roughly 4 million small family dairy operations and
rural households produce 75% of Ukraine's dairy output, and they do
so almost exclusively milking by hand.205 Industrialization of food
production has not subsumed the dairysphere.
Without
romanticizing the situation, and acknowledging some of the systemic
problems inherent in human consumption of dairy, it is worth noting
that having most of the milk produced in small-scale household
operations in Ukraine has several environmental implications.
Experts decry the "inefficiency" of household milk production,206 its
average annual milk yield per cow at 4480 kg compared with 6025
kg per enterprise cow.207 However, with its "inefficient" household
dairy production, Ukraine has avoided some of the environmental ills
associated with modern dairy production elsewhere. Yield is lower
in part because dairy cattle feed more on pasturage than silage,208
giving Ukrainian dairying a lower carbon footprint. In addition,
pasturing cows over large tracts of former collective farm land also
means that manure is dispersed, fertilizing fallow fields, rather than
concentrated in the sewage ponds common in North American dairy
production.
In addition, milk production is dominated by individual
relationships between caretaker and cow. Milk cows are tended to
205

In 2017, enterprises produced 2,765,700 tons of milk while households
produced 7,514,800 tons. Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, supra note 168, at 26. A Dairy
Revival in Ukraine, Chemonics report, June 12, 2019,
https://chemonics.com/impact-story/a-dairy-revival-in-ukraine/ (reporting the 75%
figure). Other current estimates are that some 80% of Ukrainian milk production
comes from small-scale producers. USAID Report, Ukraine Dairy Coops Get
More Competitive: Improved processing, lower costs, more sales for dairy
farmers, https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/project-makesdairy-cooperatives-competitive.
206
See, e.g., USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – UP1824 – Dairy
and Products Annual (Oct. 16, 2018)
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filena
me=Dairy%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_10-16-2018.pdf
("Households practice a low-cost, low productivity approach").
207
Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, supra note 168, at 144.
208
See Phil Durst, Michigan State University Extension dairy educator, describing
feed as a factor in "quality" and yield of Ukrainian household milk production,
quoted in Addy Battel, Can Ukraine Regain Its Reputation as the Breadbasket?
Improving Dairy Cattle Efficiency on Former Collective Farms in Ukraine (Aug.
30, 2017), https://www.canr.msu.edu/news/can-ukraine-regain-its-reputation-asthe-breadbasket-improving-dairy-cattle-efficiency-on-former-collective-farms-inukraine. But regarding perceptions of "quality," see Gereles and Szöllösi, supra
note 167, at 72 ("There is widespread belief that household milk and dairy
products are 'organic,' healthier,' of 'higher quality,' or even 'safer' than industrially
processed products").
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by caretakers who, in most cases, care for four cows or fewer;209 they
not only know each cow's milk production norms, but her name, food
preferences, preferred milking style, tolerance for proximity to
strangers, need for warmth or preference for cool, how long milking
will take, how the cow should smell, the usual rate of her
breathing.210 The relationship between milkmaid and cow is more
intimate in some of its embodied and affective dimensions than
industrialized production allows.
Though socialism rendered the means of production a public
resource, I propose that connections between cow and caretaker, if
anything, grew stronger in the earliest days of collectivization of
agriculture in Ukraine. Gaining milk cows for shared use was one of
the first tangible benefits to the rural poor of the Communist Party's
collectivization campaign and the physical struggle against rural
smallholders, the so-called "kulaks." Famine that accompanied
collectivization in Ukraine intensified the bond between village and
cow. Milk, perishable and easily consumed, was less confiscable by
state authorities than grain stores. Rural Ukrainians that survived the
Famine understood milk's importance to their survival, and that
significance grew during the years of privation during World War II
and its aftermath. The insertion of science into agricultural
production may have extended into livestock feed but did not reach
extensively into the tactile relationship of milk production between
milkmaids and cows. Teams of milkmaids worked with state and
collective farms' jointly owned or managed herds, but milkmaids
specialized by subgroups and knew each cow with whom they
worked. For families that kept their own dairy cow, the bond was at
least as strong.
The relationship between caretaker and cow remained strong
during the period of dissolution of the U.S.S.R. Soviet structures -such as the command function of a command economy, the ethical
commitments of Party membership and socialist futures, and the
control exerted by incentives and monitoring systems -- dissolved.
209

71.1 % of rural households do not keep dairy cattle. 21.7% have only one cow;
5.9% have two; 0.9% have three; and only 0.4% have four or more. Serhiy Moroz,
Rural Households in Ukraine: Current State and Tendencies, 60 ECONOMICS OF
AGRICULTURE 565 (March 2017) at Table 4, Distribution of Rural Households, by
Number of Selected Types of Livestock (in %).
According to state statistics, in 2017, agricultural enterprises held 484,600 head of
cattle, compared with 1,624,300 held by households. The number held by
agricultural enterprises is 466,600 (as of 2018). The total number held by rural
households is 1,551,200 (2018). Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, supra note 168, at 144.
210
Field observation, Gruzenske village, Ukraine, September 2009, summer 2016,
May-November 2017.
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State ownership of property, the keystone feature of state socialism,
became a central problematic of the post-Soviet era. Amidst legal
incrementalism, parliamentarians debating and policy-makers taking
centipede steps towards divesting the state and introducing private
property ownership, some village assets were treated locally as up
for grabs. Beef cattle disappeared. Milkmaids, canny to the extent
to which milk provided a reserve for village sustenance and income
and emotionally invested in the cows, took matters into their own
hands to prevent the dairy herd from being "liquidated," monetized
and pocketed by one local opportunist. Milkmaids saved the village
herd by decollectivizing it. The social cohesion of dairymaids on the
local level has proved salient; the fact that this was not an organized,
national movement makes its patterning nationwide all the more
striking. "Privatization" in beef versus dairy thus appears in
contrasting forms, secretive and wealth-concentrating versus
transparent and wealth-distibuting.
Considering law and milk in Ukraine opens up several
insights. It reveals how, during the Soviet period, milk production
provided households with a reserve of calories, income, and power
within overarching collectivization of agricultural production. The
moral of the Soviet story, however, is not one of triumphant
individualism or hardy family holdouts. Rather, it shows how
household and individual practices found a place within collective
structures. Looking at the post-Soviet experience, the story of milk
and law in Ukraine reveals some of their continuities, as well as
micro-practices at work within the frameworks of national laws,
structures of international trade, global shifts in modes of power, and
the press of security concerns.
Multinational corporations,
increasingly involved in dairy processing in Ukraine, have both
reached into the daily routines of remote villagers and found their
limits; village norms are also reshaping corporate production. In
local performances of power, the dairysphere finds both the
dissolution of some forms of collective life and the reorganization of
daily life along the lines of new collectivities. Milk production also
reveals the pragmatic plays of gender dynamics within local disputes
and vast social transformations. Milk has remained a reservoir of
calories and a ground of social networks; its story shows the
resilience of intimate relationships between dairy cows and their
keepers and the political strength, untapped nationally but salient
locally, of dairy maids.

